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ABSTRACT 
 
Why do we notice one thing but not another?  Why does one person see something that 
another does not?  Change blindness describes a common failure to notice discontinuities 
across some disruption.  Inattentional blindness describes a failure to notice information while 
observers are focused on other information.  This dissertation summarizes research on both 
phenomena and on cognitive task performance, identifying variability between individuals in 
performance across tasks by alternating between literature reviews, descriptive analyses of two 
multivariate datasets, and theoretical discussion.  More specifically, Chapter One reviews the 
paradigmatic context of change blindness and inattentional blindness as was first published in 
Jensen, Yao, Street, & Simons (2012).  Chapter Two describes theory and evidence of 
attention-based individual differences in change blindness and inattentional blindness and 
concludes by discussing a contemporary visual noticing framework and its implications for 
individual difference predictions.  The third chapter describes methods and task-level results 
from a new individual differences study with multiple estimates of visual noticing, cognitive task 
performance, and personality.  Then, Chapter Four builds on previous visual noticing findings by 
describing consistencies observed in this new dataset across tasks, across analyses, and 
across studies.  Although visual noticing under some conditions (like intentional change 
detection) correlated with cognitive task measures, noticing during unexpected single trial 
scenarios was often more strongly related to personality differences.  In neither case were other 
measures strongly predictive of noticing.  The implications of these visual noticing findings are 
discussed at the end of Chapter Four (and are revisited in Chapter Seven).  Chapter Five 
provides an extended analysis of intentional change detection performance that examines 
consistency in intentional change detection across tasks, variability in accuracy and search 
times to find a change across trials of a flicker search task, and then describes response time 
differences and variability across prompts throughout the study.  For each analysis, the 
observed data patterns are discussed in the context of relevant research and theoretical 
frameworks.  Chapter Six provides an analysis of variability within individuals performance 
across three sessions of cognitive task data collected by Lee et al. (2012).  Intraindividual 
variability in performance, overall performance, and performance changes across the three 
sessions are discussed.  Finally, Chapter Seven discusses implications of observed variability in 
noticing and cognitive task performance for perception, attention, and cognition.   
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PREFACE 
 
We know from our own experiences in the world, from proverbial stories about large 
lurking predators, and from research that noticing information in our environment can be of 
critical importance in pivotal moments of life.  The importance of noticing anomalous 
information, of detecting changes, and of becoming aware of critical unexpected objects is self-
evident in hazardous extraordinary-case scenarios.  In less fatalistic situations, detecting 
physical or environmental changes and recognizing and responding to anomalous information 
remain pivotal moments in human cognition, awareness, and behavior in the complexity of the 
real world.  Our typical expectations about visual noticing are that other observers are likely to 
notice changes and new information, that they will detect what we know to be the critical 
information of interest (Levin & Angelone, 2008; Beck, Levin, & Angelone, 2007; Levin & Beck, 
2004, Levin et al., 2002; Levin et al., 2000; Scholl, Simons, & Levin, 2004).  However, upon 
inspection, our everyday experiences of our own and others’ behavior often reveal limitations in 
our abilities to notice information in the world.  For example, when we struggle to communicate 
the visual location of a distant or difficult to find target to a partner (say when trying to point out a 
reclusive animal in the environment), it can become frustratingly evident that people do not 
always and immediately see the same things.  We can observe a relationship between noticing 
and attention when we watch other beings interact in an environment (say when an observer 
startles upon seeing something that you have already spotted).  And, we use and manipulate 
the inferred limitations of others’ awareness when we misdirect or monitor their attention to 
conceal an action or an object (e.g., when moving to stow an item before it is noticed).  Despite 
our intuitions about peoples’ understanding of the stimuli in their environment, systematic 
observation reveals that humans are limited in what they notice about external stimuli in any 
particular moment. 
To study such behaviors systematically, researchers formalize these types of real-world 
situations into laboratory tasks and experimental paradigms that then inform areas of empirical 
research1.  Phenomena like change blindness and inattentional blindness are theoretical 
formalizations of situations that encompass more real-world scenarios like pilots noticing 
                                                
1 The three examples in the previous paragraph are explored in research on topics like collaborative 
visual search for camouflaged targets (e.g. Brennan, et al., 2008), attention capture (e.g. Most & Simons, 
2001; Yantis, 1993), and research on misdirection and magic (e.g., Kuhn, Amlani, & Rensink, 2008; 
Macknik et al., 2008).   
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unexpected runway obstructions during simulations (e.g., Haines, 1991) as well as more 
constrained laboratory tasks like detecting a change in the identity of one of a few objects on a 
computer screen across a delay (e.g., Mitroff, Simons, & Levin, 2004).  The central and robust 
finding across a range of real world and laboratory-based noticing studies is that people can fail 
to notice critical information2.  But, the surprising extent to which people fail to notice 
discrepancies can obscure a complimentary finding: that noticing is often variable in any given 
scenario (e.g. some observers notice what others do not).  In other words, not only are people 
less likely to notice critical information than many of us might expect, people do not always 
notice the same things in similar situations. Variability in responses is not unexpected in the 
domain of human behavior but it is striking in the context of our expectations that people should 
see what is in front of their eyes.  Variability is also a challenging reality for attempts to study 
visual noticing systematically3.   
A central goal of this dissertation is to better characterize and understand variability in 
visual noticing.  The central thesis of this dissertation is that patterns of observed variability in 
behavior (i.e. in visual noticing and in cognitive task performance) both between individuals and 
within individuals’ performance are critical dimensions of human behavior to understand and 
study.  To assess this premise, I review relevant research and theory, describe a new visual 
noticing study (analyzing individual differences in performance), and consider the variability 
observed in participant performance across an established dataset of multiple-session cognitive 
task performance.  In structure, the chapters of this dissertation alternate between theoretical 
review, descriptive and exploratory analysis of two multivariate datasets of cognitive task 
performance, and discussion.  In content, early chapters focus on visual noticing and individual 
differences while later chapters expand to considering variability and intraindividual variability in 
cognitive-task performance.  Summaries of the content of each chapter are provided in the 
remainder of this prologue. 
The first chapter of this dissertation is a reprint of Jensen, Yao, Street, & Simons (2012) 
and provides an overview of the inattentional and change blindness literatures in a parallel 
discussion of topics that span across the two research traditions.   The scope of the review is 
                                                
2 See Chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation for an extended review and discussion of the change blindness 
and inattentional blindness literatures. 
3 For example, when studying noticing of unexpected events or information, maintaining unexpectedness 
in an experimental context limits traditional methodological solutions to variability (like repeating scenarios 
and aggregating performance across instances). 
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relatively wide and begins by providing the historical context of the experimental paradigms 
encompassed by each literature.  The chapter includes discussion of theoretical similarities and 
differences between the experimental paradigms of change blindness and inattentional 
blindness as well as reviews of research on task manipulations and observer differences that 
co-vary with noticing in change detection and inattentional blindness contexts.  To over-simplify 
the findings of these two literatures into a single summary: in both research traditions, current 
evidence suggests that observers can fail to notice visual anomalies in a range of contexts but 
that we are most likely to notice information that is task-relevant, interesting, meaningful, and 
expected (i.e. information that is likely to be or have been attended).   
The combination of a theoretical link between attention and noticing and a general 
interest within cognitive psychology in attention as a possible individual difference measure has 
resulted in myriad hypothesized relationships between cognitive/attention abilities and noticing 
of anomalies under a range of controlled conditions.  The second chapter reviews a central 
prediction of individual differences in visual noticing, specifically, that attention-related cognitive 
differences between observers should predict relative noticing (i.e. who is most likely to notice 
some anomaly).   The chapter reviews recent individual difference findings in the study of 
intentional change detection and inattentional blindness, reporting that attention-related 
differences as measured by cognitive task performance do tend to correlate to intentional 
change detection performance, but do not reliably correlate to noticing in inattentional blindness 
contexts.  More generally, noticing of unexpected stimuli in such single trial contexts has been 
difficult to predict using any factors (including concurrent behavior and performance).  The 
chapter concludes with a description of a theoretical framework from the inattentional blindness 
literature that differentiates between central processing resources and the direction of attention, 
using that framework as a context to consider factors that might predict noticing.  Implications of 
this model for individual differences research in visual noticing are discussed, concluding with 
the observation that while a wide range of individual differences may be relevant to noticing, 
expression of those differences may not fall cleanly across important theoretical distinctions.   
There are possible rationales to explain why some observers might be more likely to 
notice visual anomalies, but few studies consider whether there are stable individual differences 
across noticing scenarios, analyses, and samples.  Chapter Three summarizes the methods 
and task-level results of a study of 196 observers in a single study session that included 
intentional change detection tasks, an inattentional blindness scenario, an incidental change 
detection scenario, and a magic illusion exposure and discusses calculated outcome variables.  
x 
Chapter Four describes analysis of individuals’ performance across these tasks and discusses 
consistency in individual differences in noticing.  Across these tasks, individual differences in 
noticing performance were modestly correlated to self-rated personality and task performance 
measures.  For intentional change detection, primary task performance was most strongly 
related to primary task performance on other cognitive tasks, particularly search performance.  
For the single trial noticing tasks, data patterns were variable but suggestive of potential 
consistencies in noticing related to self-rated personality and, in limited cases, to cognitive task 
performance.  The variability in an individual’s noticing performance across trials and scenarios 
was large relative to consistencies in performance.  In particular, individual performance in one 
noticing paradigm was not strongly predictive of noticing in another.  A central goal of this work 
was to assess reliability in visual noticing differences; therefore, the chapter also includes 
explicit discussion of consistency in findings across analyses and studies.  The conclusion of 
the chapter describes alternative explanations for the observed findings and provides a 
discussion of study implications and limitations.  
Looking for consistency in behavior during single trial scenarios is perhaps a quixotic 
goal, but visual noticing can also be approximated by other paradigms (like intentional search 
for changes to a scene) that allow repeatable trials (but that also influence other characteristics 
of noticing scenarios like observer expectations).  The study described in Chapter Four included 
three intentional change detection variants; analyses in Chapter Five explicitly consider 
consistency across these different intentional change detection tasks, observing that rank-order 
differences between participants across task are correlated but not strongly.  A second inquiry 
analyzes search for change during the flicker scene task by assessing speed and accuracy 
differences in performance.  The results of this inquiry suggest that variability in search times 
predict overall performance on the flicker task where observers who were most variable in the 
search times tended to have moderate but not high accuracy.  A brief discussion places these 
findings within the speed-accuracy tradeoff literature.  The final inquiry considers individual 
differences in average response times to non-time-pressured prompts across the study and 
finds common variance between response time measures and variability in response times, but 
those differences were not strongly related to change detection performance.  Previous findings 
and theories of observed relationships between response times and standard deviations are 
discussed and motivate the extended study of intraindividual variability described in Chapter Six. 
Intraindividual variability (or the variability within an individual’s performance) is often 
averaged out of data in research contexts, but findings from across disparate areas of 
xi 
psychology report large differences in intraindividual variability (for example, during 
development, in special populations, and with aging).  To further consider stability and 
variability, an extended analysis of the performance of 75 participants across three sessions of 
a cognitive battery from Lee et al., (2012) explored intraindividual variability in performance.  
Intraindividual variability was estimated by calculating standard deviations around accuracy and 
response times within conditions, blocks, and trial types.  Overall estimates of cognitive task 
performance and performance gains across sessions were also calculated and placed in the 
context of intraindividual variability.  Reliable individual-level differences in intraindividual 
variability across sessions were observed within but also across tasks.  Further analyses for this 
dataset and future research with additional studies are proposed.  The implications of these 
findings for research on individual differences in visual noticing for theories of human attention, 
cognition, and behavior are discussed.  
The concluding chapter of this dissertation provides a brief overview of the original 
contributions of this work, a summary of central findings and conclusions, a discussion of 
implications, and directions for future lines of research.  
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CHAPTER 1: CHANGE BLINDNESS AND INATTENTIONAL BLINDNESS1 
 
1.1 Abstract 
Change blindness and inattentional blindness are both failures of visual 
awareness.  Change blindness is the failure to notice an obvious change.  Inattentional 
blindness is the failure to notice the existence of an unexpected item.  In each case, we fail to 
notice something that is clearly visible once we know to look for it.  Despite similarities, each 
type of blindness has a unique background and distinct theoretical implications.  Here, we 
discuss the central paradigms used to explore each phenomenon in a historical context.  We 
also outline the central findings from each field and discuss their implications for visual 
perception and attention. In addition, we examine the impact of task and observer effects on 
both types of blindness as well as common pitfalls and confusions people make while studying 
these topics. 
 
1.2 Introduction 
Psychologists have identified a variety of failures of awareness, such as the attentional 
blink (Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992), repetition blindness (Kanwisher, 1987), and object 
masking (Pieron, 1925, Boynton & Kandell, 1957).  Here we focus on two cases in which people 
fail to “see” something right in front of their eyes: inattentional blindness and change blindness.  
Inattentional blindness is defined as a failure to notice an unexpected, but fully-visible item when 
attention is diverted to other aspects of a display.  Change blindness is the surprising failure to 
detect a substantial visual change.  Both types of blindness expose the startling mismatch 
between what we believe we will see and what we actually see (Levin & Angelone, 2008; Beck, 
Levin, & Angelone, 2007; Levin & Beck, 2004, Levin et al., 2002; Levin et al., 2000; Scholl, 
Simons, & Levin, 2004).  Despite their similar phenomenology—people miss something obvious 
despite looking right at it—change blindness and inattentional blindness have different etiologies 
                                                
1 This chapter was originally published by John Wiley and Sons as part of Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: 
Cognitive Science and is reprinted here with permission for the purposes of this dissertation thesis.   All 
rights are reserved.  
 
Jensen, M. W., Yao, R., Street, W. N., & Simons, D. J. (2011). Change blindness and inattentional 
blindness. WIREs Cognitive Science, 2, 529–546. DOI: 10.1002/wcs.130 
 
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.; License Number: 3124820571066 
 
2 
and different implications for visual perception, representation, and awareness.  In this chapter, 
we review the history of each phenomenon and discuss similarities and differences in their 
theoretical implications. 
 
1.3 A Brief History of Inattentional Blindness and Change Blindness 
Although inattentional blindness and change blindness are often studied together, the 
two phenomena grew out of distinct research traditions. Both had precursors in the early history 
of psychology, but we focus here on the research traditions that led to modern research on such 
failures of awareness.  
1.3.1 Inattentional blindness  
The term “inattentional blindness” was coined by Arien Mack and Irv Rock in their book 
by that name (Mack & Rock, 1998), but the phenomenon has its origins in a much older 
literature on selective attention (e.g., Broadbent, 1958, Treisman, 1960, 1964, Moray, 1959, 
Cherry, 1953).  Much of the early work on selective attention adopted a task known as dichotic 
listening in which subjects focused attention on one auditory stream of information while 
ignoring a second.  Often, the two streams were presented to different ears, and subjects were 
asked to “shadow” or repeat each word or sound presented to the attended ear as they heard it.  
These early studies focused on whether unattended information could be processed, and if so, 
how richly.  After subjects performed the task, they often were queried about unexpected 
information presented to the “unattended” ear. For example, while subjects are shadowing a 
story or sequence of words being played to their right ear, experimenters might unexpectedly 
play the subject’s name to their left ear (see Wood & Cowan, 1995 for a recent example).  If 
subjects notice their own name but not other less-important stimuli, that would provide evidence 
for partial processing of the unattended speech stream.  To somewhat oversimplify the results of 
this literature, subjects typically do not notice the semantic content of the unattended stream, 
although they do notice changes to certain physical properties.  For example, subjects often 
don’t notice when the language in the unattended stream changes (Treisman, 1964d), but they 
do notice when the speaker changes from male to female (Cherry, 1953, Treisman & Riley, 
1969).  Critically, subjects also occasionally notice important stimuli like their own name in the 
unattended stream (Moray, 1959; Wood & Cowan, 1995). 
Much of the selective listening literature focused on the kind of information that people 
can notice in the unattended stream.  In particular, evidence of semantic processing in the 
unattended stream (like people hearing their own name or other semantic information) was often 
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interpreted as evidence that information can be processed without attention. However, that 
conclusion might not be justified.  The selective listening task (and as we will see, inattentional 
blindness tasks as well) is ill-suited to the study of such implicit processing because it is difficult 
to verify that subjects devoted no attention to the purportedly unattended stream (see Holender, 
1986). Subjects might occasionally focus attention on that stream, or shadowing in the attended 
stream might be spotty or incomplete.  However, evidence for processing of unattended 
information in these tasks is of secondary importance to the primary finding in the selective 
listening literature: People typically do not notice information in the unattended stream, even 
when that information is unexpected, distinctive, or semantically meaningful.  More recent work 
on inattentional blindness builds on this failure of awareness.  
Convinced that selective listening effects were not modality specific, Ulric Neisser and 
his colleagues designed a visual analog of dichotic listening known as the selective looking 
paradigm.  The studies were designed to explore the nature of focused visual attention:  Do 
people focus attention on regions of space, taking in everything falling within the attentional 
spotlight, or do people focus attention on objects?  If attention is focused on objects rather than 
space, then people might miss unattended objects appearing in the same location as the 
attended objects.  To test this hypothesis, Neisser and colleagues filmed two separate events 
and then combined them into a single display using a half-silvered mirror.  In the composite 
display, all of the actors and events were partially transparent and overlapping, occupying the 
same locations on screen.  In perhaps the best-known example, one video contained people 
passing a basketball and the other showed two people playing a hand-slapping game (Neisser 
& Becklen, 1975).  Observers were asked either to monitor the ball passes or the hand slaps, 
ignoring the other video. As with dichotic listening paradigms, subjects could attend selectively 
to one video and ignore the other (Neisser & Becklen, 1975), even though in this case, the 
events occupied the same locations in space.  In addition, just as in the dichotic listening 
literature, subjects often missed an unexpected event in the unattended stream.  For example, 
when subjects were counting passes, they failed to notice when the people playing the hand 
slapping game stopped playing and shook hands (Neisser & Becklen, 1975; Neisser, 1979).  
Alternatively, those watching the hand slapping game didn’t notice when the basketball 
disappeared from the ball passing game.  Critically, these unexpected events were obvious to 
observers who weren’t performing a task that required focused attention.   
The selective looking task extended beyond the original designs of the selective listening 
tasks by allowing multiple information streams to be superimposed in space.  In a series of 
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striking demonstrations, Neisser and colleagues superimposed two separate videos of people 
passing a basketball.  In one video, the players wore white and in the other they wore black (the 
players were actually the same three people in both cases).  Subjects were asked to count the 
passes in one of the videos (e.g., by the players wearing white) and to ignore the passes by the 
other team, pressing a key each time they saw a pass.  At some point during the trial, a woman 
unexpectedly walked through the scene carrying an open umbrella.  After the task, subjects 
were asked whether they had noticed anything other than the players, and 79% missed the 
umbrella woman (Neisser, 1979).  
Later replications tested alternative explanations for these apparent selective attention 
effects in vision.  For instance, the failure to notice the umbrella woman could be due to memory 
limitations: Subjects actually see the umbrella woman but forget about her appearance by the 
time they are asked if anything unusual occurred.  If true, increasing the amount of time after the 
unexpected content should decrease reported noticing. However, observers were no more likely 
to report noticing the umbrella woman when asked immediately after she appeared than after 
viewing an additional 30 seconds of the overlaid videos (Becklen & Cervone, 1983).  
Alternatively, observers who fail to notice the umbrella woman may never have fixated the 
region with the unexpected content.  In this case, a failure to notice the umbrella woman would 
be evidence for a location-based attentional spotlight but not selective attention.  But, observers 
noticed the umbrella woman equally often when maintaining fixation at a central point she 
always crossed as when free viewing (Littman & Becklen, 1976).  Selective attention effects in 
vision might also be unique to dynamic displays or an artifact of motion processing.  However, 
participants can selectively attend to one of two superimposed line drawings or an afterimage 
projected onto geometric figures.  As with selective listening, observers often fail to later 
recognize information in the unattended image (Goldstein & Fink, 1981; Rock, Schauer, Halper, 
1976).  Taken together, such studies show that attention can be focused on objects rather than 
spatial locations; even when unattended information appears in the center of an attended 
region, people often fail to notice it.  
Despite the surprising nature of these results and the magnitude of the effects, few other 
laboratories built on these early findings, and research on selective looking all but disappeared 
by the mid-1980s.   In part, this hiatus from research on inattentional blindness resulted from the 
technical challenges of conducting the research in the era before camcorders and digital editing, 
and in part it resulted from a shift in the field of cognitive psychology toward more computer-
based attention tasks.  Although the findings were covered in many cognitive psychology 
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textbooks of the era, they did not fit easily into the zeitgeist of the time (Most et al, 2005).  
The original results were revisited nearly 20 years later in a set of replications and 
extensions of the selective looking method (Simons & Chabris, 1999).  The more recent studies 
used digital editing to create the same superimposition effect that Neisser had achieved using a 
mirror, and they replicated the original results.  When subjects monitored the passes made by 
one of two basketball teams, approximately 42% did not see the “umbrella woman.”  Many also 
failed to notice a woman in a full-body gorilla suit passing through the scene.  Unlike the original 
studies, the more recent studies examined whether the failure to notice an unexpected object 
resulted from the unnatural appearance of the partially transparent displays by recording all of 
the action in a single camera shot.  As before, when people were focused on counting the 
passes by one of the teams, they often failed to notice an unexpected gorilla or umbrella 
woman.  Even when the gorilla stopped mid-frame, faced the camera, and thumped it’s chest, 
approximately half of the viewers failed to notice it. Additional conditions showed that noticing 
rates were even lower when the monitoring task was more difficult.   
The advantage of the selective looking paradigm lies in its realistic and dynamic nature, 
allowing greater generalization to the real world.  For example, the selective looking paradigm 
easily translates to real world analogues like driving while holding cell phone conversations. Like 
other selective looking situations, drivers must attend to driving- related information while 
ignoring distracting visual information.  When executing an additional attention-demanding task 
(like talking on a cell phone), unattended visual information is less likely to reach awareness.  
For example, drivers talking on a cell phone are less likely to notice a car breaking in front of 
them, recognize road signs or billboards, or see traffic signals (Strayer & Drews, 2007; Strayer, 
Drews & Johnston, 2003; Strayer & Johnston, 2001).   In a driving simulator, drivers talking on a 
cell phone are also more likely to crash into a breaking car (Strayer et al., 2003).  One limitation 
of selective looking tasks, however, is that it is difficult to systematically vary the nature of the 
displays, as every study requires new videos or simulations.  
During the 1990s, another paradigm emerged as the standard way to study inattentional 
blindness (Mack & Rock, 1998).  In this task, participants make a judgment about a static 
display, such as identifying the longer arm of a briefly presented cross (Rock et al, 1992; Mack 
& Rock, 1998).  On a critical trial, an unexpected item also appears in the display, and then 
subjects are asked whether they saw anything that hadn’t been present in earlier displays.  
When participants noticed the unexpected item, they typically also knew its location and color 
(Rock et al, 1992).  However, as in the selective looking task, 25-75% of subjects failed to notice 
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the unexpected item entirely.   
Even when the unexpected object was unique in the display—a bright red square—many 
subjects missed it.  In their seminal book, Mack and Rock described an extensive series of 
studies using this task and its variants to explore inattentional blindness and the factors leading 
to noticing or missing of unexpected objects.  The flexibility of this task and the ease of 
implementing it allow for more systematic study of the factors underlying of inattentional 
blindness (Mack & Rock, 1998;  Newby & Rock, 1998; Gibson & Peterson, 2001: Koivisto, 
Hyona, & Revonsuo, 2004; Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007).  Static inattentional blindness tasks 
are less naturalistic than selective looking tasks because they use short presentations and 
sparse displays, but the pattern of results is similar to those from the more naturalistic video-
based tasks.  
The third primary task used to study inattentional blindness combines the benefits of a 
dynamic display with the control of a laboratory task (Most et al, 2000; Most et al, 2001).  In this 
computer-based task, simple shapes or letters move around a computer display, and on a 
critical trial, an unexpected object moves across the display.  In most cases, participants count 
the number of times one set of shapes bounces off of the edges of the window, and on a critical 
trial, an unexpected item (generally a cross) moves across the screen.  Participants then report 
whether they noticed anything other than the shapes on that trial. As with the static inattentional 
blindness task and the selective looking studies, many people fail to notice the unexpected item 
(Most et al, 2001).  Additional dynamic tracking experiments examined factors that might predict 
noticing, including proximity of unexpected object to task (Most et al, 2000), similarity of the 
unexpected object to the attended and ignored items (Most et al, 2001), the contents of the 
observer’s attentional set (Most et al, 2005), and individual differences (Simons & Jensen, 
2009).  
All inattentional blindness tasks (and their real-world analogues) share the following 
characteristics.  First, the observer is engaged in some attention-demanding task, which we call 
the primary task.  The primary task can be anything, as long as it requires focused attention. 
Second, each task involves an unexpected event that occurs while the observer carries out the 
primary task.  The unexpected event should be obvious to people who are not engaged in the 
primary attention-demanding task. The event must also be immediately identifiable as 
something new, distinctive, or unusual so that people are likely to report it when asked.  Finally, 
the critical event must be truly unexpected.  When events are expected, we allocate attentional 
resources differently between the primary task and the critical event, which makes interpreting 
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the role of attention in noticing more difficult. That is one reason why inattentional blindness 
studies of all types typically have just one critical trial.  Once the experimenter asks a subject if 
they had noticed anything unusual or unexpected, subjects will subsequently look for such 
events, invalidating the method as a way to study unattended objects.  
1.3.2 Change blindness  
The term “change blindness” was coined by Ronald Rensink and colleagues (Rensink et 
al, 1997) to describe the surprising failure to notice large changes to photographs when those 
changes occurred during a brief visual disruption.  Just like inattentional blindness, change 
blindness originated in older literatures. Here we distinguish change blindness from other 
examples of failed change detection based on a somewhat subjective criterion: Is the extent of 
change detection failure counter-intuitive or surprising.  Although change detection has been 
used as a task for decades, change blindness refers specifically to the failure to detect 
surprisingly large changes, often, but not always, to natural scenes.  
Much of the current change blindness literature originated in the study of transsaccadic 
integration, the ability to combine information acquired from separate glances into a unified 
representation; the visual system must preserve some information across saccadic eye 
movements in order to build and maintain a coherent representation of our world. Research on 
transsaccadic integration sought to understand what information is preserved and how it is 
integrated over time.  Much of the work on transsaccadic integration came from studies of eye 
movements in reading (Erdman & Dodge, 1898; Rayner, 1975).  For example, researchers 
might limit the visual information available to a few letters or words at the center of gaze and 
systematically vary how many letters were visible for upcoming words (McConkie & Rayner, 
1975).   The idea was to explore how previews of upcoming information facilitated reading.  In 
some cases, the studies adopted change detection as a tool: experimenters changed words 
while people were saccading to them to see if the change affected reading speed or 
comprehension (Rayner & Kaiser, 1978).  If the change did affect reading, then the pre-change 
information must have been represented and used for visual integration.  If the change had no 
effect, then that information might not be integrated across glances at the display.  In general, 
these studies revealed substantial change blindness across saccades.  
For example, participants reading lines of mixed case text (e.g. “The fLoRiDa 
EvErGlAdEs”) do not notice when all the letters change case (e.g. “tHe FlOrIdA eVeRgLaDeS”) 
during an eye movement. Observers experience no disruption in reading and do not report 
noticing the changes at all.  The experimenters themselves could only verify that a change had 
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occurred by intentionally remembering the original case of the letters for comparison after a 
saccade (McConkie & Zola, 1979). Across many such studies, changes during eye movements 
go unnoticed and are minimally disruptive to reading, word naming, or picture naming 
(McConkie, Zola, Blanchard & Wolverton, 1982; Pollatsek, Rayner & Collins, 1984; Rayner 
McConkie & Zola, 1980). 
 Interest in change blindness as a topic of study in its own right grew as demonstrations 
of the phenomenon began using photographs and videos as stimuli.  Much of the current 
interest in the phenomenon can be traced to a single conference presentation by John Grimes, 
a student of George McConkie’s, in 1991 (Grimes, 1996).  In his experiment, subjects viewed 
photos on a gaze-contingent display, and as subjects scanned the image, the original image 
was swapped with a changed version during a saccade. In Grimes’s experiment, subjects often 
failed to notice substantial changes such as two people on a bench exchanging heads.  In his 
conference presentation, Grimes showed some of the same image sequences to illustrate the 
sorts of changes he used.  The subset of people in the audience who happened to saccade 
during a change, failed to notice the change just like participants in the study.  That 
demonstration of change blindness inspired a number of researchers to seek ways of inducing 
change blindness that did not require expensive eye tracking equipment.  
In perhaps the best-known approach to studying change blindness, an original and 
changed image alternate back and forth, separated by a brief blank screen.  Under these “flicker 
task” conditions, subjects often need multiple alternations of the original and changed images to 
localize the change (Rensink et al, 1997).  Earlier research on change detection had used a 
“one-shot” task in which observers view an original display, a blank, and then the changed 
display (e.g., Simons, 1996).  Unlike the flicker task, though, the one-shot task did not provide a 
rich phenomenological experience of change blindness.  In the flicker task, subjects feel that 
they are searching the scene for the change; once it is found, they cannot imagine that they 
missed it for so long—the change becomes obvious once they know where it is.  This 
experience of change blindness followed by change detection highlighted the surprising extent 
of change blindness.  And, as we noted, it is this surprise that distinguishes change blindness 
demonstrations from other failures of change detection.  
One-shot tasks share some commonalities with the flicker task, but differ in theoretically 
important ways.  In a standard flicker task, observers can focus attention on individual objects or 
small sections of the display at a time. By moving from location to location, they can hold 
smaller sections of the image in memory to compare across the blank.  In contrast, a one-shot 
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task requires an observer hold as much of the pre-change display in memory as possible to 
increase the odds of detecting the target.  As a result, the one-shot task is often used to test the 
capacity of visual memory for scenes (e.g., Luck & Vogel, 1997; Hollingworth, 2004; Hyun, 
Woodman, Vogel, Hollingworth, & Luck, 2009). 
Although much of the modern empirical study of change blindness has its roots in the 
literature on visual integration, it also took inspiration from more anecdotal analyses of motion 
picture perception (see Levin & Simons, 2000).  Filmmakers are well aware that people often fail 
to notice continuity errors, mistakes in which an object or person unintentionally changes from 
one shot to the next (Kuleshov & Kuleshov, 1974; Hochberg, 1986; Langley, 2005).  Such errors 
are an almost inevitable consequence of modern film editing techniques in which separate shots 
are combined after the fact.  Although many books on film errors have been published, relatively 
few laboratory experiments explored the extent of blindness to film errors.  In the mid-1990s, a 
series of studies created a set of simple films with intentional editing mistakes and showed that 
subjects reliably fail to notice major changes that occurred across film cuts (Levin & Simons, 
1997).  In fact, nearly two-thirds of subjects failed to notice when the only actor in a brief movie 
was replaced by a different person during a brief action sequence (Levin & Simons, 1997).  
Such effects generalize to real world situations as well. In one study, a researcher asked an 
unsuspecting pedestrian for directions, and during the conversation, two confederates carrying a 
door walked between the researcher and pedestrian.  During the brief obstruction, one of the 
“workers” switched places with the experimenter and continued the conversation as if nothing 
had happened.  Half of the subjects had no idea that their conversation partner had changed 
(Simons and Levin, 1998).  There is additional evidence for change blindness during a number 
of real world tasks, including driving (Shinoda, Hayhoe, & Shrivastava, 2001; Wallis & Bultoff, 
2000), naval command monitoring tasks (Divita, Obermayer, & Nugent, 2004), object sorting 
and reproduction (Aivar, Hayhoe, Chizk, & Mruczek, 2005, Triesch, Ballard, Hayhoe, Sullivan, 
2003), flight simulations (Nikolic & Sarter, 2001) and making tea (Tatler, 2001), among others 
(Varakin, Levin & Fidler, 2004).  
Real-world studies are often like one-shot tasks in that the change only occurs once. 
However, both the flicker and the one-shot tasks typically are “intentional” tasks in that subjects 
know that a change will take place and they actively search for it (Simons, 2000).  In contrast, 
most video-based and real-world studies are “incidental” change detection tasks in which 
subjects do not anticipate a change.  Such tasks are better suited to examining what subjects do 
by default under more naturalistic situations.   Subjects generally show some degree of change 
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blindness whether or not they actively search for a change, and many of the same theoretical 
principles apply to these various task types.  
 Change detection occurs naturally when a change draws attention but often fails when it 
does not.  Most visual changes, when they occur abruptly, produce a luminance signal at the 
change location.  For example, a yellow ball rolling across a street produces an easily 
detectable change in luminance as well as a motion signal.  In an otherwise static scene, such 
luminance signals “pop out ” and capture attention.  When signals are masked or overwhelmed 
by other luminance changes, though, change blindness often ensues.  A variety of stimuli and 
events create a large enough disruption to mask change signals: saccades (Grimes, 1996; 
Hollingworth & Henderson, 2002; Bridgeman et al.,1975), color and luminance transients 
(Arrington, Levin, & Varakin, 2006), blank screen interruptions (Rensink et al., 1997), or 
“mudsplashes” (O'Regan et al., 1999) all impede localization of the change.  Interruptions that 
conceal the occurrence of a change, such as motion picture cuts (Levin & Simons, 1997) or 
visual occlusion (Simons & Levin, 1998) also induce change blindness.  Change blindness also 
occurs when the change occurs too slowly (e.g., by a gradual fade) to generate a perceptible 
motion signal (Simons, Fraconeri, and Reimer, 2000).  Although not the focus of this review, 
failures to detect changes occur in audition (e.g., Eramudugolla et al, 2005; Vitevitch, 2003) and 
touch (e.g., Gallace, Tan, & Spence, 2006; Auvray et al, 2008) as well. In all such cases, 
observers miss the change because it does not attract attention to the change automatically.  
Instead, people must intentionally search for the change by scanning the scene, encoding 
elements into memory, and comparing what they remember to what they see at a later point.  
Failure to focus attention on a change precludes awareness of it, but inattention alone 
cannot account for change blindness. Change detection can fail even when people focus 
attention directly on the object that changes both before and after the change.  For instance, 
nearly two-thirds of observers fail to notice a change to the identity of the only actor in a brief 
motion picture (Levin & Simons, 1997) and about half miss a change to a conversation partner 
(Simons & Levin, 1998).  People also miss changes to the only object in a simple animation, 
provided that the object can change in a number of different ways (e.g., Williams & Simons, 
2000).  When changes are introduced during a blink, people miss them over 40% of the time 
even when looking directly at a change location (O’Regan et al., 2000).  In all these cases, 
people focus attention on the changing object, but fail to detect the change.  Change blindness, 
then, cannot merely be explained as a failure to attend to a changing item.  
Successful change detection requires five distinct steps, and failure at any step leads to 
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change blindness: (1) Direct attention to the change location. (2) Encode into memory what was 
at the target location before the change.  (3) Encode what is at the target location after the 
change.  (4) Compare what you represented from the target location before the change to what 
was there after the change.  (5) Consciously recognize the discrepancy.  
Much of the change blindness literature examines evidence of failure in relation to these 
steps in order to address a broader issue:  what can change blindness tell us about the 
completeness (or sparseness) of visual representations?  
Several mechanisms for change blindness have been proposed in the literature.  First, 
the post-change stimulus could overwrite or disrupt access to the pre-change stimulus (e.g., 
Rensink et al, 1997; Levin, Simons, Angelone, & Chabris, 2002; Beck & Levin, 2003).  In this 
view, change blindness occurs because the first representation is unavailable for comparison.  
Second, the pre-change representation might never be encoded into memory in the first place 
(e.g., Noë et al., 2000, O'Regan and Noë, 2001; O'Regan, 1992; Gibson, 1986).  In this view, 
our representations of our visual world are inherently sparse and incomplete; the human visual 
system does not store information about our surroundings to build mental representations, but 
accesses that information from the external world as necessary (O’Regan, 1992).  Change 
blindness, then, occurs because there is no stored information to compare to a current view.  
Third, subjects might encode the pre-change display but never bother to compare their 
representation to the post-change display.  In this case, change blindness results not from a 
representation failure but from a comparison failure (Scott-Brown & Orbach, 2000; Mitroff, 
Simons, & Levin, 2004; Hollingworth 2003).  In most cases of change blindness, the underlying 
mechanism is indeterminate, and change blindness may reflect a combination of representation 
and comparison failures.  Moreover, none of these mechanisms likely applies to all examples of 
change blindness.  
A few experiments have documented evidence that change blindness can result from 
comparison failures rather than representation failures.  In one study, an experimenter 
approached a pedestrian to ask for direction to a gymnasium.  During their interaction, a group 
of confederates walked past and removed a basketball the experimenter had been holding.  
Most people didn’t notice the change, but when asked specifically if the experimenter had been 
holding something, they spontaneously remembered that she had been holding a red-and white 
basketball (Simons et al., 2002).  If the pre-change scene were overwritten or never 
represented, subjects would be unable to recall the pre-change state of the object, even when 
guided toward it. 
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These pre-change representations may influence behavior even when a change is not 
consciously detected.  For instance, observers tend to fixate changed items longer than 
unchanged items even when they do not report detecting the change (Hollingworth Williams, & 
Henderson, 2001, Hollingworth & Henderson, 2002).  And, after failing to detect a change to an 
array of letters, participants later show priming for degraded letters that were pre or post-change 
items (Hollingworth Williams, & Henderson, 2001, Hollingworth & Henderson, 2002). 
Although these studies show that people may retain some information about the pre-
change object, they do not directly test whether change blindness can occur despite internal 
representations of both the pre- and post-change objects.  In another set of experiments (Mitroff, 
Simons, & Levin, 2004), subjects tried to detect a change to an array of objects. Following their 
change detection performance on each trial, they were given a forced choice between two 
objects and had to decide which had been in the display.  They completed the forced choice 
task for one object in the pre-change display and one in the post-change display.  
Even when unaware of the change, subjects recognized the pre- and post-change 
objects significantly more frequently than chance. Similarly, in an incidental change detection 
study, subjects viewing videos with person or item changes across a film cut were able to select 
pre-change items from a photo lineup at well above chance. Whether or not they had detected 
the change, participants were equally able to recognize the pre-change items (Angelone et al, 
2003).  In another study, subjects monitoring and responding to objects experienced high rates 
of change blindness but were nevertheless able to perform well above chance in recognition 
tests for those objects (Varakin & Levin, 2006).  In each of these studies, subjects had in fact 
encoded objects at the target location, even when blind to the change. Therefore, the failure had 
to result from a failure to compare those representations rather than a failure to encode the 
objects in the first place.  
Although change blindness may often be the result of a failure to compare mental 
representations, some overwriting or disruption of initial representations also occurs.  In some 
cases, recognition of pre-change items is better for detected changes than undetected changes.  
In the forced choice recognition task described above, recognition performance for undetected 
changes was always better than chance.  However, observers were 20% less accurate when 
recognizing objects from undetected changes than from detected changes (Mitroff, et al, 2004).  
In a similar study with a variety of object arrays (from 3-16 objects), subjects were better able to 
recognize post-change items than pre-change items.  Overall accuracy declined as set size 
increased, but pre-change recognition remained 10-40% worse than post-change item 
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recognition (Beck & Levin, 2003).  Similarly, when observers failed to notice an experimenter 
turn into a different person after ducking behind a counter, they were also unable to identify the 
pre-change person in a photo line-up.  Observers who noticed the change were 40% more 
accurate at identifying the pre-change experimenter (Levin et al 2002).  In another real-world 
study, observers who missed a change performed at chance on a pre-change and post-change 
recognition task.  However, a subset of subjects who provided high confidence ratings of their 
recognition performed well above chance on the recognition task.  In other words, change 
blindness may result from comparison failure for some subjects and a representation failure for 
others (Varakin, Levin & Collins, 2007).  In general, poor memory for pre-change items suggests 
that change blindness may sometimes result from impoverished, non- existent, or over-written 
pre-change representations. 
Ultimately, change blindness is the single behavioral consequence of a variety of failures 
in the change detection process.  Consequently, change blindness on its own provides little 
information about the nature of our visual representations.  However, successful change 
detection does require representation, so change detection tasks provide a useful tool for 
understanding visual attention and memory.  
1.3.3 Synopsis 
Despite their disparate origins, both inattentional and change blindness research surged 
in the 1990s with the advent of new technologies. Advances in photograph and film editing 
made it easier to study change detection and inattentional blindness using complex and realistic 
stimuli. Likewise, new computer technology allowed for the easy capture, manipulation, and 
presentation of images.  Such naturalistic stimuli, coupled with tasks designed to illustrate 
failures of awareness, permitted subjects to experience their own failures of awareness more 
vividly, highlighting the surprising nature of both inattentional and change blindness.  
Many people, expert psychologists included, do not always properly distinguish 
inattentional blindness from change blindness.  After all, both phenomena refer to a failure to 
perceive some perceptual event that appears in plain sight.  The distinction, though subtle, is 
important.  Inattentional blindness occurs for unexpected objects or events that become trivially 
apparent once the subject knows to look for them.  Change blindness, on the other hand, can 
persist through active search for the target object/event, with full attention devoted to detection, 
and regardless of whether or not the subject knows for what to search.  Furthermore, change 
blindness necessarily involves memory (in order to encode and compare pre- and post-change 
stimuli), whereas inattentional blindness does not. 
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 Inattentional blindness is similar to change blindness in that people fail to “see” an 
object.  However, unlike change blindness, inattentional blindness occurs while attention is 
engaged in some demanding task (Mack & Rock, 1998).   Moreover, where change blindness 
reflects an inability to identify how the visual world changes over time, inattentional blindness 
refers to the failure to notice that a fully visible item exists at all.  
A good rule of thumb for distinguishing instances of inattentional and change blindness 
is the number of displays necessary to induce the phenomenon.  Change blindness requires two 
images: the visual state before the change occurs and after.  Inattentional blindness, on the 
other hand, requires only one: an image in which the target stimulus appears.  
The two phenomena have different theoretical implications as well.  Change blindness 
shows how attention is necessary but not sufficient for visual awareness.   People can miss 
changes to attended objects if they don’t focus on and compare the features that changed.  
Inattentional blindness demonstrates that attention can serve as a filter for irrelevant 
information; items that do not receive attention typically do not reach awareness.  More 
importantly, unexpected but distinctive objects do not automatically attract attention. 
For the remainder of this chapter, we consider some of the salient similarities and 
differences between these phenomena, separating them into effects of the tasks and effects of 
individual or group differences in the observers. We end by identifying some of the common 
pitfalls in studying each phenomenon.  
 
1.4 Effects of the Task  
Change blindness occurs with a wide range of stimuli and can be induced with a variety 
of visual disruptions (e.g., blinks, saccades, movement).  Likewise, inattentional blindness 
occurs as long as observers engage in an attention-demanding primary task and an unexpected 
event occurs.  Nevertheless, some aspects of the task can alter blindness rates.  Here, we 
review task characteristics that influence change detection and noticing of unexpected objects.  
1.4.1 Inattentional blindness  
Detection of an unexpected stimulus depends on the likelihood of that stimulus attracting 
attention.  Whether or not a stimulus draws attention depends in part on the resources the 
subject has available to them when performing the task and in part on how a subject identifies 
which stimuli are to be attended.  Therefore, the likelihood of noticing an unexpected event 
varies with both the difficulty of the primary task and the similarity of unexpected object to task-
relevant items.  
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More difficult tasks demand more attentional resources, leaving less available for 
unexpected object detection.  For example, observers were less likely to notice the gorilla in the 
selective looking paradigm when keeping separate running totals of bounce passes and aerial 
passes than when just keeping a single count of the total number of passes (Simons & Chabris, 
1999).  In a static inattentional blindness task, noticing rates were lower when judging line 
lengths than when performing an easier color discrimination task (Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 
2007).  Finally, in a dynamic tracking task, monitoring faster moving objects resulted in less 
noticing than when the objects moved more slowly (Simons & Jensen, 2009).  Together, these 
results show that when the primary task requires more attentional resources, unexpected events 
are less likely to reach awareness.  
In order to selectively attend to the primary task, the visual system must identify task- 
relevant items and ignore distracters by using spatial, featural, or semantic information. 
Consequently, unexpected objects that share features with task-relevant items are more likely to 
be processed. For example, subjects notice unexpected events more often if they appear near 
attended items or locations (Mack & Rock, 1998; Newby & Rock, 1998; Most et al, 2000). 
Although spatial proximity contributes to noticing, observers still fail to notice unexpected 
objects that move through the center of the display and cross fixation (Simons & Chabris, 1999; 
Most et al, 2001; Memmert, 2006; Neisser, 1979).  Even when subjects are monitoring how 
many times the attended items touch a line through the center of the display, only 47% of 
observers noticed when an unexpected object moved directly along the line (Most et al, 2000).  
And people can miss unexpected objects in both the static and dynamic tasks even when they 
fixate them directly (Koivisto, Hyona, & Revonsuo, 2004; Memmert, 2006).  Spatial proximity 
improves unexpected item detection, but location alone does not constrain noticing.  This is 
consistent with evidence for object-based attention from Neisser’s selective looking paradigm.  
Overlap in feature dimensions between the primary task and unexpected stimulus also 
increase noticing.  For instance, observers notice the black gorilla more often when tracking 
black-shirted players than when tracking white-shirted players (Simons & Chabris, 1999).  In 
dynamic tracking tasks, similarity improves unexpected object detection across several feature 
dimensions like luminance, shape, and race of faces (Most et al., 2005).  For example, when 
attending to black and white circles, 86% of observers notice a grey circle (same shape).  
However, when attending to black and white squares, only 7% of observers notice the grey 
circle. In a driving simulator, observers notice an unexpected motorcyclist more often when it is 
the same color as task-relevant road signs than when it is a different color (Most & Astur, 2007).  
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And, when attending to letters, observers are more likely to notice the appearance of another 
letter than a circle (Koivisto, Hyona, & Revonsuo, 2004).  In sum, observers develop an attention 
set for the objects and features they must monitor and are more likely to detect unexpected 
objects that fall within that set (Most et al, 2005).  Similarity between attended and unexpected 
items increases the likelihood that the unexpected item will be erroneously tagged as task-
relevant, receive additional processing, and reach awareness.  
1.4.2 Change Blindness  
Given that change detection requires adequate representation of the pre- and post-
change scenes as well as a comparison, any task characteristics that influence the richness of 
the representation or the tendency to compare representations should affect detection.  The 
semantic importance of the changing object appears to have the biggest influence on the 
likelihood the subject will attend, and therefore notice, the change.  Changes to objects most 
people consider to be of central interest in the scene tend to be detected faster and more 
accurately than changes to more marginally important objects, regardless of the size or 
magnitude of the change (Rensink et al, 1997).  Furthermore, the detection benefit for 
interesting items occurs for upright images, but not inverted ones (Kelley, Chun, & Chua, 2003).  
Because inverting an image maintains low-level visual features while impairing the ability to 
perceive the global context and semantic content, the effect of semantic importance must be 
due to higher-level factors. Visual salience of the target object is less critical. Subjects are more 
likely to detect changes to regions other humans judge to appear salient but not to regions that 
are salient as defined by computer vision (Stirk & Underwood, 2007; Wright, 2001).  Ratings of 
salience apparently incorporate aspects of the scene that are not captured by current salience 
models (e.g., Itti & Koch, 2000).  
Devoting more attention to encoding the changing item should and does similarly 
improve detection (Brady et al., 2009, Hollingworth & Henderson, 2002).  Additional encoding 
time can increase the fidelity of memory representations of pre-change items, and better 
representations, in turn, improve the probability that an observer will maintain the necessary 
information to detect change. The benefit of better representations may be long lasting as well.  
As long as visual information is originally well-encoded, visual memory can maintain fidelity for 
at least 2,500 objects (Brady et al. 2008).  Consistent with demonstrations of high long-term 
fidelity for visual representations, change blindness rates do not increase with longer lags 
between encoding and change detection (Hollingworth, 2004; Simons, 1996; Rensink et al, 
1997).  Provided ample encoding time, participants can even report the difference between a 
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changed display and the original up to 24 hours later (Hollingworth, 2005). 
Consistent with the importance of rich encoding, conditions that impair encoding result in 
worse change detection. Changes to items that were never foveated are unlikely to be noticed 
(Holligworth, 2005; Hollingworth, Schrock, & Henderson, 2001, Hollingworth & Henderson 
2002).  Furthermore, when fewer mental resources are available for encoding, subjects exhibit 
higher rates of change blindness.  For example, observers holding conversations detect 
changes to driving images more slowly and with more errors than those who are not conversing 
(McCarley et al., 2004).  Change detection performance also declines under conditions of high 
perceptual load: when participants fixate a central array that has many letters (high perceptual 
load), they have more difficulty detecting changes to flanking scenes than when fixating an array 
with few letters (Lavie, 2006).  
Real-world studies of change blindness reveal quality-of-representation effects as well. 
Students were more likely to notice a change in conversation partner when he appeared to be 
another student than when he belonged to an out-group (i.e., “construction workers”; Simons & 
Levin, 1998).  The out-group homogeneity bias (Quattrone & Jones, 1980) would suggest that 
the subjects mentally represented a fellow student better or more distinctly than an out-group 
member.  In turn, they were more likely to encode those features that individuated the pre- and 
post-change experimenter, making them better able to detect the change.  
Even with perfectly precise and complete representations, though, people can still fail to 
detect changes; change detection requires a comparison of the original and changed items.  
Task characteristics that prompt an observer to compare representations improve change 
detection.  For example, exogenously attracting attention to the change location enhances the 
detection of changes at that location by indicating which representations to compare (Aginsky & 
Tarr, 2000; Hollingworth, 2004; Scholl, 2000).  
Change detection rates also appear closely related to the degree of semantic difference 
between pre- and post-change stimuli. For example, subjects detect changes that alter an 
object’s category more easily than those in which both objects are from the same category 
(Hollingworth & Henderson, 2002).  More broadly, changes that alter the overall semantic 
meaning or gist of a scene are noticed faster than comparable changes that maintain the same 
scene gist (Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000; Hollingworth & Henderson, 2003).   In fact, one 
scene can be progressively replaced by an entirely different image over time, provided that the 
two images share the same gist (Sampanes et al., 2008). 
 
18 
1.4.3 Synopsis  
The likelihood of detecting a change or unexpected object is related to the likelihood that 
it will be attended. For inattentional blindness, unexpected objects that are closer or more 
similar to task-relevant items are more noticeable. For change blindness, changes to fixated or 
more semantically interesting items are more detectable.  For both change and inattentional 
blindness, detection rates are tied to task difficulty where more difficultly yields less noticing.  
Altogether, these results demonstrate the pivotal role attention plays in processing information 
to awareness.  Attended items are far more likely to reach awareness; if a task manipulation 
alters the probability that a critical item is attended, it will modulate change blindness and 
inattentional blindness rates.  
Task effects for inattentional blindness primarily involve attention allocation.  When items 
receive focused attention, they are more likely to reach awareness and, consequently, be 
noticed.   Change detection also requires that items relevant to a change be noticed.  However, 
in order to identify change, we must also compare mental representations of what was once to 
what is now.  Task effects that alter how fully items will be encoded or that prompt comparison, 
either by direct cue or through semantics, improve detection.  Therefore, for change detection, 
the quality of our representations and the likelihood that we make comparisons between 
representations also influence detection rates.  
  
1.5 Effects of the Observer  
Up to this point, we have discussed these visual awareness failures in relation to all 
people.  However, some individuals “see” objects and changes that others miss.  Are there 
some people who are better able to notice than others?  Or, are these differences just due to 
chance.  Here we will discuss the contributions of individual and group differences in perception, 
attention, and interest to change detection and inattention.  
Given that both change detection and the detection of unexpected objects depend on 
focused attention, individual differences in the ability to focus attention broadly or to shift 
attention quickly might well predict noticing.   Similarly, change detection depends on encoding 
items into memory and comparing them over time, so individual differences in working memory 
or processing speed might well affect how much of a scene observers can encode and retain 
over time.  Groups that perform well on basic laboratory measures of these abilities might also 
outperform groups that do not.  
Individuals and groups also differ in terms of their prior experiences and in what they find 
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most interesting in scenes, and those experiences and top-down biases might also influence 
detection.  As we discussed earlier, change detection is better for items of central interest.  
Some objects are of general interest because of their semantic importance in a scene.  
However, other objects or regions may hold special interest to certain observers.  These 
individual differences in interest should be reflected in change detection rates.  Likewise, in an 
inattentional blindness task, subjects may more readily detect an object for which they hold a 
special affinity.  Such individual and group differences, to the extent that they exist, can inform 
us about the mechanisms underlying failures of awareness.  
1.5.1 Inattentional Blindness  
Relatively few studies have explored individual differences in the detection of 
unexpected objects, primarily due to the nature of the tasks themselves.  Once participants have 
been asked about the presence of something unexpected, they subsequently look for 
unexpected objects.  Across a number of studies, additional unexpected objects on later trials 
are far more likely to be noticed (e.g., Mack & Rock, 1998).  In fact, when using the standard 
methods to study inattentional blindness (Mack & Rock, 1998), later trials in which an 
unexpected object appears are called “divided attention” trials because subjects are assumedly 
devoting some attention to the detection of additional objects.  
Studies of individual differences in inattention have overwhelmingly focused on group 
differences in noticing to circumvent the difficultly of working with a single critical trial per 
individual.  Intriguingly, most find little or no effect of individual differences in attention and 
perception on the detection of unexpected objects.  For example, in a large study of sports 
experts and novices, the ability to visually track multiple objects did not predict noticing of the 
gorilla, nor did attentional breadth (Memmert, et al., 2009).  Consider that in dynamic selective 
looking tasks, the ability to perform the primary task constitutes a measure of attention and 
tracking ability.  Presumably, those subjects who find the monitoring task easy should have 
more resources available to detect unexpected objects.  Surprisingly, though, tracking ability 
appears to be unrelated to likelihood of noticing unexpected objects (Simons & Jensen, 2009).  
Together, these findings suggest that individual differences in basic attention and 
perception skills might not predict the detection of unexpected events.  Such basic measures of 
attention might well predict performance on other effortful, focused- attention tasks, but the 
detection of unexpected objects might not depend on the same abilities. We do not mean to say 
that perceptual ability never impacts noticing of unexpected objects.  Some factors related to 
perceptual processing do affect performance. For example, slightly intoxicated individuals are 
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less likely to notice the gorilla than those who are sober (Clifasefi, Takarangi, & Bergman, 
2006).  The primary task may be more difficult for slightly intoxicated individuals, which generally 
results in less noticing.  Of course, severe intoxication may lead people to be less focused on to 
the primary task, and as we discussed earlier, if observers are passively observing the display, 
they typically notice the unexpected object.  
Despite the lack of consistent effects of individual differences in perceptual and attention 
skills on noticing unexpected objects, several studies have revealed group differences in 
noticing. For instance, basketball players are more likely to notice the gorilla in the basketball 
pass-counting task than are non-team sport athletes (Memmert, 2006).  This benefit appears 
limited to domain-specific content, as team handball players were no more likely to notice the 
gorilla (Memmert, et al., 2009).  Nevertheless, expertise is no safeguard against inattentional 
blindness.  Even experienced airline pilots can fail to notice an obstructing airplane while making 
a demanding landing in a flight simulator (Haines, 1991).  
Subjects also tend to notice unexpected objects that are semantically important to them. 
For instance, in a static inattentional blindness task, observers see their own names more often 
than a similar name or a different common name (Mack & Rock, 1998).  Observers also notice 
unexpected smiley faces more than scrambled or frowning faces or blank circles (Mack & Rock, 
1998, Lee & Telch, 2008).  And, highly anxious observers were more likely to notice a frowning 
face when under stress than when not (Lee & Telcher, 2008).  Biologically meaningful objects 
such as body silhouettes tend to be of interest to most observers, and they are noticed more 
frequently than less meaningful objects like scrambled silhouettes (Downing et al, 2004).  
Although children as young as 7 are no different from adults in terms of noticing unexpected 
objects (provided they can engage in the primary task, Neisser, 1979; Memmert, 2006), children 
are more likely than adults to notice the unexpected appearance of another child (as described 
by Neisser, 1979).  
These effects of semantic interest are not driven by visual distinctiveness, as people 
often fail to notice a red cross in a dynamic tracking task even when it is the only colored object 
appearing at any point in the task (Most et al 2001).  Similarly, in a selective looking task, 60% 
observers miss a woman who appears and scratches her fingernails down a chalkboard despite 
its distinctive, unpleasant, and multimodal nature (Wayand, Levin & Varakin, 2001).  Rather, the 
effect seems to be driven by semantic importance, just as semantic importance carried weight in 
the earlier dichotic listening literature.  
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1.5.2 Change Blindness  
A number of studies have examined individual and group differences in change detection 
performance for tasks in which people intentionally search for changes.  (Incidental change 
detection tasks suffer from the same constraints as inattentional blindness tasks in that after 
subjects experience one unexpected change, they subsequently look for changes.)  Unlike the 
detection of unexpected objects and events, intentional change detection tasks are affected by 
individual differences in basic perceptual and attention skills.  Visuospatial working memory, 
attentional breadth, and perceptual processing speed all predict change detection speed in a 
flicker task with driving-related images (Pringle, Irwin, Kramer & Atchley, 2001). Executive 
functioning, verbal working memory, and inhibition measures are also correlated with 
performance, but do not explain unique variance after factoring in visual working memory and 
other basic measures of attention (Pringle, et al, 2004). 
Change detection performance follows the development of perception and attention skills 
throughout life.  Most of these basic measures of perception and attention improve during 
childhood and then decline again as people age (Birren, 1970; Fozard et al., 2001).   Similarly, 
children’s change detection improves with age and adult change detection declines over time; 
children aged 5-12 become faster and more accurate with age (Shore et al., 2006; Fletcher-
Watson et al., 2008), but older adults show slowed change localization (Pringle et al., 2001) and 
higher error rates (McCarley et al., 2004, Veil et al., 2006).  Older adults also make shorter 
saccades and more fixations of longer duration during change detection, possibly due to 
reduced attentional breadth and slower processing speed (Viel et al. 2006). 
Just as basketball players were more likely to notice the gorilla in an inattentional 
blindness task, extensive experience with the content domain of a change display also 
enhances change detection.  For example, experts in American football detect changes that are 
meaningful to a play (e.g., location of the ball, location of players in a play formation) more 
readily than novices.  However, both groups show equal performance on non-meaningful 
changes (e.g., clothing color, shadows) and changes to non-football scenes (Werner and Thies, 
2000).  Similarly, chess experts are better able to detect changes to meaningful chessboard 
configurations than novices, but perform similarly with random configurations (Reingold, 
Charness, Pomplun & Stampe, 2001).  
Familiarity with a specific display also influences change detection in that display.  In one 
study, after performing a change detection task with a set of images, subjects were asked to 
perform a second task with the same images.  Under these conditions, observers first scanned 
22 
the previous change locations and then scanned previously changed objects at new locations 
(Becker and Rasmussen, 2008).  In other words, they used their prior knowledge of the scene 
and change to guide change detection.  They also were faster to find entirely new changes in 
the same images than they were when they first looked for a change in that image; familiarity 
with the scene led to faster change detection with that scene (see also Beck, Angelone, & Levin, 
2004 and Beck et al., 2008 for evidence that people learn to search more efficiently for changes 
when they are predictable based on the positions of unchanged objects).  
In one clever demonstration of this principle, cognitive scientists who were familiar with 
one of Rensink’s change detection images—a scene in which an airplane engine disappears 
and reappears— tried to detect changes to that same image.  Even when the engine no longer 
changed, subjects still tended to focus on the location of the jet engine (Takahashi and 
Watanabe, 2008), hampering their search for new changes.  Such effects illustrate the power of 
top-down search strategies on change detection in the flicker task.  Moreover, they illustrate the 
potential power of center of interest effects to influence navigation and, consequently, change 
detection.  
One of the strongest predictors of noticing change is an observer’s level of interest in the 
changed item.  Observers detect changes to items rated centrally interesting more often and 
more quickly than changes to lower interest items (Rensink et al, 1997).  Just as expert football 
players show different center of interest benefits than novices, interests specific to a given 
observer also influence change detection.  For example, frequent alcohol and marijuana users 
show an advantage for detecting changes to items related to their preferred habit. Heavy users 
were more likely to detect changes related to their interest than unrelated changes, while light 
users showed the opposite pattern of results (Jones, Jones, Smith & Copley, 2003). 
Cultural differences in scene processing and scan patterns also produce differences in 
change detection.  For example, East Asian subjects are more likely to attend to contextual 
information than Westerners (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001), and are therefore more likely to detect 
changes to the more marginal aspects of the scene that provide context.  
In the same vein, patient populations show differential processing of items specific to 
their interests or fears.  For example, Williams syndrome patients, who tend to be socially gifted 
but suffer learning deficits, show a detection advantage for changes that occur within social 
interactions (Tager-Flusberg et al., 2007).  Similarly, insomniacs detect changes to sleep-related 
items (e.g. a teddy bear) more quickly than non-insomniacs (Marchetti et al., 2006), and patients 
with specific phobias more quickly and frequently detect changes to the objects of their fears 
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than to non-feared objects (Mayer et al., 2006; McGlynn et al., 2008). 
1.5.3 Synopsis  
Both inattentional blindness and change blindness involve perceptual processing, but 
only change detection performance appears to be associated with individual differences in basic 
attention and perception abilities.  This difference may be explained by the nature of each task.  
Detection of a change is dependent on many visual processes that are modulated by attention 
(e.g. search, encoding, comparison, etc.).  Detection of an unexpected object, however, requires 
representation of something that lies outside of focused attention. We see an effect of 
attentional skills on change blindness because those skills are involved in change detection.  It 
is possible that we fail to see an effect of attentional skill on inattentional blindness because 
those skills do not enhance the processing of objects and events falling outside the focus of 
attention.  
Expertise and personal interest, however, influence change blindness and inattentional 
blindness in comparable ways.  The reasons behind the benefit of expertise for domain- related 
tasks are open to conjecture.  Expertise might allow more efficient processing of patterns of 
visual information (e.g., basketball experts may be able to extract more information more quickly 
from a basketball related display).  Alternatively, expertise might alter the relative 
meaningfulness of aspects of the display—an expert and novice chess player will find different 
areas of a chess position meaningful, so these groups would show different change detection 
depending on the region of the change.  Given the paucity of studies linking expertise to the 
detection of unexpected objects, more research is needed to fully understand how expertise 
alters the link between primary task performance and inattentional blindness.  
Taken together, both literatures show that semantic importance influences visual 
awareness, affecting which objects and changes people notice and report.  Nevertheless, how 
semantic meaning influences the visual system is still unclear.  For intentional change detection 
tasks, such effects of meaning are likely driven by top-down goal setting in scanning the scene 
(Yarbus, 1967); individual differences in performance may co-vary with differences in how 
people approach the task of parsing the scene.  Meaning may further influence how completely 
you encode information and the likelihood of making a comparison to memory.   Fully 
understanding center of interest effects will require separating out the relative contributions of 
interest to each component of change detection.  
The role of meaning in detecting an unexpected object is even less clear.  In an 
inattentional blindness task, subjects are not looking for the target object, but meaning still plays 
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a role.  At the very least, such effects of meaning, as well as priming effects from unseen 
objects (see Mack & Rock, 1998), appear to support a late selection model of attention in which 
unattended objects are processed to a level of semantic comprehension.  However, as for the 
dichotic listening literature, the failure to report a critical stimulus does not mean that the 
stimulus was unseen, unprocessed, or even entirely unattended.  It might well have been 
processed and forgotten (i.e., inattentional amnesia; Wolfe, 1999).  Or, it might have been 
processed fairly fully but not registered in the way necessary for a verbal report (i.e., 
inattentional agnosia; Simons, 2000).  
 
1.6 Common Misconceptions and Pitfalls  
We conclude our review of change blindness and inattentional blindness by identifying 
some common mistakes and pitfalls that researchers often make when studying these 
phenomena.  Each phenomenon has its own pitfalls that can muddy the interpretation of 
experimental results.  
1.6.1 Inattentional Blindness Pitfalls  
Although individual and group differences in the detection of unexpected objects are 
inherently interesting, interpreting the results of such differences can be challenging.  In order to 
compare the ability to notice something unexpected, experimenters must first equate the ability 
of members of each group to perform the primary task.  More precisely, they must equate the 
degree to which each group devotes effort to the focused attention task.  For example, if an 
experimenter wanted to test whether children are more (or less) likely to notice the unexpected 
object, they must first be certain that these two groups devote similar effort to the focused 
attention task.  Without some independent measure of focused attention, it is difficult to be 
certain that any differences between groups result from differences in the tendency to notice 
unexpected events rather than to differences in the ability (or desire) to perform the primary 
task.  
A more fundamental issue in studies of inattentional blindness is that the critical stimulus 
must be unexpected.  In most cases, that means subjects can only experience one critical trial.  
Although many other failures of awareness occur when observers are performing a focused 
attention task (e.g., repetition blindness, the attention blink, etc), unless the critical object is 
unexpected, the task does not measure inattentional blindness. Inattentional blindness is 
premised on the theoretical assumption that unexpected objects are unlikely to be the focus of 
attention in advance.  That is, subjects are unlikely to shift attention to a location where 
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something might appear if they have no expectation that anything will appear there.  Once 
people know that something might appear, it is impossible to verify that they didn’t devote some 
attention to looking for the target.  That is one of the central pitfalls in using tasks like dichotic 
listening as a measure of unattended processing (Holender, 1986); if subjects know the target 
might appear, they may devote some attention to it.  
1.6.2 Change Blindness Pitfalls  
The literature on change blindness is larger, and in some cases, more fraught with errors 
of interpretation.  When findings of change blindness first emerged in the 1990s, many were 
eager to argue that change blindness implied the absence of representations (e.g., Simons, 
1996; O’Regan & Noë, 2001) or at least sparse representations (Simons & Levin, 1997; Rensink 
et al, 1997).   Yet change blindness does not imply the absence of representations, as we noted 
above (see Simons & Rensink, 2005 for details).  Perhaps the most common error in 
interpreting findings of change blindness is to draw too strong an inference about the nature of 
visual representations from evidence that people did not report a change.  
Another common error is to draw strong inferences about visual representations from 
differential rates of change detection across different types of stimuli.  Such inferences might 
well be merited, but only after equating the magnitude of the changes physically and 
psychologically.  As a thought experiment, consider a change blindness task in which people 
notice color changes but fail to detect position changes.  If the position changes involved shifting 
objects by 1 nanometer and the color changes involved a shift from white to black, the 
interpretation that color changes are easier to detect would be unmerited—the relative 
detectability of changes across those dimensions could easily be reversed by varying the 
magnitudes of the changes.  In essence, comparisons of different change types involve a 
comparison of apples to oranges.  Only by putting both on the same scale is it meaningful to 
compare their overall rates of detection.  Of course it might not be necessary to equate the 
magnitude of each individual change in an experiment.  In fact, in our hypothetical thought 
experiment, it might be better to systematically vary the magnitude of each change type to 
determine whether the magnitude of a change has a differential effect across dimensions.  In 
essence, a valid approach seeks an interaction between some other variable and detection on 
each of the dimensions being compared. Such interactions can be interpretable even if the 
absolute differences in detectability are not.  
One study adopting that approach compared the detection of changes to faces and 
objects (Ro, Russel, Lavie, 2001).  In an initial experiment with upright faces, subjects detected 
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changes to faces faster than changes to objects.  Absolute differences in detectability are hard 
to interpret because the faces and objects could differ in numerous ways (e.g., the faces could 
be more salient than the objects, the objects may be more complex than the faces).  However, 
the advantage for faces disappeared when the faces were inverted.  Across these two 
conditions, the absolute physical magnitude of the changes was equated, but detection 
performance varied. Consequently, the authors could infer an advantage in change detection for 
upright faces.  The key factor allowing the interpretation was that the change magnitude was 
equated on low-level features across the conditions. Furthermore, the authors based their 
conclusions not on sheer differences in change detection, but on the interaction of inversion with 
stimulus type.  
A third common error in change blindness research comes from a basic design flaw. 
Recall that in a change blindness task, observers must compare the post-change display to the 
pre-change display in order to detect a change.  If the displays are poorly designed, observers 
could, in principle, detect the change without seeing one of the two displays. For example, 
experiments that change the number of items in the array can be problematic: If subjects must 
detect whether or not an item was removed, and the initial array always has 4 or 5 items, then 
any second array with 3 items must have changed.  For a change blindness task to legitimately 
measure change detection performance, it is essential that each display, on its own, contain no 
information about the presence or absence of a change. 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
Change blindness and inattentional blindness both document a surprising failure to 
notice something that occurred right before our eyes.  Change blindness is the failure to identify 
when something has changed from one moment to another.  Inattentional blindness is the 
failure to notice the existence of something unexpected when attention is focused on some 
other task.  As psychological effects, both phenomena inform theories of perceptual processing, 
attention, and visual awareness.  As human behaviors, they serve as a cautionary reminder of 
the fallibility of our own visual systems.  Despite our impression that we perceive and represent 
much of our visual world, we often are unaware of important information that passes right before 
our eyes.  Many of the studies reviewed here suggest that in novel, complex, or difficult 
situations, we will be even more prone to miss unexpected information or fail to see changes in 
our environment.  At the same time, our experiences, interpretations of meaning, goals, and 
preferences may work to minimize the likelihood that we miss potentially relevant visual 
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information.  In both cases, our blindness reveals the struggle between our need to maximize 
processing of potentially meaningful and useful information while dealing with limited mental 
resources and noisy, complex sensory information. 
 
28 
CHAPTER 2: ATTENTION-RELATED INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN  
CHANGE BLINDNESS AND INATTENTIONAL BLINDNESS 
 
2.1 Abstract 
Attention-based accounts of individual differences in visual noticing link detection of 
critical stimuli to primary task performance on cognitively-demanding tasks. When considering 
noticing performance in contexts like intentional search for visual changes, better cognitive task 
performance is correlated with faster and more accurate search for visual anomalies.  In other 
incidental noticing contexts like inattentional blindness paradigms, predicted and observed 
relationships between noticing and cognitive task performance are more varied.  The final 
section of the chapter discusses the implications of a central distinction within the inattentional 
blindness literature between the direction of attention and processing limits of attention (e.g. 
Most, 2010); such a distinction helps to account for attention-related individual differences in 
visual noticing findings and informs further search for possible individual differences in visual 
noticing.  
 
2.2 Introduction 
Imagine walking across an open plaza or city square on your way to some destination.  
How likely are you to notice an unexpected event (say passing by a unicycling clown) under 
these conditions?  Research suggests you are not as likely to notice as you might think.  For 
example, only 51% of observers saw a unicycling clown when walking alone through a campus 
square and only 25% of observers talking on a cell-phone noticed the clown (Hyman, Boss, 
Wise & Caggiano, 2009).  In other words, some observers do not notice perceivable fully-visible 
anomalies like a unicycling clown (or a wandering gorilla or an umbrella lady or, more 
disturbingly, a staged assault1).  
Prior research explores how characteristics of the situation are likely to influence 
observers’ overall probability of noticing something unexpected (as reviewed in Chapter One).  
For example, a busier walking environment is likely to reduce noticing of a clown, whereas the 
addition of relevant-to-walking targets that look like clowns is likely to increase noticing of the 
clown.  Characteristics of an observer (both temporary and more long-lasting) also influence 
noticing rates (again, as reviewed in Chapter One).  For example, if an observer were heavily !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!i.e., Simons & Chabris, 1999; Neisser, 1979; Chabris, Weinberger, Fontaine, & Simons, 2011 
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engrossed in a cell-phone conversation, an observer should be less likely to notice the clown.  
Or, prior knowledge of a clown-saturated environment or a particular personal interest in 
unicycling clowns might increase an individual’s likelihood of noticing a clown-related stimulus.   
Factors like an individual’s direction of attention and prior knowledge are “characteristics 
of the observer” in that they describe features of the observer (not the environment).  However, 
these factors are still likely to vary by situation (e.g. to apply in particular contexts but not others, 
depending on interest, expertise, current mental pre-occupation, prior experience, etc.).  In other 
words, experimental research often explores how factors that vary by situation modulate 
noticing rates across groups of observers.  An alternative approach to explaining why some 
observers notice information when others do not (or search longer before noticing) under similar 
conditions is to consider how more sustained differences between individuals predict noticing.  
For example, stabilities or regularities in performance that are less likely to vary by situation (like 
personality characteristics or cognitive ability) may vary by individual and predict noticing 
differences.  One of the most common and central predictions for such individual differences in 
visual noticing is that attention-related cognitive differences will manifest in visual noticing 
differences.   
This chapter begins by focusing on theories and evidence for attention-based individual 
differences in visual noticing by highlighting several new individual difference findings in the 
change blindness and inattentional blindness literatures and then discussing the theoretical 
implications of those results.  In the third section of this chapter, I describe a visual noticing and 
attention framework and discuss how distinctions within that framework inform potential 
individual difference predictors, predictions, and hypotheses. 
 
2.3 Attention-related Individual Differences in Intentional Change Detection  
As reviewed in Chapter One, the findings across change detection studies suggest 
there is a connection between attention and noticing2.  In most experimental contexts, more 
likely to be attended means more likely to be noticed.  For example, known group differences 
in attention correspond to systematic differences in noticing, where search times for particular 
types of changes often reflect differences in observer’s experiences, interests, and attention-
selection preferences (Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997; Jones, Jones, Smith, & Copley, 
2003; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Tager-Flusberg, Plesa-Skwerer, Schofield, Verbalis, & !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 i.e., many scientists argue attention is a necessary if not sufficient condition for awareness of anomalies. 
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Simons, 2007; Marchetti, Biello, Broomfield, MacMahon, & Espie, 2006; Mayer, Muris, & 
Vogel, 2006; McGlynn, Wheeler, Wilamowska, & Katz, 2008).   Such findings support 
theories that argue attention processes are centrally engaged in searching for anomalies like 
visual changes. 
Within individual difference studies, the primary evidence of attention-related 
performance differences in intentional change detection come from correlational studies of 
behavioral task data. In these studies, individuals’ search times for changes during intentional 
change detection tasks (e.g. searching for changes in flickering scenes) tend to correlate 
positively with other indicators of visual attention and memory (Pringle, Irwin, Kramer, & 
Atchley, 2001; Pringle, Kramer, & Irwin, 2004; Shore, Burack, Miller, Joseph, Enns, 2006; 
Veiel, Storandt, & Abrams, 2006). These studies often focus on group differences in cognitive 
performance (e.g. by comparing performance of athletes, training groups, or different age 
groups), and the typical finding in such studies are that change detection measures share 
data patterns and variance with other attention and memory measures (e.g. Alvez, Voss, 
Boot, Deslandes, Cossich, Salles, & Kramer, 2013; Huang, Mo, & Li, 2012; Lee, Boot, Basak, 
Voss, Prakash, Neider, Erickson, Simons, Fabiani, Gratton, Low, & Kramer, 2012).  For 
example, one recent large sample study explicitly examined individual differences across 
several attention and cognitive tasks.  Embedded in the cross-task data patterns, Huang, Mo, 
& Li (2012) reported that accuracy at identifying a change during a time-restricted scene 
flicker task was correlated at around r(255) ≈ .24 with various search, memory, and attention 
paradigms like a dynamic tracking task, a visual short term memory task, and a conjunction 
search task, among others (Huang, Mo, & Li, 2012). The authors argue that a general 
attention factor is the shared mechanism across these paradigms but note that substantial 
variation in task-specific performance consistencies remains to be explained.   
Evidence that individual differences in search for visual change shares common 
variance with performance on other perception and cognition tasks continues to accumulate.  
In contrast, understanding the significance of that variation and identifying other regularities 
in subject performance remains an elusive goal.  For example, is this common variation an 
artifact of statistical or methodological techniques to measuring human behavior; is it a 
reflection of some underlying common ability like g; or is it the result of some other 
consistency in an individual’s interaction with a cognitive task?  If a common factor can 
explain a reliable but limited portion of the variance in human behavior, are we fundamentally 
limited in the consistency of individual performance that we can predict or are there other 
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predictors that can explain additional variation in human performance? 
Many theoretical accounts of cognition posit that observed differences between 
individuals’ cognitive task performance reflect differences in cognitive/attention abilities as 
well as other, possibly situation-specific, performance factors (see Spearman, 1927, for an 
early articulation of this idea).  As a canonical example, estimated working memory capacity 
correlates with performance on many other cognitive tasks and outcome measures (e.g., 
Cowan et al., 2005a; Daneman & Merikle, 1996; Engle et al., 1999; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, 
& Conway, 1999 among many others).  But, there is vigorous debate about how attention 
measures might fit into more global performance consistencies that could be captured by a 
common factor like general intelligence (e.g., Ackerman, Beier, Boyle, 2005; Cowan, 2005; 
Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 2005).  For example, a commonly debated distinction is made 
between short-term memory processes and working memory processes (Baddeley & Hitch, 
1974; Cowan, 1995; Engle, et al., 1999).  Similarly, many researchers draw a distinction 
between more perceptually demanding and more cognitively demanding tasks, making a 
dissociation between proposed mechanisms like visual short term memory and working 
memory (Kane, 2006; Luck, 2008; Unsworth & Engle, 2007).  Expanding this idea further, 
some data analyses suggest several dimensions of cognitive ability might uniquely explain 
behavior.  For example, theorized cognitive constructs like fluid intelligence, executive 
control, perceptual speed, episodic memory, vocabulary, attention capacity, inhibitory control, 
working memory capacity, and task switching might inform individual task performance 
(Baniqued et. al., 2013; Salthouse, 2005, 2010; Salthouse & Ferrer-Caja, 2003; Salthouse & 
Pink, 2010).   
Echoing a trend throughout psychology, cognitive constructs are also increasingly linked 
to neural physiology and activity to confirm and test hypotheses about the human mind.  In this 
context, individual differences in neural activity and structure have been correlated to individual 
differences in task performance.  Across studies, performance on attention-demanding tasks is 
often linked to activity differences in areas like bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and 
parietal cortex, brain regions thought to be involved in executive control and attention processes 
(Beck, Rees, Fith, & Lavie, 2001; Burgress, Gray, Conway, Braver, 2011; Cowan, 2005; Kane & 
Engle, 2002; Prat & Adam, 2008; Yarkoni et al., 2009).  Other work highlights possible 
relationships between speeded task performance and differences in neural connectivity as 
measured through white fiber tracks in diffusion tensor imaging (e.g. Kanai & Rees, 2011).  
Such studies further inform our understanding of attention and cognition by providing additional 
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correlates of performance to use to identify reliable individual differences between observers.   
The trend in cognitive psychology to identify sub-components of cognitive task 
performance across multiple individual difference measures is mirrored by the trend in 
neuroscience to approach individual differences in cognition by looking for convergence across 
neural and behavioral measures in differences between individuals.  The general approach of 
both areas of research is to look across combinations of outcomes to identify which distinctions 
are most parsimonious in describing the human mind, behavior, and brain.  The prescription for 
individual differences in intentional change detection from these two approaches is to look 
across indicators for common data patterns and determine how differences in change detection 
performance fit within the broader context of individual differences in human performance.  For 
intentional change detection, this means the search for reliable individual differences must 
consider the extent of similarity across alternate measures of change detection, should consider 
data patterns across multiple predictors, and should look for replications and convergence 
across findings.  
 
2.4 Attention-related Individual Differences in Inattentional Blindness 
An inattentional blindness scenario begins with observers who are engaged in an 
attention-demanding primary task, a task that shares similarities with other demanding 
cognitive tasks.  If we assume consistency in individuals’ relative performance across 
cognitive tasks, then primary task performance during an inattentional blindness situation 
should correlate to performance on other cognitive tasks.  And, in inattentional blindness that 
assess this relationship, primary task performance during an inattentional blindness situation 
does tend to correlate with performance on various other cognitive attention measures 
(Bredemeier & Simons, 2012; Memmert, Simons, & Grimes, 2009; Jensen & Simons, in prep; 
Seegmiller, Watson, & Strayer, 2011; Wright, Boot, & Morgan, 2013).   
When observers engaged in a cognitive task are then exposed to unexpected but 
perceivable additional information, the unexpected information is outside of the standard 
primary task framework.  Instead, the critical measurement is of noticing, of whether the 
observer noticed the existence of anomalous information.  In other words, in an inattentional 
blindness paradigm, the performance of interest is not an individual’s primary task 
performance but whether an observer noticed task-irrelevant information.  Because noticing 
unexpected information sits somewhat outside the standard primary task model, theories and 
predictions for noticing of unexpected information are more varied and controversial.  In 
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particular, varied hypotheses about how attention-based individual differences should predict 
inattentional blindness dominate the current discussion and research questions in this area of 
research.   
2.4.1 Predictions of Attention-related Individual Differences in Inattentional Blindness  
Myriad hypotheses link attention-related individual differences to inattentional 
blindness.  Here, I describe two central hypotheses that are derived from capacity and 
inhibitory control interpretations of working memory capacity.  Then, I summarize several 
hypotheses of complex relationships between attention-related predictors and discuss the 
null prediction of no reliable relationships between predictors and inattentional blindness.   
A central attention-based individual difference prediction for noticing unexpected 
events emerges from capacity accounts of attention and working memory.  In the same way 
that working memory capacity has been correlated to a variety of performance measures 
(e.g. Conway et. al., 2002; Conway & Kane, 2001, Cowan et al., 2005; Daneman & Merikle, 
1996; Engle et al., 1999; Kane & Engle, 2002), working memory capacity might relate to 
inattentional blindness if higher measured working memory capacity reflects greater mental 
resources to manage primary task goals and stimuli as well as to notice unexpected 
information (Hannon & Richards, 2010; Richards, Hannon, & Derakshan, 2010; Seegmiller, 
Watson, & Strayer, 2011).  In other words, a positive relationship between performance on a 
working memory task, (as measured by AOSPAN, for example) and noticing of an 
unexpected red cross (e.g. during dynamic tracking task) might emerge because “IB 
individuals do not have sufficient processing resources to fully process goal-irrelevant stimuli” 
(Richards, Hannon, Derakshan, 2010).  One challenge for testing predictions of attention 
capacity individual differences in an inattentional blindness framework is that participants 
may not equally or sufficiently engage in their primary task 3.   
A second prediction for a relationship between inattentional blindness and cognitive 
ability emerges from an emphasis on inhibitory and control processes in working memory.  
This perspective argues that higher working memory capacity reflects increased attention 
control or better attention filtering (Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 2001; Kane & Conway, 2002; !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 A common solution to the primary task engagement problem is for researchers to establish subject 
exclusion criteria to screen out participants with lower than a particular threshold of accuracy (typically 
around 80% accuracy on some primary task outcome measure).  Although a reasonable and pragmatic 
solution, such a subject selection approach introduces its own limitations and methodological concerns 
(as further discussed in Chapter Four.) 
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Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 1994, 2001; Kane & Engle, 2003; Vogel, McCollough, & 
Machizawa, 2005).  Assuming an attention control emphasis in working memory capacity, 
higher working memory ability should allow observers to better filter out task-irrelevant 
information, resulting in lower noticing rates for any primary-task-irrelevant information.  In 
one foundational example of this data pattern observed during a dichotic listening task, high 
working memory participants shadowing content in one ear were less likely to hear their own 
name in the other to-be-ignored auditory channel than low working memory individuals 
(Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 2001).  One challenge of an emphasis on attention control for 
predicting relationships between variables is the apparent dynamic nature of the selection 
and inhibition of attention.  For example, in a similar study employing a dichotic listening task, 
higher working memory individuals were MORE likely than low working memory individuals to 
hear their own name when they were dividing attention between shadowing one channel and 
monitoring the other for their name (Colflesh & Conway, 2007).  
Evidence of complex data patterns between attention measures and visual 
awareness underlie the next group of inattentional blindness and cognitive capacity 
predictions.  These nuanced theories predict relationships between noticing and attention 
measures in the context of additional situational constraints like task demands or display 
complexity.   For example, relationships between working memory capacity and task 
performance might only become manifest when observer’s tasks are cognitively demanding, 
where higher working memory individuals are better able to flexibly and strategically deploy 
their attention given increased difficulty (Bleckley, Durso, Crutchfield, Engle, & Khanna, 2003; 
Braver et al 2007; Burgess et al 2011; Cowan, 2005; Kane & Engle, 2003).  In the 
inattentional blindness context, then, attention capacity measures might only be predictive of 
noticing during sufficiently cognitively demanding primary tasks.  Other complex attention 
theories argue for a tradeoff between display complexity and internal mental workload, where 
the extent of processing of visual information is a function both of internal cognitive demands 
and perceptual display-related complexity (Lavie & Tsal, 1994; Lavie 1995; Lavie, 2005; 
Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007; MacDonald & Lavie, 2008).  Under this perspective, 
individual differences in ability to manage increasing cognitive load and increasing perceptual 
load may be uniquely predictive of individual noticing, interacting to make noticing more likely 
under some kinds of load and less likely under others.  Alternatively, relative working memory 
ability might differentially predict noticing by predicting the nature of the unexpected 
information that observers are likely to notice.  For instance, low working memory individuals 
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might be more likely to notice visually salient information whereas higher working memory 
individuals might be more likely to notice unexpected information that shares features with 
task-relevant information (Bredemeier & Simons, 2012).  Although there are many subtleties 
between theories, all complex accounts share a common argument that the relationship 
between cognitive task performance and inattentional blindness is not a stable linear 
relationship; instead the engagement, direction, and demands of attention resources 
influence the direction and strength of any relationship between attention abilities and 
noticing during an inattentional blindness scenario.  One challenge for all complex accounts 
is to make clear and testable hypotheses for relationships between variables. 
The final prediction for a relationship between attention capacities and noticing of 
unexpected information is the prediction of the null hypothesis, or of no reliable relationship 
between variables.  Under this prediction, working memory capacity will not and should not 
reliably explain variation in noticing of unexpected information.  But, like complex attention 
and noticing predictions, this overall prediction of a null effect represents a commonality 
across many possible theoretical explanations.  There are an infinite number of possible 
rationales for a null result; these rationales require additional consideration in the context of 
individual differences in inattentional blindness because, despite many strong theories of 
attention and their stated implications for inattentional blindness, researchers are still trying to 
identify and characterize whether reliable individual differences in inattentional blindness 
exist at all.   
2.4.2 Evidence of Attention-related Individual Differences in Inattentional Blindness 
Despite strong hypotheses of individual differences in inattentional blindness, 
research has found mixed evidence of reliable predictors of noticing performance.  Recall that 
in Memmert, Simons, & Grimes’ (2009) study of 40 handball experts, 40 non-handball 
athletes, and 40 non-athletes, participants completed an attentional breadth task, a multiple 
object tracking task, and watched a dynamic tracking trial with an unexpected object.  Neither 
attentional breadth nor multiple object tracking ability was strongly related to noticing on the 
critical trial.   Nor in our Simons & Jensen (2009) study were we able to predict noticing by 
using primary task tracking ability during a dynamic tracking task with an unexpected object.  
Additional research has attempted to link noticing in an inattentional blindness context with 
other measures of cognition and attention with mixed success. 
 To test attention-related individual difference predictions, several studies correlated 
noticing during an inattentional blindness trial with individual differences in attention 
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measures or working memory capacity.  In these studies, researchers use observer’s relative 
perceptual and cognitive abilities to predict noticing during a single critical inattentional 
blindness trial (typically during a dynamic tracking task).  A number of attention theories 
argue attention capacity will relate to inattentional blindness.  No matter the specific 
prediction, the general logic to this approach is to consider how measures of cognitive ability 
predict noticing during a constrained inattentional blindness situation.  In practice, such 
studies typically involve correlating individual subject performance on established perceptual 
and cognitive tasks like visual short-term memory task (e.g. Luck & Vogel, 1997) or working 
memory capacity (e.g. Turner & Engle, 1989) with a single noticing trial during a version of an 
established laboratory inattentional blindness task.    
The patterns of results across such studies have been inconsistent.   For example, 
visuospatial working memory as measured by a variant of Luck & Vogel (1997) did not relate 
to noticing of a red cross during a dynamic tracking task, r(75) = .12 (Hannon & Richards, 
2010).  However, in this sample of 77 mixed-age observers, working memory capacity as 
measured by Operation Span (Turner and Engle, 1989) did correlate with inattentional 
blindness at r(75) = .27 (Hannon & Richards, 2010).  Richards, Hannon, & Derakshan (2010) 
also found that participants who noticed an unexpected red cross during a dynamic tracking 
trial remembered, on average, four more items during an OSPAN task (out of forty-two 
possible, 47% vs. 36% accuracy) than observers who did not report noticing the unexpected 
object.  However, in the same study, there was no correlation between noticing and stroop 
task performance, a task thought to demand inhibitory processes, nor was there a 
relationship with a highly constrained global/local intentional change detection task (Richards, 
Hannon, & Derakshan, 2010).  Seegmiller, Watson, & Strayer (2011) did not find an overall 
relationship between noticing the gorilla during the Simons & Chabris (1999) inattentional 
blindness video and working memory ability as measured by Operation Span.  However, if 
they only considered observers who provided an accurate count of the passes, individuals 
with the highest working memory scores were more likely to report noticing the gorilla than 
individuals with the lowest working memory scores.  In contrast, Bredemeier & Simons (2012) 
found little evidence of a relationship between working memory span (as measured by an n-
back task in one sample and an n-back and Operation Span task in a second sample) and 
inattentional blindness (during a dynamic tracking task) in two college-aged samples (N = 
134 and N = 207).  Overall, then, capacity estimates of cognitive constructs like working 
memory have been found to correlate with inattentional blindness, but these relationships are 
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limited, only occurring in particular circumstances and possibly not reliably (see Bredemeier & 
Simons, 2012 for additional discussion).   
Other possible predictors of noticing might appear in concurrent behavioral measures 
(particularly indicators that are believed to reflect overt attention).  For example, several 
studies have attempted to predict individual noticing of the unexpected information in specific 
inattentional blindness scenarios by considering concurrent behavioral measures collected 
during the noticing situation (like eye-gaze direction, physiological arousal, blinks, or pupil 
dilation).  So far, such studies find little or no relationship between overt measures of 
attention and noticing (Most et. al., 2000; Koivisto, Hyona, & Revonsuo, 2004; Memmert, 
2006).  For example, in a recent attempt to use eye-tracking to determine how noticers and 
non-noticers differ in their eye-movements, noticers and non-noticers were equally likely to 
saccade near and to spend time fixating the unexpected object across several experiments 
(Beanland & Pammer, 2010).  Or, in another recent study, researchers measuring pupil size 
during a dynamic tracking task found pupil diameter to be a reliable correlate of the load of 
the primary task, of error rates, and of overall self-rated conscientiousness, but were unable 
to reliably link pupil size during the critical event to reported noticing (Wright, Boot, & Morgan, 
2013).   In other words, overt attention as measured through concurrent observable 
behavioral measures is not necessary nor sufficient to explain observer noticing of an 
unexpected stimulus.  
Given the challenge in finding stable individual difference effects, is there any reason 
to think noticing of unexpected low-task-relevant information is predictable?  There are 
reasons to be skeptical about observing a reliable relationship between noticing and possible 
predictors.  Noticing in a single scenario might be too variable to reliably correlate with more 
stable cognitive measures (Simons & Jensen, 2009).  In this case, it could be that noticing of 
unexpected information is too variable in general, perhaps being too dependent on transient 
constraints or chance for reliable individual differences to emerge.  Alternatively, reliable 
individual differences in noticing of unexpected information may exist but be too variable to 
allow an accurate measurement given current methodological approaches4.  Or, noticing of 
unexpected information might fall outside of the standard attention/inhibition framing and not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 The single trial constraint is imposed on most inattentional blindness studies to prevent the possibility of 
more intentional search for visual anomalies on later trials. 
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reflect individual differences in such dimensions (Bredemeier & Simons, 2012)5. 
A final approach to studying individual difference in inattentional blindness is to look 
across visual noticing scenarios to look for consistency in performance. For example, one 
recent study links the attentional blink, another visual noticing paradigm, to noticing during an 
inattentional blindness trial (Beanland & Pammer, 2012).   The attentional blink has a 
literature and zeitgeist of its own (Raymond et al., 1992), but shares a similarity to 
inattentional blindness in that awareness of new information is impeded by an observer’s 
current mental pre-occupation with something else.  In an attentional blink context, observers 
often fail to detect a target if it follows a previous target by a few hundred milliseconds but, 
importantly, not immediately following the first target (e.g. lag 1 sparing).  In this 52-subject 
dataset, the magnitude of the attentional blink (or an individual’s estimated time delay after a 
first target before a new target could be detected) was correlated with noticing an unexpected 
object during a dynamic tracking task.  The authors argue this commonality reflects common 
underlying mechanisms between the two noticing paradigms (Beanland & Pammer, 2012), 
but theories explicating what those mechanisms might be remain to be articulated.  The 
question of how strongly noticing in one visual awareness paradigm is related to noticing in a 
different visual awareness paradigm remains an important and unresolved question. 
Chapters Three and Four describe a new study that assesses consistency across other 
incidental noticing tasks. 
To summarize, recent individual difference studies of inattentional blindness show 
limited evidence for consistent differences between those who notice an unexpected stimulus 
and those who do not.  Individual difference predictions for inattentional blindness are often 
multi-directional and varied.  Concurrent behavioral measures do not seem to be useful in 
revealing whether an observer will report noticing an unexpected stimulus.  Nor, so far and 
despite good efforts, does working memory capacity reliably predict inattentional blindness 
and cross-task relationships have been unstable across studies and findings.  Altogether 
these findings leave an important question unresolved: Is there something reliable to predict 
about noticing during inattentional blindness situations?   
In conclusion, although the pattern of results for individual differences in inattentional !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Evidence that attention capture by unexpected stimuli may be distinct from capture for known distractors 
raises the possibility that attention abilities may not be engaged in the same way in noticing unexpected 
information (Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992; Most & Simons, 2001; Most, Scholl, Clifford, & Simons, 
2005) and would, therefore, not be strongly predictive of noticing. 
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blindness differs from individual differences in intentional change detection, the culmination of 
the findings within this literature require resolution of some of the same questions.  For 
inattentional blindness, the search for reliable individual differences must consider the extent 
of similarity across alternate incidental noticing scenarios, should consider data patterns 
across multiple predictors, and should look for replications and convergence across findings.  
 
2.5 Theories of Attention and Individual Differences in Visual Noticing 
Within the inattentional blindness literature, manipulations that influence overall 
noticing rates are often framed in terms of attention but particular studies often emphasize 
different aspects of attentional processing as being particularly relevant to interpreting their 
observed results.  Some results and interpretations emphasize how display complexity or the 
demands of a primary task limit or load attention abilities, creating possible late-stage 
bottlenecks in visual processing to awareness.  For example, faster speed of tracked moving 
objects (Beanland & Pammer, 2010; Simons & Jensen, 2009), holding multiple counts 
(Chabris, C F, Weinberger A, Fontaine, & Simons, 2011; Simons, & Chabris, 1999), difficulty 
of discrimination (Mack & Rock, Lavie, 2010; Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007), and 
maintaining a dual-task working memory load (Hyman, Boss, Wise, McKenzie, Caggiano, 
2010; Strayer, Drews, & Johnston, 2003; Fougnois & Morois, 2007; Todd, Fougnie, & Marois, 
2005) all result in a lower noticing rates across subjects for unexpected information.  Other 
findings emphasize that noticing is not just about demands on attention but also about how 
attention is deployed.  In other words, an observer’s strategic deployment of attention toward 
and away from information shapes noticing.  For example, stimuli that share features and 
characteristics with task-relevant items are more likely to be noticed (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 
2007; Most et. al., 2001; Most, Scholl, Clifford, & Simons, 2005; Simons, & Chabris, 1999;), 
as is information that is more expected from prior experience (Beanland & Pammer, 2010; 
Moore, Lleras, Grosjean, & Marrara, 2004; Simons, 2010; White & Davies, 2008).  These 
findings emphasize that attention is more likely to be directed toward particular content given 
the goals and experiences of observers.  As Steven Most (2010) observed in a commentary 
on inattentional blindness, “the overarching term ‘inattentional blindness’ likely obscures 
mechanistic distinctions between at least two different sub-types, one driven by covert 
allocation of spatial attention and a second driven by preoccupation or disruption of non-
spatial selection mechanisms.”  In other words, an observer could have never looked or 
never directed attention to the critical information, a kind of spatial inattentional blindness, 
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and/or an observer could be constrained or occupied by their task of processing something 
else, a kind of central inattentional blindness (Most, 2010).  
A distinction between the direction of covert attention and the mechanisms of 
attentive processing is particularly useful in understanding a central debate about likely 
factors in noticing unexpected objects.  An attentional bottleneck or attention capacity 
perspective suggests that measures characterizing the limits of attention will be most useful 
in explaining noticing differences all else being equal.  Therefore, stable individual differences 
in factors that reflect attention capacities and limits should predict noticing when variables are 
held constant and observers are mostly doing the same thing.  This is the central approach 
taken in attempts to correlate working memory and attention measures to noticing.  In 
contrast, an attentional direction emphasis suggests that factors relating to spatial 
deployment of attention, both task-related and internally driven, will be possible predictors of 
visual noticing.  In this case, individual difference measures that predict where and how 
observers are likely to focus attention should uniquely predict an individual’s likelihood of 
noticing information.  Or, to combine the implications of these approaches into a single view, 
perhaps capacity measures predict noticing insofar as central resources are equally directed 
toward the critical anomalous information.  Individual difference measures that predict where 
and how those capacities are directed would then explain unique variance in noticing during 
an on-line cognitive task.   
Such a distinction between spatial and non-spatial dimensions of attention also informs a 
central dissonance between the individual differences findings in intentional change detection 
and inattentional blindness paradigms: Although there is evidence of reliable attention-related 
individual differences for tasks like intentional change detection, those same relationships do not 
appear consistently when studying noticing during an inattentional blindness scenario.  In 
intentional change detection tasks, observer’s primary task is to search for change anomalies 
and, for the most part, their primary attentional resources should be allocated to that primary 
task.  Therefore, individual difference measures that capture central attention differences should 
relate to differences in change detection performance directly.  For inattentional blindness, 
observer’s attention should primarily be directed toward task goals and away from the critical 
information to be noticed.  In this case, central processing resources may not be as consistently 
engaged with the critical information across observers, making possible relationships between 
attention ability and noticing more variable. 
Recognizing that the selective direction of attention is as critical to understanding 
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noticing as the central processing aspects of attention raises the possibility that a wider set of 
individual difference measures may be needed to explain differences in noticing.  For instance, 
stylistic and personality-based differences in how observers deploy attention resources during a 
cognitive task may help predict noticing.  For example, differences in extroversion may relate to 
differences in the level of arousal an individual requires to maintain good task performance over 
time, where more extroverted individuals show a drop in engagement with their primary task as 
it becomes dull (Szymura & Necka, 1998; Eysenck, 1967).  Alternatively, personality measures 
like “grit” or perseverance, that explain unique variance in measures of performance like gpa 
and academic achievement (Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, and Kelly, 2007), might explain 
how individuals are likely to be deploying attention during a visual noticing task (see Lleras, 
Buetti, & Mordkoff, in press, for recent relevant discussion).  For example, some individuals may 
more strongly engage central attention resources toward their primary task, as suggested by 
research linking characteristics like grit to effort during a cognitive task through physiological 
measures like impedance cardiography (Sylvia, Jones, Kelly, & Zibaie, 2011).  Similarly, work 
on cognitive load and eye-gaze suggests individual observers may differentially pull overt spatial 
attention away from irrelevant and possibly distracting stimuli under mentally demanding 
conditions (e.g., Glenberg, Schroeder, & Robertson, 1998).  Alternatively, differences in more 
focused or dispersed attention strategies like those identified as cultural differences in attention 
(Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Duffy & Kitayama, 2010) may help predict noticing given overall 
differences in attention deployment.  
Although recognizing the direction of attention may vary systematically across observers 
prescribes a wider search for individual difference predictors, such differences in attention are 
somewhat agnostic to a distinction between spatial and central attention limitations.  Instead, 
there is reason to believe such stylistic differences are expressed in both dimensions of 
attention.  For example, psychological disorders like anxiety and depression are linked to overall 
differences in attention and visual awareness and could extend to create reliable differences in 
visual noticing (e.g., Bredemeier, et al., 2012).  However, depressed and anxious individuals 
show systematic differences both in how attention is directed (particularly in relation to stressful 
or emotional content) as well as central processing differences (see Bredemeier, et al., 2012 for 
a review).  In other words, many individual differences are likely to reflect both differences in the 
direction of attention as well as differences in central processing.   
One additional challenge for using an understanding of spatial and central attention to 
explain individual difference findings is that these dimensions are likely to co-vary and 
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diverge depending on situation-specific constraints.  Consider, for example, a commonly 
manipulated aspect of intentional change detection tasks like set size.   With increasing set-
size, intentional search for change typically becomes slower (in a response time dependent 
task like the flicker task) and less accurate (for more accuracy based tasks like a one-shot 
change detection task).   In relation to the direction of attention, more items means there are 
more distinct spatial locations for attention to be directed toward, leaving any individual item 
as less likely to fall under the focus of spatially directed attention under larger set sizes.  But 
similarly, for the central limitations of attention, additional items increase the overall amount 
of information available within an attended area for processing, possibly influencing the 
inhibitory and selection demands placed on central attention as well as the informational load 
available for processing.  In other words, manipulations of covert spatial attention and non-
spatial selection mechanisms are likely to influence one another and variability in those 
dimensions is unlikely to be fully independent. 
In summary, an emphasis on the importance of both the direction of attention and the 
mechanisms of attention in explaining behavior prescribes an inclusive approach to individual 
difference predictors.  However, an inclusive approach does not necessitate that outcome 
measures neatly fall into two groups of those that capture the direction of attention and those 
that reflect the central limits of attention.  Instead, factors related to internal limits of attention 
and to the allocation of attention interact or co-vary (Cowan, 2005), leaving no straight-
forward dissociations between common established measurable inter-individual difference 
measures for the direction and capacity limits of attention.  Nevertheless, the recognition that 
a wide range of inter-individual measures are possibly relevant to noticing visual anomalies 
and to predicting attentional and perceptual behavior is important in itself.  Better 
characterizing such individual difference relationships is an important component of 
understanding the variability in human behavior and, in the context of this dissertation, is a 
critical step in understanding whether one person is more likely to notice something than 
another.  
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CHAPTER 3: STUDY ONE METHOD AND RESULTS BY TASK1  
 
3.1 Abstract 
Chapter Three provides method details and task-level results from a new individual 
differences in visual noticing study.  During the two-hour behavioral study, 196 young adults 
responded to questions and completed a series of computerized tasks that included incidental 
noticing scenarios, intentional change detection tasks, and variations of several attention-
demanding cognitive tasks.  This chapter describes participant information, task procedures and 
results, and a brief summary of extracted outcome variables.  For additional information about 
the cross-task dataset, see Chapters Four and Five and Appendix A. 
 
3.2 Introduction 
This study included an incidental change noticing situation during a short video, an 
intentional change detection flicker task, an attentional breadth task, an inattentional blindness 
exposure during a line length judgment task, and a paper questionnaire with questions from 
several personality (as a replication of Jensen & Simons, in prep).  In the second half of the 
study session, participants also completed five additional tasks, including a speeded search and 
click task, a noticing scenario during a magic trick video, an object change detection task, a 
standard visual short-term memory measure, and a subset of the Ravens Progressive Matrices 
logic problems.  Descriptions of each task and of the primary outcome variables extracted from 
participant behavior during each of those tasks are provided in this Chapter in task order.  The 
final figure in this chapter summarizes the primary outcome variables across each task. 
 
3.3 Participants 
Participants were recruited from the Champaign-Urbana campus region through 
Craigslist and the Virtual Job Board as hosted by the office of student financial aid at the 
University of Illinois, and were scheduled through the University of Illinois psychology 
department paid subject pool website.  Subjects were recruited to be between 18 to 30 years of 
age, highly proficient in English, not colorblind, and with 20/20 or corrected to normal vision.  
Participants were paid a total of $16 for their time.    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!This study was supported by a subject payment grant from Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society, 
through their Grants-in-Aid of Research Program, and with additional funding through the University of 
Illinois Psychology Department Irwin Funds.   
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 In total, 196 young adults (122 female, 74 male) participated in single 2-hour experiment 
sessions at the Beckman Institute at the University of Illinois throughout 2012.  Participants 
ranged in age from 18 to 29 (M = 20.5, SD = 2.1).  They reported varied amounts of time playing 
video game with 76 participants playing zero hours per week (F = 61, M = 15), 32 participants 
playing less than 2 hours per week (F = 21, M = 11), 33 playing from 2-under 5 hours a week (F 
= 12, M =10), and 63 participants playing more than 5 hours a week (F = 26, M = 37)2. !
3.4 Task Procedures and Results  
Upon arriving in the lab, participants were greeted and consented to participate in the 
study as approved by the University of Illinois Institutional Review Board.  Researchers provided 
subjects with generic instructions about the lab and the study session.  They also verbally 
instructed subjects to take breaks as needed between tasks and to expect a longer break 
halfway through the session3.  Participants were run in groups of 1-6 people in one of two 4-
station testing rooms attached to a central lab room in the Beckman Institute at the University of 
Illinois.  Throughout the study, Macintosh eMac computers presented stimuli and collected data 
on 17-in. CRT monitors (1024 X 768 resolution) with a maximum refresh rate of 85 Hz using 
custom software for Matlab R2007b and the PsychToolbox-3 (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997).  
Participants viewed the screen from approximately 57 cm through open goggles attached to a 
black cloth viewing-hood structure that obscured the screen from other participants in the room.  
A viewing angle of 57 cm is assumed for all visual angle calculations.  At this distance, the 
screen subtends approximately 31° by 24° of visual angle.   
Once participants were seated at the test computers, they first read general instructions 
about the study and then completed each of the study tasks in the order described at their own 
pace.  Each new task began with task instructions and concluded by asking participants to rate 
the task's difficulty on a scale of 1 (very difficult) to 5 (very easy) followed by a brief break 
screen.  Participants' total time spent on each task was also recorded.  After the first five tasks, 
participants were prompted by the program to exit the testing room to take a break.  During this 
mid-way break, participants completed a paper and pencil battery of personality self-rating 
questions before returning to complete the remaining tasks.  Once they finished the remaining 
tasks, participants filled out an exit questionnaire and then were debriefed about the study by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Of particular note, there was large group of females that did not play video games, N = 61 female 
(50.8% of females), N = 15 males (20.5% of males). 
3 Full scripts for verbally and electronically presented instructions are available upon request.!
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the experimenter. 
3.4.01 Incidental Video Change Detection Task 
The incidental change detection task began by instructing participants to watch a short 
video and to expect to answer questions about the video when it ended and resembled 
incidental change detection video tasks from prior work (e.g. Levin & Simons, 1997, Jensen & 
Simons, in prep).  Upon a participant’s key press, the video began to play in a centered window 
spanning approximately 10° X 7.5° across the screen.  In the 8-second silent video, a student 
actor removed a book from a shelf and walked toward the camera out of the room and into the 
hallway.  Both the actor and the camera’s perspective moved into the hallway across a video cut 
that also provided a visual disruption to mask changes to the central actor.  As pictured in Figure 
3.1, the book moved from the actor's left hand to his right and the actor's unbuttoned black and 
tan layered shirts changed into a buttoned blue shirt.                  
When the video ended, participants made three responses.  They answered two 
separately presented yes/no computer prompts by responding, first, whether they noticed 
anything unusual during the video and, second, whether they had noticed any changes during 
the video clip.  Then, participants described any changes they noticed in writing on a piece of 
paper next to their computers.   
Participant responses to the three prompts resulted in different estimates of noticing.  
While only 41% of observers (81/196) reported noticing something unusual, 66% of observers 
reported noticing a change (129/196), and 50% of observers identified one of the critical visual 
anomalies in writing (98/196).  Of the two changes, the shirt change was far more likely to be 
reported (41% of observers) than the book change (11%).  Only 8 out of the 196 observers 
identified both changes (4%).  In the written responses, 27 participants who correctly identified a  
change in writing did not report noticing anything unusual in response to prompt one (14%) and 
5 observers who later described a critical change did not report noticing any changes during 
prompt two (3%).  In other words, a few individuals who described the change in writing did not 
respond affirmatively to prompts one or two.  Conversely, several participants who reported 
noticing a change in response to prompt two did not write about a critical change during prompt 
three but instead described scenery changes, the camera angle, or the video cut as the primary 
change in their written response (N = 32, 16%).  It was not uncommon for all participants (both 
those who did and did not correctly identify any of the critical visual anomalies) to mention the 
scenery, lighting or video angle/cut change in their written response (N=83, 42%).  
Because of this variability in responses, a binary outcome variable for reported noticing 
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during this task was coded by considering a combination of participant responses to all prompts 
with the most emphasis placed on the written responses.  For example, written responses like 
“he changed the hand that he was carrying the book” and “his shirt changed” were coded as 
noticed changes. Reported changes like “color of notebook” or “He was not carrying his book 
when the scene changed” or “shirt got wrinkled?” were also coded as correctly noticed changes 
as is typical in previous work (Levin & Simons, 1997).  Participants who wrote responses like 
“The man carrying the book switched rooms (setting changed)” were coded as not noticing the 
changes of interest for this task.  Using this method, 98/196 observers (50%) noticed at least 
one of the changes during the incidental video.  Of those 98 participants, 22 people wrote 
descriptions that were close but somewhat inaccurate at describing a change.  Partially accurate 
noticers were included in the main incidental change detection variable with equal weight to 
those who correctly identified one or more of the changes as is traditional in this literature.  
3.4.02 Intentional Change Detection Flicker Task 
In this variant of a flicker task with scenes, participants searched for a change (an item 
appearance/disappearance) in a photographed scene as it flashed on and off the computer 
screen.  The original and changed versions of the scenes alternated with a grey blank screen to 
create a flickering effect, with all stimuli and blanks appearing for 250 milliseconds across the 
full display.  A full alteration of the pre-change and post-change scenes with both blanks 
occurred every second.  The scenes continued to alternate until participants indicated they had 
located the change by ending the trial with a key press.  Then, they identified the change 
location by clicking on the scene with a mouse.  Finally, participants were prompted to press a 
key to begin the next trial.   
The stimuli for the flicker task were twelve scene pairs with a single item existence 
change.  The stimuli were originally selected to represent a range of central and more 
peripherally located changes in images of real world scenes, with minimal conceptual overlap in 
the changing items.  (See Figure 3.2 for an example scene pair.  For all scene pair stimuli used 
in this study and their corresponding changes, see Figure C.2 in Appendix C.)  In our prior work 
with the same flicker task design, we used a set of 25 normed change detection image pairs to 
score individual performance on the flicker task (Jensen & Simons, in prep).  The twelve image 
pairs used in this study represent the twelve items that had the strongest correlation between an 
individual’s time to correctly find the change and their overall composite change detection score 
in that study (average r(124) = -.27, SD = .04).  See Figure 3.3 for average search data for 
these test stimuli from Jensen & Simons (in prep).  
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This change detection flicker task provided two primary behavioral measures: search 
time until a change was located (as indicated by a key press) and overall accuracy at identifying 
the changes (as identified through a mouse click on the scene).  There was moderate internal 
consistency in both overall accuracy (alpha = .61) and change detection search speed for all 
trials (alpha = .51) as measured by Cronbach’s alpha.  Overall accuracy and response speeds 
were slightly slower in this sample than in Jensen & Simons (in prep) but performance was 
comparable overall to previous work.   
Out of 195 participants who completed the flicker task, 162 participants correctly 
identified more than 80% of the changes and 95 participants correctly identified all changes4.  
Eleven participants did not correctly identify any changes for a variety of reasons including 
computer error, mis-understanding task instructions, and unknown problems5.  Participants 
without any accurate flicker trials are treated as having missing data for this task in relation to 
the larger dataset.  The average accuracy for each subject was calculated as the average 
accuracy at localizing changes with a mouse click.  For inclusion in composite scores, the 
accuracy totals were transformed onto a standardized scale. 
As can be seen in Figure 3.3, the change scene stimuli varied in difficulty as indicated by 
overall mean differences in search time (as well as in accuracy).   Time to find the change 
varied widely between subjects with one individual searching as little as 1.2 seconds (or just 
over one alternation of an original and changed image) to correctly identify the change and 
another searching as long as 3 and a half minutes before correctly identifying a change.  
Average time to correctly identify a change was 15.1 seconds (SD = 19 sec). To calculate an 
individual’s average search time, search times were standardized relative to average participant 
search times for each particular scene pair.  Averaging across each participant’s standardized 
search times for accurate trials provides an estimate of how fast or slow an individual was to 
successfully find changes relative to their peers across flicker trials.   
Theoretically, perfect accuracy on the flicker task is possible, leaving time to find the 
change as the primary dependent measure of performance.  However, in previous work with 
similar scene pairs there was variability in subject accuracy across trials (Jensen & Simons, in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Two of the 195 participants did not complete all twelve trials of the flicker task.  One participant only 
completed a single trial and was excluded from analysis (as one of the eleven participants without 
accurate trials) and the other participant completed 8/8 trials before pre-maturely ending that task. This 
subject’s data was included in the sample for all available change detection trials. 
5 Similarly, in Jensen & Simons (in prep) 12/138 participants did not accurately identify enough changes 
to permit reliable estimates of change detection speed.   
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prep).  Because of the variation in both accuracy and response time in this sample, assessing 
overall performance on this task required a measure that took both dimensions of performance 
into account.   In previous work with the flicker task, we used a composite change detection 
measure that combined standardized accuracy and standardized response time together by 
subtracting response time from accuracy6.  High scores on the resulting variable indicate 
observers were faster and more accurate at finding changes than their peers in the sample and 
lower scores correspond to observers who were slower and less accurate than their peers.  
3.4.03 Attentional Breadth (FFOV) 
In this variant of the functional field of view task (Ball, Beard, Roenker, & Miller, 1988; 
Boot, Kramer, Simons, Fabiani, Gratton, 2008; Green & Bavelier, 2003), participants completed 
five blocks of twelve trials.  The first three blocks are treated as practice blocks and the final two 
blocks as test blocks.  On each trial, a participant’s task was to fixate a centrally-located open 
white square and then to locate a circled triangle target in a briefly presented eight-armed array 
of twenty-three distractor open squares before a 100-msec scrambled mask covered the 
display.  After viewing the target array, participants selected the arm of the array where they 
believed the target had appeared using a key response.  Examples of the fixation square, 
stimulus array, mask, and response screen are available in Figure 3.2. 
All stimuli spanned approximately 2.3 degrees of visual angle on their longest dimension 
and were presented at 10, 20, and 30 degrees from fixation.  The duration of the search array 
varied by block and, for the test trials, by target eccentricity.  Across the first three practice 
blocks the arrays appeared for approximately 75, 50, and then 25 msec.  During the test trials, 
the array appeared for approximately 14 msec for targets at 20 or 30 degrees away from fixation 
or for approximately 7 msec if the target appeared at 10 degrees.  
Here, the primary dependent measure is average accuracy at correctly selecting the arm 
of the array that contained the target.  195 participants completed all trials of the task (the 
remaining participant did not complete several tasks and is logged as coming to the lab sick).  
As is typical in this task, participants were able to perform well on the more slowly presented !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 An alternative performance measure can be computed by performing the opposite operation.    By 
adding accuracy to response time, accurate observers with the slowest response times will have the 
highest scores and observers with inaccurate and fast responses will have the lowest scores.  The 
resulting composite scores are uncorrelated overall with one other r(182) = -.1 but each capture variation 
in the original accuracy and response time variables.  For the composite better performers variable, r(182) 
= .7 with accuracy and r(182) = -.76 with response time.  For the speed/accuracy tradeoff composite, 
r(182) = .64 with accuracy and r(182) = .72 with response time. 
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practice trials (M = .72, SD = .21).  Performance on the test trials was less accurate with the 
shorter stimulus presentation time (M = .44, SD = .24) but is correlated with overall performance 
across the practice trials, r(193) = .67.  Overall internal reliability across trials was strong (alpha 
= .93), reflecting more test items and high intra-individual consistency in accuracy across trials.  
The standard outcome variable from this task is overall accuracy on the two test blocks of 
quickly presented trials. 
3.4.04 Inattentional Blindness Task 
Next participants completed eight trials of a line judgment task as originally reported by 
Rock, Linnett, Grant, & Mack (1992).  On each trial participants fixated a central fixation point 
and then had 200 msec to identify which of two crossed lines was longer before a pixelated 
colored mask appeared for 500 msec to mask the display.  On the forth, seventh, and eighth 
trials an additional object appeared next to the cross in one quadrant.  For all subjects, the first 
unexpected object was a blue triangle, the second was a red rectangle, and the third a black 
cross.  All stimuli for this task were presented in a 12.9° diameter circular window; the line 
lengths spanned approximately 2.5-4.5° and the additional objects averaged .6° across a 
dimension, appearing within 2.1° of the center of the crossed lines  (See Jensen and Simons, in 
prep for additional details).  After each presentation of the crossed lines and mask, participants 
identified the line they believed to be longer with a key press.  On the three trials with additional 
information, participants were then also queried about the additional information.  They first 
reported whether they had noticed “anything else presented at the same time as the cross” and 
then were asked to identify several features of the object; including the stimulus shape as one 
out of six simple shape options, the stimulus color as one of seven color options, and the 
stimulus location in one of four quadrants around the central figure.   
The first trial with the unexpected additional object (the forth trial) is the inattentional 
blindness trial.  The trial with second additional object (the seventh trial) is typically described as 
a divided attention trial7.  On the eighth and final trial, participants were instructed to ignore the 
line judgment and instead to look at the display, providing confirmation that the additional visual 
stimulus is fully visible to all observers. 
195 participants completed the line judgment task.  The primary measure of performance 
in the line judgment task is accuracy.  Across participants, accuracy for the first trial of the line !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Prior work indicates that the additional item is very likely to be noticed by most observers under these 
task conditions.   
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judgment task was 79.5% but was around 90% for the remaining trials, including those with 
additional objects (and excluding the final full attention trial when subjects were asked to look at 
the display).  On the forth trial, during the first unexpected object presentation, participants who 
reported noticing the unexpected object were no more or less accurate at the line judgment task 
on that trial (M = 92.9%, SD = 25.9%) than observers who did not notice the unexpected object 
(M = 92.8%, SD = 26.1%), a finding that is consistent with prior work.  For this dataset, the 
average accuracy over the first three trials was compiled for each subject as a measure of 
primary task ability (M = 87.9%, SD = 22.8%).   
The fourth line judgment trial with the first additional object is an inattentional blindness 
trial.  As with the incidental change detection task, the multiple prompts of the noticing question 
and then the additional feature identification questions resulted in multiple measures of reported 
noticing.  To the standard noticing question, 57.4% of observers reported seeing the additional 
object (112/195).  The percentage of participants who reported noticing the object and then went 
on to correctly identify object features can be seen in Fiugre 3.5.   
The overall pattern of accuracy and noticing is consistent with prior work (e.g. Rock, 
Linnett, Grant, & Mack, 1992) where observers who notice the critical item are overwhelmingly 
able to report the item’s location and color but are less accurate in identifying the object shape.  
On later divided and full attention trials, participants are more successful in correctly reporting all 
features.  For the purposes of cross-task analyses, the primary noticing outcome variable was 
calculated as in Jensen & Simons (in prep) by considering participant responses to the first 
noticing question (if observers reported noticed anything else presented at the same time as the 
cross).  
3.4.05 Trail Making Task 
In this computerized version of the Trail Making Task (Reitan, 1958; Corrigan & 
Hinkeldey, 1987; Gaudino, Geisler, & Squires 1995; Lezak, Howieson, Loring, 2004) 
participants completed two practice trials and two test trials.  Each practice trial exposed 
participants to the task in the following test trial (but with a reduced number of items).   In test 
trial A, participants were tasked to click on circled numbers labeled 1-25 in number order.  As 
they clicked, a line trail connected the current correctly clicked circle with the previous circles.  In 
test trial B, participants were presented with a similar display of 24 circles but, instead, were 
tasked to click on the circles in an alternating number-letter order as quickly as possible (e.g. 1, 
A, 2, B….12, L).  The circles and numbers appeared in the same locations for all subjects at 
approximately analogous locations to the original paper version of the task (although the test 
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stimuli were rotated from a vertical to landscape layout to better fit the dimensions of the 
computer monitor).  Each circle subtended 80 pixels (or approximately 2.7°) in diameter. 
Performance on the Trail Making Test is traditionally reported as the time to draw the 
trail between the circles on each test trial, where average performance for Trial A is about 29 
seconds and for Trial B is about 75 seconds (Corrigan, Hinkeldey, 1987; Gaudino, Geisler, 
Squires, 1995; Lezak, Howieson, & Loring, 2004; Reitan 1958).  Using a computerized variation 
of this task resulted in an overall reduction of time for test trial one (M = 19.4 sec, SD = 6.9 sec) 
and test trial two (M = 36.0 sec, SD = 19.2 sec) relative to the pen and paper tasks.   
In this experiment, response time was also more finely recorded as the time between the 
current and previous click.  For the primary task response speed measure for the Trail Making 
Task, all click response times for correct clicks were averaged into a composite measure.  While 
most clicks per circle were executed quickly (M = 1.0, SD = .25), there were several outlier trials 
that may represent meaningful data or might be the problem of computer interface problems.  
Internal reliability of click speeds across the items in the two test trials was sufficient but not 
strong as measured by Cronbach’s alpha (alpha = .65).  Taking the difference between the 
overall time to solution in trial one and trial two provides an indication of how much a participant 
was slowed by having to alternate between letters and numbers in trial two in relation to their 
speed on test trial one with the circles in number order.   Participants were about 16 seconds 
slower overall on the second trial (SD = 17.6).  Typically, the difference between response times 
in the numbers-only series and numbers-letters series is also calculated as a primary outcome 
measure (in addition to an estimate of response speed).  In this sample, the difference between 
response times in the first and second trials were highly correlated with overall click response 
times, r(189) = .688. In future variants of this task, additional trials with the 25 sets of circles 
(randomly placed) would provide more observations for analysis of both measures. 
The computerized version of the task also provided additional possible performance 
measures.  For example, click errors outside of the circle or to the wrong item are, perhaps, 
more common and easily measurable with a mouse-based task than pen-and-paper.   Of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Explanations for this relationship are open to speculation (for example, as a normal young adult 
population the variability between the two trial types may be reduced). No matter the reason, the variables 
were not both included in analyses as they were redundant.  Instead, we included only the click response 
speed estimates as the aggregation of multiple data points.  For example, the difference variable had 
similar overall relationships with cross-task variables. Variations in the overall pattern included a stronger 
relationship to non-time pressured prompts (RT & SD) across inclusion criteria than just the average 
response time.  Higher variability between response times on the trials also correlated with higher 
conscientiousness and agreeableness like overall response times (slightly more strongly).  
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191 participants who fully completed this task, 148 made an erroneous click at some point 
during the test trials (M = 2.6 errors, SD = 3.1, Mode = 1). 9  Participant’s click proximity to their 
target circle on correct trials was collected.  For instance in this sample, correct clicks deviated 
from the center of each circle by 18.8 pixels (SD = 9.2 pixels).   However, these variables were 
not included in any additional analyses. 
3.4.06 Personality Questionnaires & Break 
After the first five tasks, computerized instructions prompted participants to exit the room 
to fill out a survey and take a brief break.  As they left the room, participants were greeted and 
asked to fill out a paper-and-pen survey that included items from several personality measures.   
193 participants completed the personality questions10.  Participants first responded to 
the standard Big Five Inventory with established subscales of agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, and openness11 (John, Donahue, & Kentle 1991; 
John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008).  Participants then responded at their own pace to the remaining 
questions in one of two random orders.  The questions included items from the Need for Closure 
(Kruglasnkie, Webster, & Klem, 1993), Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), the 
Horizontal & Vertical Individualism & Collectivism II with four dimensions (Supportive (HC), 
Independent (HI), Dutiful (VC), Competitive (VI) (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), and the Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scales (Patton, Stanford & Barratt, 1995). On the five-point scale, participant’s 
average rating was 3.19, (SD = 1.28).  We did not collect response time for the personality 
questionnaire except in the computer estimate of the duration of the overall break time.  
For ease of interpretation, the set of 138 questions were reduced to seven factors using 
principle component analysis.  By considering the scree plot of eigenvalues and employing 
exploratory principle component techniques with a varimax rotation (Abdi & Williams, 2010; 
Worthington & Whittaker, 2006), seven factors were selected to reduce the personality 
responses into more limited dimensions that represented the range of questions across the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Because click errors were recorded throughout the test sessions, it would be possible to sort and 
categorize these errors (e.g. was it an error because it was near but not close enough to the next target 
circle, or was it a click on a wrong item in the number/letter series).  There is also some suggestion from 
log-files and participant performance that some students struggled to use the Apple Pro Mouse because 
of user error or computer/experimenter error.  Therefore, these erroneous clicks could be further explored 
but would need to be interpreted with caution first.    
10 Three participants in one session did not complete their packets due to experimenter error and a forth 
did not complete the first two pages of personality questions.   
11 Due to a printing error, the last 12 items were omitted from the big five personality questionnaire.  The 
omitted items were equally represented across the five dimensions.  !
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personality surveys.  The resulting 7-factor solution roughly corresponded to the Big Five 
dimensions with some additional contributions from the other scales.   
See Figure 3.5, for the seven factors listed with the most heavily weighted questions.  
For example, the first factor was defined primarily by items from the need for cognition scale like 
“I would prefer complex to simple problems” and the big five openness scale like “is ingenious, a 
deep thinker”.  The second factor explained variance related to the conscientiousness and 
impulsivity scales where items like “Does a thorough job” were weighted against impulsivity 
items like “I act on impulse”.  The third factor was primarily defined by agreeableness measures 
like “is considerate and kind to almost everyone” as well as items from the collectivism 
dimension of the horizontal/vertical individualism/collectivism scales like “I feel good when I 
cooperate with others”.  The forth factor was reflective of the vertical dimension of the 
horizontal/vertical questions like “It is important that I do my job better than others” as well as 
items from the impulsivity survey like “ I am future oriented” and from the closure scale like “I 
think that having clear rules and order at work is essential for success.”  The fifth factor 
corresponded to ratings relating to neuroticism like “worries a lot” as well as items from the 
closure scale like “I tend to struggle with most decisions.”   The sixth factor primarily 
corresponded to introversion/extroversion where extraversion ratings like “is reserved” weight 
opposite questions like “is talkative”.  Finally, the last factor related to items from the closure 
rating scale and including statements like “ I dislike unpredictable situations” and “I hate to 
change my plans at the last moment”. 
3.4.07 Magic Video  
After the break, participants were instructed to watch a short video carefully and to 
expect questions about the video when it ended.   Participants pressed a key to begin a five 
second video from the pro-illusion social cues condition of Kuhn & Land (2006) that appeared in 
an approximately 21° X 16° (640 X 480 pixel) window in the center of their screen12.  In the 
video, a man in a black shirt tosses a ball two times before the ball is palmed using sleight of 
hand at the bottom of the third, final, and now mimed toss of the missing ball.  The typical 
phenomenological experience of this sleight of hand for a naive observer is that the missing ball 
continues to move toward the top of the screen on the third toss as cued by the body language 
of the central actor.  For example, 68% of approximately 20 observers of this video recalled !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Videos are viewable as demonstrations in the supplemental information provided with the original 
paper: http://www.current-biology.com/cgi/content/full/16/22/R950/DC1, and are used here with 
permission from the original authors.) 
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seeing the ball continue to move upward after it was palmed, leaving the camera window at the 
top of the toss (Kuhn & Land, 2006).  In our variation of the task, after watching the clip, 
participants were presented with the final frame of the video and were asked to click on the 
location where they last saw the ball.  Participants viewed the clip a second time with similar 
instructions, followed by the same response prompt to click on the location where they last saw 
the ball. 
Several performance measures were recorded during this task.  For example, time to 
respond with a click was recorded for both trials and averaged around 4.5 seconds (SD = 1.9 
sec) across trials, with participants spending more time to respond after the first viewing of the 
video (M = 5.9 sec, SD = 2.9 sec) than the second (M = 3.1 sec, SD = 1.8 sec).  The most 
critical measure for noticing the illusion is the observer’s click estimate of the last location where 
they saw the ball.  In particular, the vertical dimension of the click response is of interest as an 
indicator of how strongly an observer experienced the illusion of the ball continuing to move 
upward after it was no longer visible on screen.  Observer click responses are plotted over the 
response image in Figure 3.1 for the first and second exposures to the video. 
After a first exposure to the video, over 70% of observers clicked on a location that was 
above the magician’s hand in the final still frame from the video (N = 138/196), replicating Kuhn 
& Land (2006) with a larger sample and a non-verbal response.  However, after a second 
viewing, only 13% of observers clicked above the magician’s hand (N = 26/196).   Across 
observers, click responses were relatively uniform, clustering into several general areas 
primarily above, below, and on top of the central actor’s right hand13.  The average vertical click 
location across both trials was approximately 315 pixels from the top of the screen (or about 
41% of the screen from the top down toward the middle, slightly above the actor’s right hand), M 
= 314.7, SD = 88, and approximately 456 pixels from the left edge of the screen (or about 45% 
of the way across the screen to correspond with the magician’s right hand), M = 455.8, SD = 
30.0.  Of 196 participants, 118 participants decreased the altitude of their click by over 100 
pixels (a height decrease of about 40% of the video window size) after viewing the video a 
second time and only 13 participants increased their altitude assessments by over 100 pixels 
after viewing the slight-of-hand trick a second time.  The average click change in the vertical 
dimension was a drop in altitude of about 131 pixels (SD = 139.7).   In contrast, the average !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 As plotted in Figure 3.1, there is one click to the extreme left in the first trial responses and to the 
extreme right in the second trial responses.  These click responses are from one individual and were 
excluded from further analysis in this task because of their extreme values in relation to other participants.   
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horizontal click movement was a 10.9 pixel shift to the right (SD = 78.9).  Only the first response 
to the video is included in the cross-task analyses described in Chapter Three. 
3.4.08 One-Shot Object Change Detection Task 
Next, participants completed twenty trials of a one-shot intentional change detection 
task.  On each trial, five photographed real-world objects appeared in one of twelve positions.   
Possible object locations were centered on a 4 X 3 position grid with objects appearing in 
positions jittered from those center points by up to 10% of the object’s size.   Objects were 
scaled to span 20% of the smallest screen dimension at their widest point (here, about 4.8° of 
visual angle or 153 pixels).  In this change detection task, participants saw each array of four 
objects for 1.5 sec followed by a 2 sec blank grey screen. Then, the object array re-appeared 
and remained on the screen until subjects responded.  In 70% percent of the 20 test trials, one 
item in the array was replaced with a new object image.  Participants then reported a 
change/no-change judgment about the display by pressing one of two keys.    
The change detection task provided an outcome measure of a participant’s ability to 
accurately detect a change trial through participant hit rates (M = 76.3%, SD = 14.6%) and false 
alarm rates (M = 17.0%, SD =13.3%) that were combined into a measure of sensitivity, d’ (M = 
1.9, SD = .7).  Of 196 participants, three participants had low hit rates and high false alarm rates 
that resulted in zero or negative d’ estimates.  These scores could not be resolved by 
considering a key miscoding.  Extreme values for hit rates of one and false alarm rates of zero 
were adjusted in by a 1/N transformation (Hautus & Lee, 2006; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). 
The task also provided a measure of individual observer’s response bias based on the 
distribution of errors.  Overall, observers were somewhat biased to report no change (M = .11, 
SD = .35) but this tendency varied and was not included in further analyses.  Time to respond to 
the change/no-change prompt was also recorded (M = 2.2 sec, SD = 1.7 sec) and was included 
in the non-time pressured response prompts measure (See Chapter Five for additional 
information). 
3.4.09 Visual Short Term Memory (VSTM) 
The next task in the study shared design elements and response keys with the prior 
object change detection task.  This visual short-term memory measure was based on tasks 
described in Luck & Vogel (1997).  In this variation, participants completed 40 trials of a one-
shot change detection task with a color change to one of six simple colored square shapes.   On 
every trial, six colored squares appeared in random but constrained positions for 100 msec.  
Each square was 6.5% of the smallest dimension of the display (here, approximately 1.6° of 
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visual angle or 50 pixels).  The squares then disappeared for 100-150 msec before re-appearing 
and persisting in the same locations until participants responded.  On 50% of the trials, one 
square changed from its original color to a different color (either white, black, red, blue, yellow, 
purple, green, or gray, and limited to never more than two of the same color in any display).  
On every trial, participants reported their judgment of whether an item had changed or 
not on that trial through a key press.  Translating this change detection judgment into a signal 
detection context of hits and false alarms, performance on this task is typically reported as an 
estimate of the “size” of visual short term memory through a capacity estimate K (Pashler, 1988; 
Rouder, Morey, Morey, & Cowan, 2011), where K = (Set Size * (Hit Rate - False Alarm Rate)) / 
(1.0 – False Alarm Rate).   Standard signal detection outcome measures provide a similar 
measure of sensitivity as measured by d' = z(HR) - z(FR) and of response bias as estimated by 
c = (-Z(HR) + Z(FAR))/2 (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). In terms of 
differentiating between individuals, either way of calculating sensitivity yields a similar relative 
ranking of individual performance (d’ is highly correlated with K given the single set size.)  For 
discussion of alternative calculations for capacity estimates using this task see Rouder, Morey, 
Morey, & Cowan (2011).  To adjust for hit rates and false alarms rate of zero and one, I applied 
a standard correction adjusting the extreme values in by a 1/N transformation (Hautus & Lee, 
2010; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). 
Using these procedures, the 194 participants who completed this task (one participant 
left the experiment due to illness and a second experienced a computer crash earlier in the 
session) had an average estimated capacity of 3.4 items (SD = 1.3).  Across participants, hit 
rates were high but varied (M = 62.2%, SD = 15.3%) and false alarm rates low (M = 10.5%, SD 
= 11.2%).  Participants were typically sensitive to the changes as measured by d’ (M = 1.8, SD 
= .65) and somewhat biased as measured by c to report no changes (M =.54, SD = .36).  
Typical d’ values range from 0 (when HR = FAR) to around 2 but as high as around 4.5 with 
near perfect HR and FAR.  For this task, 2 participants had such low hit rates and high false 
alarm rates that their resulting d’ estimate was zero or negative.  (Note that there is overlap 
between these subjects and those performing poorly on other tasks.)   Average time to respond 
change or no change was around a second across participants and trials (M = 1.1 sec, SD = .4 
sec). 
3.4.10 Ravens Matrices – QUEST Adapted 
Next, participants read a variation of the standard Ravens Matrices instructions (Raven, 
Raven, & Court, 2003), including a description of the solution to a simple example problem and 
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one low difficulty practice problem.  Ravens progressive matrices are typically administered in 
order of ascending difficulty across a longer testing session (Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 2009).  
Because our study was a single session and time-limited, participants started with a mid-level 
Ravens question (approximately item #14 of the Set II problems) and then the QUEST staircase 
algorithm (Watson & Pelli, 1983) selected more or less difficult problems based on solution 
rates.  Set I of this Ravens question set has 12 items, although the first two are used as 
instructional example problems.  Set II consists of 36 items.  Altogether, then, there were 46 
possible Ravens problems for a participant to solve.  Because the number of Ravens problems 
is finite, the program included an additional algorithm to select a nearby alternate problem when 
the closest quest-recommended value had already been sampled.  QUEST was set to estimate 
the threshold (or problem number difficulty) at which a participant would be likely to solve the 
puzzle correctly approximately 80% of the time.  
Each participant completed a total of 12 Ravens problems (2 practice and 10 test items).  
The average quest estimated threshold for participants to achieve 80% accuracy was 33.4 (SD 
= 8.4).  For comparison, in a college-age norming sample using the problem sets included in 
this study, scores on the Set II problems ranged from 6 – 35 correct out of a possible 36 with an 
average score of 22 (SD = 6) (Bors & Stokes, 1998). In relation to the number scaling used in 
this study, that would be an average score of 32 (i.e. to problem 14 in test set II), suggesting 
these estimated values are reasonable given prior work.     
On average, participants spent about 41 seconds answering each question (M= 41.4 
sec, SD = 22 sec) but were far more likely to spend more time answering more difficult 
questions than easier questions.  Across, participants, the correlation between item number (or 
ranked difficulty) and time to solution was strong, r(46) = .87.   Given the restricted adaptive item 
sampling, time to solution was correlated with a participant’s overall estimated threshold.  
Therefore, this response time estimate was not included in the general response time measures 
calculated across task responses nor was this response time measure included in the overall 
dataset.   
3.4.11 Final Exit Questionnaire & Main Task Feedback 
In addition to the response and outcome measures collected for each task, additional 
data were collected throughout the experiment.  The main computer program recorded overall 
time on tasks and during breaks.   The program also prompted participants to rate the difficulty 
of the task they had just completed from 1 (very difficult) to 5 (very easy).  Participant’s average 
rating was 3.1 (SD = .5) and differences in overall ratings of task difficulty can be seen in Figure 
58 
3.7.  Through self-report, 193 participants also provided additional information in response to a 
final questionnaire that included questions about prior experience with the tasks in the study and 
participant experiences in this study.  Participant written responses were coded and aggregated.    
Participants also made responses to prompts throughout the experiment that were not 
time-pressured and were not directly included in the primary outcome measures from the 
behavioral tasks.  These response time measures were transformed onto a standardized scale 
and averaged into two composite scores, an overall response time measure and the average of 
the standard deviations in response time across individual participants.  As discussed in 
Chapter Five, overall response time was correlated across several different response time 
measures. 
3.5 Extracted Outcome Variables and Summary 
Within this framework of analysis, each behavioral task employed in this study resulted 
in a single primary outcome measure of performance.  The primary outcome variables extracted 
from each task are listed in Figure 3.6 with summary statistics and the number of participants 
with data for each measure.  For the scene flicker task, the variable that provided an estimate of 
participant performance is the composite change detection score where participants who were 
more accurate and faster to find changes received higher combined scores than those who 
were inaccurate and slow to find the changes.  If observers had been equally accurate at 
identifying the changes, the primary outcome variable would be defined by average search time 
to find the changes.  In the signal detection framing of the object change detection and visual 
short-term memory tasks, the d prime estimates of sensitivity provided an outcome measure to 
reflect differences in individual performance.   For Ravens, the primary task outcome measure 
was the quest-estimated problem difficulty for an individual to have an 80% accurate solution 
rate.  For the Trail Making Task, the primary outcome variable was calculated as average time 
to correctly click per item (standardized).  Finally, for the three unexpected visual noticing tasks 
the primary dependent measures are, first, a binary noticing variable to reflect noticing of 
changes during the incidental change video; second, a binary noticing variable for inattentional 
blindness; and, third, the relative height of the individual’s first click to indicate the last-seen-
location of the disappearing ball in the magic video.  In addition to these primary task outcome 
measures, participants responded to a number of personality questions that were reduced into 
seven factors as described earlier in this chapter (See Section 3.2.6). 
Each of the tasks described in this chapter has its own place within psychology, its own 
traditions and reference literatures, and its own implications.  Several of the findings reported in 
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this chapter are of interest in their own right14.  However, in the context of this paper, the goal is 
to use variables from these tasks to create a dataset that captures participant behavior across 
the study and document how individuals differ from one another in measurable performance.  
Considering the tasks and outcome variables from this perspective, individual performance on 
these tasks fulfills many of those desired constraints.  The single trial visual noticing tasks (the 
incidental change detection, inattentional blindness, and magic trick tasks) all have roughly half 
of the participants noticing the critical information (respectively, 50% noticing the video change, 
57% noticing the unexpected critical stimulus, and 30% not reporting an experience of the ball 
height illusion).  For the multiple trial noticing tasks, there are differences between individuals in 
performance.  For example, performance on the intentional noticing flicker task reflects a range 
of performances in both search time and accuracy as further explored in Chapter Five.  
Participant performance on the remaining cognitive tasks was somewhat stable as measured by 
inter-trial correlations but performance between observers varied.  Altogether, this variability and 
stability in responses suggests there is sufficient variability in performance to consider 
differences and similarities in individual performance across tasks. 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 For example, this study included new implementations of well-established psychological tests, like an 
adaptive Ravens implementation and a computer and mouse-based Trail Making task, that may be useful 
in future research and merit further testing to ensure construct validity. 
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3.6 Figures 
 
Incidental Noticing Scenarios 
 
Figure 3.1 Single Trial Noticing Stimuli Examples.  Pictured for the incidental change video (Task 1) are 
two video stills from before and after the change.  The inattentional blindness images (Task 4) include a 
fixation screen, an example of a line judgment task with a critical object, and an example of the pixelated 
mask.  The Illusory magic ball video images (Task 7) depict the same post-illusion screenshot with 
participant click estimates of the ball’s last location for the first and second trials plotted over the first and 
second images, respectively. 
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Multiple Trial Cognitive Tasks 
 
Figure 3.2 Multiple Trial Cognitive Task Stimuli Examples. For Task 2, an example of a full cycle of blanks 
and object-present/object-absent scenes are presented.  For Task 3, a fixation screen, briefly presented 
target image, mask, and then a response screen are pictured.  The four trials of click targets are plotted 
for Task 5.  For both Task 8 & 9, an example trial with a blank, pre-change array, blank, and post-change 
array is provided. 
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Flicker Change Detection Summaries by Stimulus Pair 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Scene Stimuli Summaries for Flicker Task.  For each image pair and corresponding change 
included in the study described in Chapter Three, this table lists performance summaries including the 
average accuracy, search time to find the change, and correlation of that item with the composite score. 
 
 
Inattentional Blindness Task 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Inattentional Blindness Task Critical Object Trials. Noticing and accuracy at identifying object 
properties for each trial with an additional object.  Participants selected one out of six possible objects, 
one out of seven possible colors, and one out of four quadrants around the central figure. 
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Self-Rated Personality Factors 
 
Figure 3.5. Factor Loadings for Personality Questions. The highest loading personality self-ratings on 
each factor are listed with the question origin, whether questions were reverse coded, and question text. 
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Self-Rated Personality Factors  
 
Figure 3.5 (cont.) 
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Summary of Primary Outcome Variables 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Primary Outcome Variable Summary Table. The primary outcome variables calculated from 
each task are listed with summary statistics and task ratings of difficulty and familiarity. 
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CHAPTER 4: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN VISUAL NOTICING1 
 
4.1 Abstract 
Why does one person notice something that another does not under similar controlled 
conditions?  This chapter builds on previous literature and on preliminary findings from our lab to 
identify patterns of relationships across cognitive task performance and personality measures 
that co-vary with visual noticing.  Noticing is considered both as performance during multiple 
trials of intentional change detection search and as noticing during three single trial incidental 
scenarios (a video change, an anomalous shape appearance, and a magic illusion) in an 
analysis of a new study of individual differences in a sample of 196 young adults.  Consistencies 
in noticing across incidental tasks, in data patterns across analyses, and in findings across 
studies are discussed.  Alternate interpretations of the observed data patterns are contrasted in 
the conclusion with a discussion of limitations and future directions of research. 
 
4.2 Introduction 
Imagine standing at the edge of a town plaza with a perpetually unicycling clown circling 
the center of the common area.  Imagine watching as two hundred of your friends and family 
each walk through the square on their way to some destination.  Assume half of the people will 
report seeing the clown and half will not (e.g. Hyman, Boss, Wise & Caggiano, 2009).  Is it 
possible to accurately predict which half of your people will notice the clown?  And, if you made 
such a noticing prediction for your two hundred observers, what features or distinctions would 
inform your decision?  Perhaps some observers have a particularly keen eye or astute mind for 
noticing anomalous information as they go about their daily tasks.  Perhaps some individuals 
are more likely to seek out visual anomalies across contexts or to re-assess ambiguous or 
conflicting sensory information.  Or, perhaps some observers are simply more willing to report 
the perception of anomaly than others.  Although possible hypothesized differences between 
individuals are infinite, the focus of this discussion and analyses is limited to replicating and 
extending prior findings of individual differences in visual noticing. 
In order to replicate and extend prior findings, discussion across this chapter entertains 
two parallel perspectives or goals.  The first goal is to characterize the relationships observed 
between visual noticing and the other variables extracted from this individual differences study, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The study described in this chapter was supported through a subject payment grant from Sigma Xi, The 
Scientific Research Society, through their Grants-in-Aid of Research Program, and with additional funding 
through the University of Illinois Psychology Department Irwin Funds. 
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a study that was informed both by previous work in our lab and previous research (as reviewed 
in Chapters One and Two).  The first section of the introduction briefly summarizes findings from 
relevant literature by discussing the central visual noticing paradigms employed here and 
predictions from prior work for their relationships to other variables in the study.  The second 
goal is to assess the consistency of these findings across tasks, analyses, and studies.  The 
second section of the introduction describes how understanding individual differences in noticing 
requires looking for reliable and robust effects across dimensions of consistency.  To address 
each goal, the study described in this chapter includes multiple exposures to visual noticing 
tasks across the same observers as well as measures of their performance on several attention-
demanding cognitive tasks and personality measures.  The final section of the introduction 
describes the present study and summarizes the central hypotheses and planned analyses for 
the dataset. 
4.2.1 Previous Findings of Individual Differences in Visual Noticing  
Experimental approximations to scenarios like those that began this chapter primarily 
originate in the inattentional blindness and change blindness literatures.  Inattentional blindness 
paradigms exploit limitations to observers’ awareness of information beyond their primary task 
by presenting unexpected but clearly visible stimuli while observers are cognitively engaged with 
something else (typically finding that many observers fail to notice the critical additions).  
Change blindness paradigms reveal limitations in human perception and memory by asking 
observers to detect discrepancies across views or exposures to sensory information (typically 
finding that observers are slow and error-prone in noticing and finding changes).  Studying 
individual differences in both visual noticing paradigms has most frequently been approached by 
looking for group level differences in noticing, often including other measures of attention and 
cognition as covariates of noticing (e.g. under influence of alcohol or not, Clifasefi, Takrangi, & 
Bergman, 2006; Colflesh & Wiley, 2012; sports expert or not IB; Memmert, et al. 2009; 
Memmert, 2006; Werner & Thies, 2000; across age groups Fletcher-Watson et al., 2008; 
McCarley et al., 2004; Pringle et al, 2001; Pringle Kramer, & Irwin, 2004; Shore, 2006; Veil et 
al., 2006, as some examples).  In this section, I briefly discuss such individual difference 
findings in relation to the four central visual noticing paradigms employed in this study that 
include an intentional change detection task, an inattentional blindness scenario, an incidental 
change detection scenario, and an exposure to a magic ball drop illusion. 
Across several studies, individual differences in intentional search for change share 
modest commonalities with performance differences on other cognitive tasks.  For example, 
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findings from large-scale batteries of cognitive performance typically report better flicker task 
performance correlates with better performance on other cognitive task outcome measures2  
(Alvez, et al., 2013; Pringle, et al., 2001; Pringle, Kramer, & Irwin, 2004; Huang, Mo, & Li, 2012; 
Shore et al., 2006; Veiel, Storandt, & Abrams, 2006).  In contrast, single trial inattentional 
blindness scenarios tend to show irregular relationships with individual’s performance on other 
attention-demanding cognitive tasks, finding noticing correlates with some primary task 
measures in some studies (Hannon & Richards, 2010; Richards, Hannon, & Derakshan, 2010), 
with some subsamples3 (Seegmiller, et al., 2011), but not in others (Bredemeier & Simons, 
2012).  See Chapter Two for additional discussion. 
Incidental change detection scenarios, situations in which observers are exposed to an 
unexpected visual change (typically during a video or in-person interaction), share similarities 
with both inattentional blindness and intentional change detection tasks.  Like intentional change 
detection, many incidental change detection scenarios involve directing observer attention in 
part or in full toward the to-be-noticed information as part of the observer’s cover task.  Like 
intentional change detection tasks, noticing an unexpected change in these scenarios requires 
observers to store and compare information over time to notice a difference.  However, unlike 
intentional change detection tasks (but like inattentional blindness scenarios), the changes in 
incidental change scenarios are unexpected and are typically measured in a single observation 
of noticing.  Very few studies have considered differences between observers during incidental 
change detection.  Preliminary work in our lab observed that noticing changes during an 
incidental video trial correlated with change detection performance and other primary task 
measures.  However, as a single isolated finding, individual differences in incidental change 
detection merit further investigation.  Moreover, considering such differences may help to bridge 
some of the disparities between individual difference findings in change blindness and 
inattentional blindness research. 
Magic is a topic of recurring interest in the study of perception and attention, in part 
because magicians often skillfully engage, manipulate, and misdirect attention to achieve their 
effects in real-world contexts under replicable conditions4 (see Kuhn, Amlani, & Rensink, 2008; !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Preliminary work in our lab has replicated this overall finding.  For example, in an early study, response 
speeds during a change detection task correlated with response speeds on a picture matching task, r(52) 
= .41, and with response speeds to a cue during a stop inhibition task, r(52) = .22.   
3 In Jensen & Simons (in prep), noticing during a static line judgment task did not correlate to attentional 
breadth but was irregularly correlated to intentional change detection across sub-samples. 
4 Magic tricks share similarities with established visual noticing tasks but with several important 
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Macknik et al., 2008 for discussion).  Few studies explore how individual differences might 
predict observer susceptibility to misdirection or magic illusions.  However, there is evidence 
that reported paranormal belief as measured by survey questions correlates with the strength of 
magic illusions (Wiseman & Morris, 19955) and susceptibility to verbal suggestion (Wiseman & 
Greening, 2005, see Wiseman & Watt, 2006 for a review).  In the context of the other visual 
noticing tasks and variables included in this study, noticing during magic illusions provides an 
interesting parallel as an incidental noticing scenario.  Like an incidental change detection video, 
a magic video depicts a human actor in a real environment across a scenario during which an 
unnatural discontinuity occurs.   The magic video is also a novel incidental noticing situation that 
has been previously documented in an experimental context (Kuhn & Land, 2006).  Like both 
inattentional blindness and incidental change detection situations, the ball disappearance 
provides an unexpected single exposure to a visual anomaly, but, unlike those scenarios, all 
observers eventually notice the ball disappearance; the critical noticing question is at what point 
do observers report noticing the ball’s disappearance, and does that report predict whether 
observers report noticing anomalies in other scenarios?  
4.2.2 Consistency in patterns of Individual Differences in Visual Noticing 
  A conclusion of the review in Chapter Two in both change detection and inattentional 
blindness contexts was that future research must “consider the extent of similarity across 
alternate measures of same phenomena, consider data patterns across multiple predictors, and 
look for replications and convergence across findings.”  Such a conclusion mirrors a wider 
recognition within psychology that methodological blindspots can create deficits in critical 
scientific practices (Ioannidis, 2005).   For example, after public revelations of problematic 
research practices (John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012), there is growing recognition that both 
direct and conceptual replications of findings are an essential aspect of quality empirical 
research (for example, see Volume 45(3) of Social Psychology for a special issue discussing 
replications of central social psychological findings).  This chapter addresses some of these 
methodological concerns by explicitly assessing consistency in findings across scenarios, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
distinctions (see Kuhn & Tatler, 2011 for discussion).   
5 For example, Wiseman and Morris (1995) asked two samples of participants (N = 37 & N = 51) to 
complete paranormal belief surveys and classified them into skeptical observers (goats) and less 
skeptical observers (sheep) and exposed them to a magic trick (a bending fork illusion or a divining card 
identity trick).  Wiseman & Morris (1995) found that skeptical observers were more likely to recall critical 
method-relevant information from the video than less skeptical individuals (unless those less skeptical 
individuals were explicitly told the video contained trickery).!
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analyses, and studies.  
Consistency in noticing is first considered in the following analyses by looking across 
incidental detection scenarios for similarity in individuals’ performance.   The unexpected nature 
of many visual noticing scenarios has limited prior studies to a single trial of noticing as a 
dependent measure, which has, in turn, made documenting consistency in unexpected noticing 
situations a challenge.  Are there more stable differences in incidental noticing such that one 
person might be more or less likely than another to notice anomalies across scenarios?  Few 
studies collect multiple observations of noticing for unexpected stimuli and as a result there is 
limited empirical evidence that some individuals might be more likely to notice visual anomalies 
generally.  Replicating and extending our earlier work on individual differences in visual noticing, 
the study described here implements three different incidental visual noticing paradigms to 
begin to address this limitation of current research. 
Consistency in noticing is next assessed in this study by considering alternate 
descriptive accounts of the data patterns observed across analyses.  Along with a collective 
insight into the importance of replication, there is also increasing recognition that researchers 
make many small decisions about tasks, data calculations, inclusion criteria, and so on that 
together culminate in large “researcher degrees of freedom” in defining instantiations of a task 
and sizes of reported effects (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011).  There are solutions to 
such problems. For example, new studies can pre-register or pre-record study details and 
planned calculations to register their road map to consistent study and analysis implementations 
(as I did for this study with my committee).  Another more traditional alternative is to bias design 
decisions away from finding a hypothesized effect and then to only consider a narrow set of pre-
planned contrasts or analyses.  In reality, best practices are likely imperfectly followed (John, 
Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012) and the cumulative bias created by researchers making small but 
favorable design and analysis decisions could be quite large.  To consider data pattern reliability 
across alternative analyses, the cross-task results in this chapter are summarized across 
informed sub-samples, across regression and classification tree models with random re-
sampling, and in full ordinary least squares regression models (for contrast). 
Finally, consistency in noticing is assessed through a (nearly6) direct replication of a prior !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 There were some differences between the original and replicated studies.  For example, the second 
study had a larger sample size, a slightly different sample population, and participants were paid (as 
opposed to participating in exchange for psychology course credit).  Similarly, there were some small 
method differences between tasks that are noted in Chapter Three (e.g. hand-written reports of the 
71 
study from our lab.  With the goal of replicating and extending prior results, the first half of each 
two-hour session in this study was a replication of a prior large-scale individual difference study.  
The tasks included in both studies were an incidental change blindness scenario, an intentional 
change detection task, an attentional breadth task, an inattentional blindness trial during a 
judgment task, and a series of personality responses.  To assess how well the cross-task data 
patterns replicate across studies, the method and analysis section includes a description of the 
original findings, the current results, and their similarities and dissimilarities. 
4.2.3 The Present Study 
The single trial noticing scenarios included in this study were an incidental change 
exposure, an inattentional blindness trial, and a magic illusion.  Visual noticing was also 
measured during intentional search for change during the flicker task and two one-shot change 
detection tasks.  Additional attention-demanding cognitive tasks and personality measures were 
also included as covariates of performance.  To consider consistency in these descriptive data 
patterns, analyses in this study take three different perspectives on the data by looking across 
similar single trial noticing tasks, looking across different analyses at the descriptive account of 
the relationships between measures, and, finally, by looking across studies for evidence of 
consistent results. 
 
4.3 Method and Results 
See Chapter Three for full method details and task-level results summaries.   
4.3.1 Participants 
196 young adults (62% female, N = 122) participated in one 2-hour experiment session.  
Participants were 18 to 29 years of age (M = 20.5, SD = 2.1). For additional details about 
participant recruitment and demographic summaries, refer to Chapter Three and Appendix A. 
4.3.2 Procedures 
Each participant completed several computerized tasks in the same order under 
controlled conditions.  The tasks included three single trial noticing scenarios in the form of a 
video version of an incidental change detection task (Task 1), an inattentional blindness trial 
during a line judgment task (Task 4), and a video of a magic illusion (Task 7).  A flickering scene 
change detection task (Task 2) provided a multiple trial intentional change detection measure.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
unexpected change were collected instead of a mouse click on an image and there was an addition of 
one extra task before the personality packet break.) 
72 
Additional individual difference tasks included short stimulus exposure target search and 
memory tasks like an attentional breadth task (Task 3), a variant of the trail making task (Task 
5), a one-shot object change detection task (Task 8), and a shorter exposure one-shot color 
change detection Visual Short Term Memory task (Task 9).  Participants also responded to a 
series of personality questions (Task 6) and solved a series of Ravens Matrices problems (Task 
10).  Refer to Chapter Three for details including task citations, descriptions, and stimuli 
examples. 
4.3.3 Incidental Change Detection Results  
Of the 196 observers who viewed the short video with an unexpected change, 98 
described the critical change(s) in writing.  Noticing the video change was not reliably correlated 
with primary task outcome measures, only sharing a non-zero correlation with non-standard 
primary task variables like noticing during inattentional blindness, r(193) = .13, where identifying 
the video change was weakly correlated with more noticing in the inattentional blindness tasks. 
Personality variables like conscientiousness, r(190) = -.16, and preferring closure, r(190) = -.16, 
correlated with identifying the changes during the incidental change video, where lower 
conscientiousness and higher need for closure were associated with lower noticing rates.  See 
Figure 4.1 for a summary of cross-task relationships. 
4.3.4 Intentional Change Detection Results  
When searching for changes across alternating presentations of scenes, participants 
varied both in how long they viewed the scenes (M = 15.1 sec, SD = 19 sec) and in how 
accurately they clicked on the change locations (M = 86.2%, SD = 24.8%7).  See Chapters 
Three and Five and Appendix B for additional details and discussion about performance on the 
flicker task.   
Observers’ relative search performance (as measured by a composite search score8) 
was considered in the context of predictor variables that were calculated from other tasks within 
the study.  Across the dataset, faster and more accurate performance on the flicker task was 
weakly correlated with better performance on other primary task measures of attention, 
cognition, and memory.  For example, participants who found the changes most quickly and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Eleven participants did not accurately click on the change location during any flicker trial; No composite 
score could be tabulated for participants without accurate trials.  See Chapter 3 for additional detail.   The 
remaining participants were more uniformly accurate, M = 91.8% SD = 11.7%.  
8 Composite scores were calculated by subtracting correct search times (standardized within stimulus pair 
across subjects) from standardized accuracy.  See Chapter 3.4 for additional details. 
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accurately tended to also be faster to click on the next target during the trail making task, r(182) 
= -.28, more sensitive to changes during the object memory change detection task,  r(182) = 
.22, and the visual short term memory task, r(182) = .13, and to have higher estimated Ravens 
ability, r(182) = .16.  Intentional change detection was also correlated with accurately identifying 
the briefly presented target during the attentional breadth task, r(182) = .15.  Correlations 
between search for changes and the calculated personality factors were negligible.  See Figure 
4.2 for a summary of cross-task relationships with intentional change detection. 
4.3.5 Inattentional Blindness Results  
During the forth trial of a brief exposure line length judgment task, an additional 
anomalous shape (a blue triangle) also appeared on the computer screen.   57.4% of 
participants reported noticing the shape when questioned after the trial.  See Chapter 3.4 for 
additional information about the inattentional blindness task. 
There was mixed evidence of inattentional blindness correlating with performance on 
other primary tasks (See Figure 4.3).  In particular, noticing was somewhat related to better 
performance on attentional breadth, r(193) = .14, but not to click speed during the trail making 
task, r(189) = -.04, nor to intentional change detection, r(182) = .06.  Noticing did correlate to 
varying degrees with calculated sensitivity to the object memory changes, r(193) =.27 and color 
changes in the visual short term memory task, r(192) =.14, as well as to estimated ability to 
solve Ravens problems, r(193) =.16.   Higher openness and need for cognition were related to 
more noticing of the unexpected object, r(190) = .16.  There was also a moderate negative 
correlation between neuroticism and noticing where more neurotic individuals were less likely to 
notice the unexpected item9, r(190) = -.21.  Conscientiousness showed a negligible correlation 
with noticing, r(190) = -.11   
4.3.6 Magic Ball Height Estimate Results  
The final incidental noticing scenario included in this individual differences study involved 
exposure to a short magic trick video.  During the video, observers watched a man toss and 
then drop a ball using sleight-of-hand.  138/196 observers did not immediately notice the ball 
drop as evidenced by their report that the last seen location of the ball was in the air above the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Items that inform this personality factor are positively weighted characteristics like “worries a lot” and 
negatively weighted items from scales like need for closure and the items tend to involve decisiveness, 
e.g. “I make up my mind quickly” (See Chapter Three for more detail).  In other words, individuals who 
self-rated as more decisive and less neurotic tended to be more likely to report noticing the additional 
unexpected item in this sample. 
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magician’s hand (and not low in the video frame where the ball had actually dropped).  See 
Chapter 3.4 for additional details. 
As can be observed in Figure 4.4, participants’ first estimated height of the disappearing 
ball shared common variance with a few measures across the dataset, including several 
personality factors.  There was limited evidence that cognitive task performance was associated 
with experiencing a ball height illusion.  For example, lower sensitivities to the object changes in 
the array were correlated with higher ball height estimates, r(194) = -.15.  Several personality 
factors correlated with the height estimate.  For example, higher competitiveness/vertical rules, 
r(190) = .18, and extraversion, r(190) = .14 each appeared to correlate somewhat with the 
overall height judgment. 
4.3.7 Consistency Across Incidental Scenarios 
Across the three incidental detection scenarios, there was little evidence of reliability in 
the observers who noticed the critical anomaly in one incidental scenario verses another.  
Noticing during the incidental change detection movie and during the inattentional blindness 
task were only slightly deviant from a distribution expected by chance, p(χ2 > 3.78)  =  0.052, 
with a slight tendency for there to be more observers who noticed both or neither critical 
stimulus, rather than to report noticing one but not the other.  The contingency table is available 
in Figure 4.5.   
The magic ball illusion height estimate is also plotted for each individual in Figure 4.5 
and is grouped by noticing in the other two incidental detection tasks.  Although individuals who 
noticed neither change made the highest height estimates (M = 29.5%, SD = 12.2% from the top 
of the screen), the other groups had similar distributions of responses (for those who noticed 
both changes, M = 32.7%, SD = 17.9%; who noticed the change but not the unexpected object, 
M = 30.8%, SD = 16.0%; and who did not identify the change but noticed the object, M = 35.0%, 
SD = 17.3%). 
4.3.8 Consistency Across Sub-samples and Analyses 
To assess stability of data patterns, these data reports describe relationships across 
informed sub-samples, using sample exclusion criteria employed in previous research.  The 
informed sub-samples included an 80% accuracy cutoff group and a 100% accuracy cut-off 
group, using flicker task performance as the criteria for inclusion (because 100% accurate 
performance was possible across all individuals and was a cutoff measure used in our prior 
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work10).  Relationships as correlations across the full sample (N = 196), across a sub-sample of 
only those observers who performed at or above 80% accuracy on the flicker task (N = 162), 
and for a sub-sample of observers who achieved 100% accuracy on the flicker task (N = 94) are 
reported in relation to each of the four primary noticing measures.  Data for the subset of the 
sample that had no missing observations for any tasks is also listed because such a constraint 
is a common exclusion criteria applied before more complex statistical analyses and modeling 
are implemented.  See Appendix A for a full summary of cross-task relationships across 
different subsamples. 
An alternative to creating informed subsets of the sample is to estimate the consistency 
of relationships by repeatedly selecting random subsets of the full sample and considering the 
data pattern across them.  For example, bootstrapping and random re-sampling methods are an 
increasingly common way to consider stability of data patterns within a large sample.  Such 
techniques also typically allow assessments of cross-validation by assessing the predictions of 
models that were created from one subset of the data for observations from a different subset of 
the data that was not included in the creation of the model.  To estimate the importance of 
various predictors for explaining individual differences in visual noticing in this study, I used 
classification and regression tree modeling across multiple randomly selected sub-samples to 
predict noticing differences between observers in the four main noticing paradigms.  These 
estimates of predictor importance are plotted next to the cross-task correlations that are listed 
across informed sub-samples and with a full OLS or logistic regression model.  See Appendix A 
for additional detail about these cross-task calculations. 
There are a few observations to be made across analyses.  First, across all correlations 
and modeling, relationships between measures were not strong and could not predict noticing 
much better than base-rate noticing predictions (Refer to Appendix A for additional information).  
There may be consistent individual differences in responses across the observations captured 
by this study, but the overall variability shared between the measures collected in this study is 
not large.  Second, variables and relationships that tended to be most useful in prediction across !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 For example, in Jensen & Simons (in prep), a full sample of participants was contrasted with a reduced 
sample of subjects who performed at or above 80% accuracy on the flicker task (~15% of sample 
dropped).  For the intentional change detection, the incidental change detection, and the attentional 
breadth tasks, this sample change resulted in very little change in the overall data patterns.  For less 
stable relationships across the dataset, the reduced sample revealed inconsistency.  For example, by 
removing inaccurate observers on the flicker task, we excluded a subset of individuals who were 
particularly unlikely to report noticing the unexpected object on the inattentional blindness trial, resulting in 
a shift in the correlations between change detection performance and inattentional blindness.  !
76 
random sub-samples were variables that typically remained correlated across the informed sub-
samples.  Finally, the strongest correlations across the sub-samples tended to appear within the 
most trimmed, 100% accurate, subject group.   
4.3.9 Consistency Across Studies 
In the original psychology student sample, incidental change detection was correlated 
with attentional breadth, r(123) = .26, and to intentional change detection performance, r(124) = 
.18, but not to inattentional blindness.  The most notable personality correlation with incidental 
noticing was with conscientiousness, although the pattern was somewhat inconsistent11.  For 
the paid campus sample described in this study, incidental change detection showed no 
relationship with primary task measures or intentional change detection across analyses.  
However, conscientiousness again correlated with noticing, where more conscientious 
observers were more likely to report the critical change.  See Figure 4.1.   
In the previous psychology student study, change detection performance correlated with 
accuracy on an attentional breadth task during which participants had to locate a very briefly 
presented target among an array of simple distractors, r(123) = .21 (Jensen & Simons, in prep).  
In that study, across variables, the two most consistently predictive variables for change 
detection performance were accuracy at judging line-lengths during the primary task of an 
inattentional blindness task and performance on an attentional breadth task.  In other words, 
primary cognitive task performance was most consistently related to change detection 
performance.  However, personality measures were not strongly correlated to intentional change 
detection12.  Prior work from our lab that included personality measures with intentional change 
detection search tasks also found limited evidence of stable relationships13.  In this study, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Individuals who were less conscientious (and more impulsive) were more likely to respond that they 
had noticed a change, r(122) = .24, but were not more likely to accurately identify the change, r(122) = 
.06.  For a subsample of participants with above an 80% accuracy exclusion cutoff on flicker task 
performance, higher conscientiousness was correlated to both being more likely to report noticing the 
unexpected change, r(105) = -.15, and to correctly identifying the change, r(105) = -.19.   
12 The two most obvious relationships between flicker task performance and personality depended upon 
the sub-sample of the dataset under consideration.  In the full dataset, overall flicker task accuracy (but 
not time to find the change) was negatively correlated with extraversion, r(105) = -.18.  In the reduced 
sample, where particularly low accuracy flicker task performers were removed from analysis, 
conscientious individuals were more likely to find changes quickly and accurately than less conscientious 
participants, r(105) = -.25. 
13 In preliminary studies, observers responded to personality surveys, allowing us to explore whether self-
rated personality differences might predict behavioral performance across tasks.  For example, in a study 
with a matching images task and an intentional change detection task we also included a personality 
survey of impulsivity.  Responses to the impulsivity questionnaire did not correlate with change detection 
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intentional change detection was again correlated to attentional breadth (but not to line 
judgment accuracy).  Additional cognitive task measures also correlated with intentional change 
detection, particularly response speeds on the trail making task.  Once again, intentional change 
detection was not clearly related to any personality differences.  See Figure 4.2.  In our previous 
work, performance on the flicker task was also correlated with incidental change detection and 
showed a somewhat inconsistent relationship to inattentional blindness14.  In this sample, better 
performance on the flicker task was not strongly related to better noticing during either of the 
unexpected visual noticing tasks.  For example, there was not a strong relationship between 
noticing the unexpected object and change detection search performance, r(182) =.06.  
Inconsistent with our prior work, individual noticing of changes during the video clip did not 
correlate with better noticing during the flicker task either, r(182) = .01. 
Noticing during an inattentional blindness trial has been challenging to predict in 
previous studies.  For example, inattentional blindness was only weakly related to attentional 
breadth, r(123) = .10 and was somewhat irregularly related to intentional change detection.  
Inattentional blindness was also somewhat correlated to primary task accuracy on the line-
judgment task (although not accuracy on the critical trial) as well as to overall response time 
measures on unrelated prompts.  In that sample, reported noticing of the unexpected object 
correlated to personality dimensions like conscientiousness, where participants who reported 
noticing the unexpected object also tended to self-report as being more impulsive and less 
conscientious, r(122) = .16 and r(105) = .14 in both sub-samples.  Other weak correlations 
between noticing and personality dimensions like neuroticism (where more neurotic participants !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
speed, r(52) = -.02, but higher reported impulsivity was associated with lower change detection accuracy, 
r(52)=.22.   More generally, there was some indication that participants who self-rated as more impulsive 
were more likely to have poor performance overall.  For example, lower accuracy on the matching was 
related to higher impulsivity, r(52)=.32, but higher impulsivity was also weakly related to slower responses 
on the matching task relative to their peers, r(52) = -.19.  In a larger scale study, there was some 
indication that measures of personality like conscientiousness were correlated with performance on the 
flicker task, r(107) = -.21, but these patterns explained less variance than other cognitive-behavioral task 
measures included in the modeling.  In other words, although there is evidence of some covariation 
between change detection search and personality measurements, we have not found strong patterns of 
personality differences to predict search differences so far. 
14 In the full dataset better overall performance on the flicker task was also associated with more noticing 
during the inattentional blindness task, r(124) = .29.  However, in the reduced sample of observers who 
were 80% or more accurate on the flicker task, there was no overall correlation between inattentional 
blindness and flicker performance, r(107) = .08, although there was some suggestion that individuals who 
noticed the unexpected object were somewhat faster to search for changes than other participants across 
trials, r(107) = -.23. !
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were less likely to notice) and openness (where more openness associated with more reported 
noticing) were less stable across the full and reduced samples.  In this sample, inattentional 
blindness weakly correlated with poor performance on some primary tasks.  In particular, 
noticing was somewhat related to better performance on attentional breadth, r(193) = .14, but 
not to click speed during the trail making task, r(182) = -.04.  Noticing did correlate to varying 
degrees with calculated sensitivity to the object memory changes, r(183) =.27 and color 
changes in the visual short term memory task, r(192) =.14, as well as to estimated ability to 
solve Ravens problems, r(193) =.16.  In the Jensen & Simons (in prep) classification model, 
conscientiousness and openness were often more diagnostic predictor variables than other 
personality dimensions for inattentional blindness, where higher openness and higher 
conscientiousness were both related to more noticing.  As in Jensen & Simons (in prep), the 
factor that included items related to openness correlated to noticing of the unexpected objects.  
In this sample, conscientiousness did not relate to noticing but more neurotic individuals were 
less likely to notice the unexpected item, r(182) = -.21 (consistent with other work but not with 
this prior study from out lab).   
The original psychology student sample study did not include a magic illusion exposure.  
The results of this study found reports of experiencing the illusion were most consistently 
correlated with personality differences like extraversion, competitiveness, and openness.  These 
results are consistent with the original characterization of the ball-drop magic trick as a socially 
cued illusion as well as with the idea that some observers may be more skeptical than others.  
Such individual differences in reported magic perception deserve replication and additional 
research.  
 
4.4 Discussion  
For intentional change detection during the flicker task, there was continued evidence of 
a commonality between visual search for change and primary task outcome measures.  The 
next step in understanding this regularity is to consider what common patterns across those 
tasks account for the similarities in individual task performance and to consider how broadly and 
strongly individual differences in change detection might extend.  For inattentional blindness, 
identifying consistent relationships across variables is still a somewhat elusive goal.  In this 
study, there was evidence of better primary task performance and several personality factors 
being associated with more noticing.  For example, this study replicated a finding that 
openness/cognition was related to more reported noticing as well as a relationship between 
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noticing and lower levels of neuroticism.   This instantiation of an inattentional blindness task 
provides arguably optimal conditions to find capacity based differences in inattentional 
blindness.  The line judgment task with its short presentation and known location is likely to be 
the center of attentional focus with no added distractors and might be a task where the 
attentional capacity accounts of a link between attention and inattentional blindness are most 
likely to occur.  However, across the other performance measures, inattentional blindness was 
only somewhat irregularly correlated to primary task performance.  There was also not a strong 
relationship between noticing the unexpected changes and primary task performance.  Instead 
personality measures like preference for closure or overall conscientiousnss/impulsiveness were 
most correlated with performance.  Similarly, estimates of the illusory magic ball height were 
more correlated with personality dimensions than primary task performance.  Further 
explanation and implications of these results are discussed in the remained of this discussion 
section as well as in Chapter Seven. 
Additional contributions of this study involve addressing a fundamental individual 
differences question: is there consistency in behavior across time?  Across various analyses, 
there was evidence for stability in performance, particularly in relation to intentional search for 
changes.  Random re-sampling allowed multiple iterations of models to be drawn to describe the 
data.  The study also presented sub-samples defined by subject criteria consistent with 
standards within the field and with conceptually meaningful boundaries.  The rationale for 
considering sub-samples and re-sampling in this manner was to look for consistency across 
different analyses.  While the analyses all made similar characterizations of the data, one 
conclusion across the findings was that consistency in performance across tasks is limited.  
Therefore, if we hope to measure and quantify reliable individual differences between observers, 
research needs to continue to look across tasks to consider the range of consistency 
observable across different levels of aggregated performance. Such efforts will help to define 
the scope and scale of meaningful experimental variability and improve our models of likely 
response distributions.  More generally, until there is stronger evidence of "better noticers", 
researchers need to exercise caution when assuming that meaningful reliable differences 
between individuals can be expressed by performance in a single trial.  Just because an 
observer noticed an anomaly in one situation does not mean she will notice the next.   
4.4.1 Alternative Interpretations 
There are several plausible accounts to explain the data patterns observed across the 
analyses in this study.  The most commonly articulated account of visual noticing data comes 
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from attention and cognition based understandings of primary task performance.  Such an 
attention-cognition primary task explanation for the intentional change detection patterns is 
relatively straight forward: Whether one posits multiple dimensions of cognitive abilities or one 
primary underlying difference like g or working memory capacity, reliability across different 
searches for visual change should reflect consistency in underlying cognitive ability(ies) that 
support that search.  Such a theory could easily accommodate substantial variability in 
performance that was explained by situationally dependent factors and so, for example, might 
hypothesize that particular individual differences related to interest-based differences (e.g. 
extraversion) might predict noticing of certain kinds of content anomalies (e.g. people changes).  
An attention-cognition account might encourage efforts to sub-divide observed performance 
variability into different factors or different groups of tasks (i.e. to predict more peripheral change 
detection with a functional field of view task).  Alternatively, an attention-cognition approach 
might encourage efforts to try to capture variability in differences like attention strategies (e.g. 
diffused vs. focused attention) to further reduce and explain variability in visual noticing.  Under 
this interpretation, the limited relationship observed between intentional change detection and 
other measures of attention-cognition in this study would be explained as the result of 
measurement noise and error and of not closely enough controlled task and stimulus 
parameters.  To solve such a limitation, then, and find reliable relationships, the task batteries 
would need to be improved, further tested, and more tightly controlled.   
 An attention-cognition primary task explanation cannot as easily explain the observed 
incidental noticing relationship patterns in this study.  From an attention perspective, all three 
tasks should have directed observer attention toward the critical information of interest.  
However, the primary task of simple observation during the two videos (incidental change and 
magic illusion) was different than during the inattentional blindness trial when participants were 
to focus on making an accurate line length judgment.  But those task differences do not nicely 
align with the several inconsistencies in findings between the two studies that were observed.   
For example, noticing during the incidental change detection video with the original psychology 
subject study was correlated with primary task performance and intentional change detection 
but in the study described in this chapter there was no evidence of such a relationship.  Why? 
Perhaps a difference between the subject populations could explain such a difference?  
Similarly, noticing of the unexpected object correlated to primary task performance in both 
studies, but not to performance on the same tasks across studies.  Why?   
 Data patterns that the attention-cognition account cannot fully accommodate include the 
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personality differences that did correlate with incidental noticing across both studies.  The 
multiple trial cognitive task measures did not typically show much commonality with personality 
measures but, across studies, the most reliable relationships between noticing and other 
predictors was with the personality measures. One explanation for relationships between single 
trial noticing and personality differences is that single exposure incidental scenarios may be 
particularly unique trials.  The incidental detection tasks were somewhat strange first-trial 
situations when observers are not sure what they are doing.  Then, they are asked weird 
questions about what they noticed.  In contrast, multiple trial cognitive tasks allow observers to 
adjust to and understand the task.  It may be that in these unique trials, personality differences 
(like observers willingness to acknowledge ambiguity) dominate response decisions. 
 Closely related to the claim that incidental scenarios represent unique trials is the 
observation that incidental scenarios are single trials.  As Epstein & O-Brien observed in 1985, 
“Single behavioral acts tend to be (a) low in reliability and (b) low in generality.”  In other words 
the further you get from controlled repeated trials, the less predictable we can expect behavior 
to be.  Unfortunately, isolated or rare events are often the events we are most interested in 
predicting with precision and also the events that become anecdotes from which we infer too 
much significance.  So, perhaps the most probable account of the incidental data patterns 
observed in this study is that, as single trial observations, noticing is essentially random and, as 
data in isolation, is not particularly informative. 
An alternative possibility for inter-individual difference predictors is that different 
individual difference dimensions may not be equally relevant to predicting performance across 
individuals (Bem & Allen, 1974).  For example, particularly extreme agreeableness appeared as 
a predictor of performance in the regression tree modeling for intentional change detection (both 
in this study and in the Jensen & Simons, in prep, sample).  In both cases, extremely agreeable 
individuals ware predicted to have lower overall performance scores on the flicker task.  
However, agreeableness across the sample did not correlate to intentional change detection 
overall.  A possibility articulated by Bem & Allen (1974) predicts that some individual difference 
dimensions will not be useful for predicting the performance of all observers but could still be 
central to predicting performance for others.   In other words, individual difference predictors 
may not be equally relevant or applicable across all situations and all individuals.  The context-
dependence of individual consistencies is something most people seem to infer naturally.  For 
example, the context of a behavior is an important factor in subject judgments of the behavioral 
consistency of peers (Kammrath, Mendoza-Denton & Mischel, 2005).  However, in the 
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laboratory, only a limited set of linear relationships with inter-individual differences predictors are 
typically considered under controlled circumstances. 
One consistency across this study and the replicated original study was the order of 
tasks.  In experimental contexts, tasks and conditions are often counter-balanced across tasks 
and trials.  In this study, all tasks were presented in the same order to control variability in prior 
exposure to noticing scenarios (because of limited numbers of participants in the study).  As a 
result, there are likely task order influences on performance and overall data patterns.  
Considering the time-dependence of the relationships across the study offers a final explanation 
to explain some of the observed data patterns.  For example, fatigue across the two-hour study 
session may have lead to a divergence between individuals performance over time.  
(Anecdotally, some subjects reported mild cognitive fatigue at the end of the study after the 
extended effort on attention demanding and sometimes cognitively challenging tasks while 
others reported being energized by the study.)  Similarly, across the study session some 
individuals may have become more suspicious of the possibility of visual anomalies than others.  
Or, alternatively, one possibility is that those observers who more likely to experience illusions 
(e.g. observers who did not notice the change or the object) began to show depressed 
performance on later cognitive task measures because of their earlier experiences in the study. 
4.4.2 Design Limitations  & Tradeoffs 
The central limitation of this work as an individual differences study is that the primary 
variables of interest are not under experimenter control and cannot be randomly assigned or 
manipulated across participants.  Correlational designs limit the scope of causal interpretations 
and instead provide a method to identify variables of interest and consider the range of 
variability and stability within measured behavior.   Additional limitations of the study include 
design and measurement issues that are common to many research contexts but are of 
particular interest in the context of individual differences work in visual noticing.  For example, 
one set of limitations involves the consistencies inherent in laboratory testing sessions that may 
limit the generality of findings.  The formality of the testing sessions and tasks may have 
influenced participant performance in the study, making the results less representative of 
noticing in more realistic conditions.  This is of particular concern in an individual differences 
context as some participants may be more influenced by the pressures of a laboratory situation 
than others.   Similarly, the participant sample was recruited from the general Urbana-
Champaign University of Illinois area with some constraints for age and vision.  As a somewhat 
homogenous group of young adults, we hoped individual differences in cognitive and perceptual 
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performance would be less dominated by more global changes that might be associated with 
cognitive aging (as one example).  However, the restricted sample and specifics of the 
population cohort in this time and place may limit the representativeness of participants in this 
study for the wider population.  Conversely, as participants recruited from the region for a single 
paid study session, these participants may be more (or less) representative of a wider range of 
participants than graduate students, psychology undergraduates, or seasoned long-term paid 
research participants. 
To conclude this chapter, I have chosen to describe such limitations in part because 
each particular of a study, every design decision, creates limitations as a simple practicality of 
being part of a finite singular data sample.  There is no perfect sample, no perfect study design.  
In research, we often have the tendency to find some flaw, some specificity that makes a study 
imperfect and then dismiss the results.  However, the answer is not to dismiss the findings we 
have but to obtain more observations to create more instantiations of improved study designs.  
My committee posed a question of how to best divide resources for research:  Should we 
distribute maximum resources to one study with a massive sample size or divide resources into 
multiple studies for smaller samples using varied methodologies?  My unequivocal answer is 
that we must research, replicate, and repeat.  Individual studies are flawed but by looking across 
measures, analyses, and studies, larger consistencies and patterns can be found.  
 
84 
4.5 Figures 
Incidental Change Detection and Cross-task Variables 
Figure 4.1. Incidental Change Detection and Cross-Task Results Summary.  The figure summarizes the 
relationship between noticing an unexpected change and other primary outcome measures from the 
study.  Estimated feature importance graphs the relative utility of predictor variables as estimated by 
classification tree ensemble modeling with re-sampling (higher positive values represent more useful 
predictors).  Correlations are listed across the full sample, the 80% accurate, and 100% accurate cutoffs, 
N ≈ 196, N ≈ 162, N ≈ 94, respectively.  175 observers have complete data with no missing observations.   
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Intentional Change Detection (Flicker Task) and Cross-task Variables 
  
Figure 4.2. Intentional change detection and Cross-Task Results Summary.  The figure summarizes the 
relationship between change detection search during the scene flicker task (higher values = faster and 
more accurate search) and other primary outcome measures from the study.  Estimated feature 
importance graphs the relative utility of predictor variables as estimated by regression tree ensemble 
modeling with re-sampling (higher positive values represent more useful predictors).  Correlations 
between intentional change detection and predictor variables are listed across the full sample, the 80% 
accurate, and 100% accurate cutoffs, N ≈ 196, N ≈ 162, N ≈ 94, respectively.  175 observers have 
complete data with no missing observations.  
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Inattentional Blindness and Cross-task Variables 
 
Figure 4.3. Inattentional Blindness and Cross-Task Results Summary. The figure summarizes the 
relationship between noticing an unexpected object during an inattentional blindness trial with other 
primary outcome measures from the study.  Estimated feature importance graphs the relative utility of 
predictor variables as estimated by classification tree ensemble modeling with re-sampling (higher 
positive values represent more useful predictors).  Correlations are listed across the full sample, the 80% 
accurate, and 100% accurate cutoffs, N ≈ 196, N ≈ 162, N ≈ 94, respectively.  175 observers have 
complete data with no missing observations. 
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Magic Illusion and Cross-task Variables 
 
Figure 4.4.  Magic Height Judgment and Cross-Task Results Summary.  The figure summarizes the 
relationship between the magic height judgment (higher values = higher estimates) and other primary 
outcome measures from the study.  Estimated feature importance graphs the relative utility of predictor 
variables as estimated by regression tree ensemble modeling with re-sampling (higher positive values 
represent more useful predictors).  Correlations between the height judgment and predictor variables are 
listed across the full sample, the 80% accurate, and 100% accurate cutoffs, N ≈ 196, N ≈ 162, N ≈ 94, 
respectively.  175 observers have complete data with no missing observations.  
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Noticing of Unexpected Changes, an Unexpected Object, and a Magic Illusion 
 
Figure 4.5. Noticing Across Incidental Detection Tasks.  A contingency table of the binary noticing 
variables for the incidental change detection video and the inattentional blindness task is provided at the 
top of the figure. The click heights for participants within each quadrant of the contingency table are 
plotted with a box indicating the upper and lower quartiles of observer estimates and a heavy dark line 
indicating the median height estimate for that sub-group. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONSISTENCY IN INTENTIONAL CHANGE DETECTION 
 
5.1 Abstract 
Chapter Four provides an exploratory analysis of stability and variability in intentional 
change detection across tasks and across trials, providing additional analysis of the dataset first 
presented in Chapter Three.  Analyses reveal limited consistency across variants of intentional 
change detection tasks and substantial variability within flicker task search times, particularly on 
error trials.  Overall differences in flicker change detection performance were correlated to 
variability in change search times across trials.  Theories of speed accuracy tradeoffs and 
relationships between average response speed and variability in response speed are discussed.  
A re-examination of response times to non-time pressured prompts also found similarity in 
response speeds but change detection during the flicker task was more strongly related to 
cognitive task measures than these response speeds.  Explanations for these observed data 
patterns motivate a series of questions about intraindividual variability that underlie the analysis 
described in Chapter Six. 
 
5.2 Introduction 
We intuit consistency in the behavior of humans (Bem & Allen, 1974); but measuring and 
understanding consistency in behavior requires more than mere intuition.  For example, early 
attempts to document consistencies in human performance found surprising variability in 
behavioral dimensions that experimenters thought were likely to reflect stabilities (e.g. variables 
like punctuality, see Bem & Allen, 1974 for a review).  In the years since these studies, 
variability in human behavior has become an accepted reality of human research.   Expected 
relationships between outcome variables across psychological predictors are often modest, 
even under highly controlled conditions with established tests (Bem & Allen, 1974; Mischel, 
1983; Schretlen, Munroe, Anthony, Pearlson, 2003).  In other words, from a measurement of 
human behavior perspective, response variability is predicted by many theoretical and statistical 
accounts of human performance and is observed in most systematic measures of human data.    
The standard methodological and statistical approach to response variability is to control 
and limit variation as possible and then to aggregate across individual observations to reveal 
more global patterns.  For example, Seymour Epstein (1980) describes how the search for 
stability involves both experimental control, in which researchers minimize variance by 
controlling experiment parameters to the extent possible, and data aggregation, where, by 
averaging across a “sufficient number of occurrences”, researchers attempt to identify central 
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tendencies in the data.  Epstein (1980) writes, “When extraneous variance cannot be eliminated 
by experimental control, it can be canceled out through aggregation.”  On this aggregated level, 
performance consistencies are more easily observed and it is these consistencies that often 
become the basis for experimental contrasts and modern day empirical inquiry (Mischel, 1983, 
2004)1. In other words, the typical solution to response variability is to generalize across 
instances, while controlling parameters as possible, to observe trends in behavior. 
By averaging away the variability (or the differences) between individual observations, 
central tendencies become the consistency in performance that our measures typically capture, 
often providing an additional parameter of spread around that mean as calculated across the 
aggregated observations2.  Observations can be averaged across people or referents, across 
time and occasions, across stimuli and situations, and across measures (Epstein, 1980).   
Critically, the observed behavior is still variable, but the aggregated patterns across multiple 
observations reveal consistency through central tendencies in the data; consistency that is often 
used to infer even larger coherence across measures, tasks, individuals, and moments in time.   
When studying performance differences between individuals in visual noticing, 
aggregation presents a challenge for the range of questions that can be asked.  In particular, 
studying noticing of unexpected critical stimuli limits the possibility of replicating trials with the 
same observer without fundamentally altering the topic of study3.  There are solutions to such a 
problem.  One possibility is to employ similar but distinct noticing scenarios in the hope that 
knowledge of prior experiences does not alter later participant behavior (Beanland & Pammer, 
2009).   Another solution is to replicate single-trial studies and aggregate across them (as 
research on inattentional blindness and working memory differences has done), although this 
solution can require large numbers of participants and studies.  Another solution to 
unexpectedness limitations is to test noticing in different sessions by employing some sort of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 For example, experimental psychologists often aspire to design controlled repeatable experiment trials 
that then permit the re-introduction of controlled variability (e.g. in the stimuli, in the trial parameters, or in 
the passage of time).   
2 Measuring variability around the mean also requires aggregating across observations that can be 
collapsed across different dimensions.  For example, researchers traditionally report variability of 
individuals’ estimates around a group mean but may not report variability within individual estimates. 
3 Epstein also recognized the potential import and challenge of such single trial phenomena, writing,  
“There are phenomena that cannot be studied with experimental designs that use repeated measures 
within or over sessions.  In studies requiring deception or surprise, only a single exposure to a stimulus 
may be feasible.  Thus, studies of single events on single occasions have their place.  However, if they 
are to be able ultimately to make a contribution in the aggregate, it will be necessary for journals to 
encourage replication studies, to not be influenced by outcomes in such studies, and to make decisions 
solely on the basis of the adequacy of the procedures.” 
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ruse or delay so that participants do not associate the two instances, another experiment design 
that can be complicated to employ but is worthy of further investigation.   An alternative solution 
is to put aside constraints of unexpectedness and unique critical trials to consider repeated 
noticing scenarios; The following series of analyses adopts such an approach by re-considering 
stability and variability in intentional change detection performance across tasks and trials. 
Considering visual noticing during intentional change detection tasks could help to 
constrain the scope and scale of possible predictions for consistencies in visual noticing more 
broadly.  Therefore, the goal of this chapter is to re-consider consistency in intentional change 
detection performance by looking at participant responses across different dimensions of 
aggregation.  Although the breadth of visual noticing tasks and questions raised in this chapter 
is narrower than those discussed in earlier chapters, this chapter focuses on intentional change 
detection as estimated across multiple repeatable trials in three sets of analyses.  The first 
analysis considers aggregated performance across three versions of theoretically similar 
intentional change detection tasks to identify possible consistencies in performance.  The 
second analysis explores composite change detection performance during a flicker task by 
looking at variability in individual performance across trials of same task in both accuracy and 
response time.  The third series of analyses re-considers consistency in response time more 
broadly by aggregating across non-time pressured responses throughout the study to assess 
whether overall response time variability predicts intentional search for change better than 
intentional change detection performance as measured by other tasks.  
 
5.3 Consistency across Intentional Change Detection Tasks 
To assess performance consistencies across intentional change detection tasks, the 
study described in Chapter Three and Four included three tasks that are representative of 
common intentional change detection tasks in the laboratory: a flicker task with scenes, a one-
shot object change detection task across a several-second delay, and a one-shot color change 
detection task across a few-millisecond delay.    
There are similarities between these three intentional change detection variants.  All 
three tasks are referenced by common literatures and observed effects evident in one variation 
of an intentional change detection task typically appear in other instantiations of the task.  Each 
task also shares commonalities in aspects of the cognitive demands often argued to be involved 
in detecting changes.  For example, all three intentional change detection tasks require 
observers to assess their visual field, to store enough of a trace of that visual information to 
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compare it in some way to a post-change visual array, and to make a judgment and response 
as to whether they noticed any discrepancy.  Each detection task also occurred under 
constrained laboratory conditions that ensured consistency and precision of the stimuli and 
measurements across participants.  The behavioral measures were also collected on the same 
day, with the same experimenter, in the same testing session, on the same computers.   
Despite similarities, cognitive demand differences are theorized to underlie the method 
differences between these instantiations of an intentional change detection task.  For example, 
the tasks differ in the memory retention interval or in the delay between the first and second 
exposure to the displays.  The object change detection task required the longest retention of 
information across time (2 seconds). The color change detection task (a variant of the 
commonly employed visual short term working memory measure from Luck & Vogel, 1997), 
shared a shorter inter-stimulus interval with the flicker task (150 msec and 250 msec, 
respectively).  A difference between a several second delay and a few milliseconds is significant 
in relation to theories of visual memory and the visual perception.4  In the flicker task, 
participants are given multiple alternations of the differing visual arrays to localize the change.  
In contrast, the color and object change tasks provide a single exposure to the pre-change and 
post-change arrays.  Again, this task difference has implications for the theoretical framing of 
the tasks.  The multiple alterations of an original and changed display allow participants more 
time to overtly and covertly move attention around the display across exposures, making visual 
search a likely component of the task.  In contrast, a single exposure to a pre-change and post-
change display necessitates that any information available for noticing from the pre-change 
display is encoded and retained during a single encoding phase, meaning the task is likely to be 
heavily memory-dependent (See Chapter One for additional discussion).   
The stimuli in each task also differed in their complexity, in the range of possible 
changes, and in their intrinsic interest, among many other possibilities.    The tasks differed in 
their order relative to the experimental session, the number of trials, and, to a small extent, the 
perceived difficulty of the tasks across individuals (see Chapter Three for task difficulty ratings).  
The tasks also differed in the responses participants made and the measures collected.  For 
example, during the one-shot object change detection and VSTM tasks, participants made the 
same change/no change response with the same keys and, during analysis, the same outcome !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!4!For example, traces of visual persistence or iconic sensory memory are believed to fade within a few 
hundred milliseconds (di Lollo, 1980; Coltheart, 1980; Long, 1980; Sperling, 1960).   !
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variables were aggregated from each task.  However, for the flicker change detection task, time 
to search and a mouse click location response were collected instead of a simple change or no 
change judgment.  In sum, possible differences between these three intentional change 
detection tasks are substantial.   
To more explicitly consider how broadly individual differences in intentional change 
detection extend across tasks, this section considers reliability between different measures of 
intentional change detection as measured by the flicker change detection task, one-shot object 
change detection task, and VSTM one-shot color change detection task.   Can we predict 
performance in one type of change detection task with another?  If you are good at detecting 
changes in one task, how likely are you to be good at finding changes in another? 
5.3.1 Analysis Results  
For the three subsets of participants (created by different flicker task inclusion criteria as 
described in Chapter Four and Appendix A), the correlations between flicker task performance 
(measured as a standardized composite of accuracy minus accurate search speeds) and object 
change detection (measured as sensitivity) were r(183) =.27,  r(160) = .15,  and r(92) = .18, 
respectively.  Across the sub-samples, the overall correlations between flicker task performance 
and VSTM (measured as sensitivity) were r(183) =.14, r(158) = .18, r(91) = .18. The correlations 
between sensitivity to the changes during these two visual memory tasks across the sub-
samples were r(183)  = .31, r(160) =.32, and r(92) = .29.   
Scatterplots of flicker task performance and sensitivity during the visual short-term 
memory and one-shot object change tasks are plotted in Figure 5.1.  The over-lapping plots of 
the different sub-groups of accuracy on the flicker task are a depiction of the relationships 
between the variables across the different subject criteria employed in Chapter Three.  From 
these plots, it is easier consider the possible impact of influential points and outliers as well as 
to consider the strength of the relationships in performance across these three intentional 
change detection tasks and across different inclusion criteria.  For example, while the below 
80% accuracy group appears to perform below average in the object change detection task, the 
80-100% accuracy group does not appear to perform noticeably different than the 100% 
accuracy group during the one shot change detection tasks.   
5.3.2 Section Discussion  
All three tasks (the flicker change detection, object change detection, and VSTM tasks) 
were inter-related, sharing common variance that was also correlated to performance on other 
attention-cognitive tasks.  At the same time, there was limited similarity in performance across 
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the three intentional change detection tasks, even under highly constrained but similar task 
constraints5.  If similarities in performance across tasks are limited, how much can performance 
in one intentional change detection task predict of performance in another?   
Limited reliability across these intentional change detection tasks might be explained by 
basic design differences between the tasks.  The object change detection task had the longest 
memory interval and a five-object set of complex object stimuli.  The VSTM task had short 
exposure and delay times and a simple stimulus color change among six colored squares.  The 
flicker change detection task used complex scenes and a flickering exposure.  Although all of 
these tasks are likely to place demands on theorized constructs like working memory, perhaps 
there are too many differences between the intentional change detection tasks for differences 
between individuals in performance to be stable.  For example, individuals’ performance across 
tasks might reflect underlying differences in aspects of cognition that are engaged by the 
different task parameters6.  One hypothesis consistent both with the wider cognitive psychology 
literature and with the study presented here is that processes like visual short term memory, 
working memory, and processing speed are all engaged to differing degrees in each change 
detection task.  The strength of similarity between cognitive measures and each change 
detection task should then reflect those task similarities.  In other words, VSTM may correlate 
with functional field of view because they both engage short-term visual memory processes; 
whereas, flicker task search for change correlates with trail-making performance because both 
tasks engage visual search processes.  However, correlations between intentional change 
detection and other cognitive task measures are modest.  The two one-shot change detection 
tasks only shared about 10% of their variance with one another, but across all variables those 
two intentional change detection outcome measures remained more correlated to one another 
than to any other outcome measure.  In other words, there may be limited systematic 
differences between individuals that can be captured and shared by these kinds of cognitive 
attention tasks. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 For example, using r2 as the coefficient of determination to provide an estimate of the proportion of 
variance shared between the two variables suggests limited commonality between tasks.  For the flicker 
and object change detection tasks, an average of about 4.3% of variance was shared between measures 
across sub-samples.  The shared variance between the flicker task and VSTM tasks was lower at 2.8%.  
Even the object change detection and VSTM task sensitivity measures, which were very similar, only 
shared approximately 9.4% of their variance with one another. 
6 In the cross-task relationships described in Chapter Four, flicker task performance was most strongly 
related to response speeds on the other visual search task, the trail-making task.  The one-shot change 
detection tasks shared limited but common variability with other measures of cognitive task performance.  
See Appendix A for additional information.  
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An alternative explanation for limited consistency across measures of intentional change 
detection is that the variability within individual performance was too wide for stable differences 
to emerge.  Estimates of central tendency might be variable because there were not sufficient 
numbers of observations to aggregate.  In this case, methodological changes to the study 
design might improve the correlations between the intentional change detection tasks.  For 
example, including more trials might provide more stable estimates of individuals’ mean 
performance.  However, increasing the number of trials and sessions can create complications 
like changing performance over time due to fatigue or learning.  Another solution might be to 
limit the sample to highly motivated or expert participants to reduce spurious within subject 
variability but such changes also have limitations like restricting subject representativeness.  
Another possibility would be to further isolate the most reliable stimulus pairs to create a more 
precise measurement instrument or to further decompose change detection performance into 
sub-factors.  Although none of these solutions ensure finding stability in change detection 
across tasks, they all suggest that further research exploring consistency across conceptually 
related perceptual tasks (like change detection tasks) is an important and necessary area of 
research.  
 
5.4 Consistency within an Intentional Change Detection Flicker Task 
Given the limited consistency observed in individuals’ performance across intentional 
change detection tasks, how consistent is change detection performance within an observer 
across trials of the same task?  To better characterize the relative difference between observers 
that is captured by intentional change detection composite measures, this section (along with 
supplemental figures in Appendix B) describes variability within flicker task performance 
between observers.   
Although there were three variations of intentional change detection tasks included in the 
study described in Chapters Three and Four, this analysis focuses on variability within flicker 
task performance for several reasons.  The flicker task required participants to identify the 
change location in addition to collecting a response time measure of how long observers 
searched before responding, whereas both of the one-shot change detection tasks employed 
only simple signal detection prompts resulting in hit rates and false alarm rates across trials.   
The flicker task is also the most real-world analogous change detection paradigm and, in this 
study, used a well-tested stimulus set employed by our lab.  Finally, the flicker task had a 
particularly large impact on the analyses described in Chapter Three as relative accuracy of 
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observers during the flicker task was used as a criterion to define sub-samples of the overall 
collected data.   
In prior flicker change detection studies from our lab, we found change detection search 
was best characterized by a combined measure of participant’s speed and accuracy7.  For 
example, the common relationship between change search during a flicker task and 
performance on a visual matching task was characterized by a similarity in how observers 
navigated the speed and accuracy dimensions for both the change detection and matching 
tasks relative to their peers; subjects who were faster and more accurate on the matching task 
were also likely to be fast and accurate on the change detection task8.  A combined 
consideration of accuracy and response time may provide the best characterization of 
differences between observers in the flicker task, but it is also the case that accuracy and 
response speeds are the only outcome measures available to use to characterize performance 
differences. 
To better understand individual differences in intentional change detection in this study, 
the analyses presented in this section and in Appendix B provide an assessment of variability in 
individuals’ performance as measured by both accuracy at identifying the change and search 
time until a change was reported during the flicker task.  The goal of these analyses is to study 
performance within intentional change detection to characterize differences between observers 
in performance and consider how those differences are reflected in aggregated performance.    
5.4.1 Analysis Results 
Almost half of participants accurately clicked on the change for all flicker trials (95/195).  
The remaining participants, however, did not click on the change location for at least some 
scene changes.  A majority of observers correctly responded to at least 80% of the trials 
(162/195)9.  In Figure 5.2, median search times for correct responses (and upper and lower !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 For example, in Jensen & Simons (in prep), we considered search times for correctly identified changes 
and standardized those search times within stimulus pair (because overall search times for images vary 
depending on change difficulty) and also considered overall accuracy.   
8 Using the binning procedure advocated in the original matching task parameters, the crossover of the 
speed and accuracy dimensions was used to classify participants into four categories of decision-making 
(i.e. reflectives, slow-inaccurates, fast-accurates, and impulsives).  Performance on both tasks classified 
participants similarly at rates greater than chance would predict, χ2 (3, N = 54) = 10.72, p < .01, with 
about 45% of subjects classified into the same bins for both tasks.   
9 Perhaps participants thought there was no change on that trial, knowingly responded incorrectly, 
incorrectly believed they had found a change, made a response in error, or did not understand the task 
(among infinite possibilities).  For example, two participants hand-wrote change descriptions on nearby 
paper but never clicked on a change location, suggesting they misunderstood task instructions.  Whatever 
the reason, mis-localized click locations were labeled as incorrect responses in the data coding.   
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quartiles) are plotted by overall accuracy.  See Appendix B for a matched chart from a previous 
study with more change detection trials per participant. 
There are several additional figures available in Appendix B that provide visualizations of 
participant performance in both speed and accuracy, revealing extensive variability in response 
times between participants (particularly during error trials).  These figures include performance 
summaries by stimulus pair, plots of participant’s longest search time across trials, and plots of 
participants average search times on correct and error trials.  Across trials and participants, 
participants varied in how long they searched before terminating a trial with an incorrect 
response.  Variability in search times was particularly evident for those participants who had 
good accuracy (over 80%) but not perfect accuracy (under 100%) across flicker trials.   
In Figure 5.3, the standard deviation in time to find the change across trials (regardless 
of accuracy) is plotted against the composite better performance measure.  As can be inferred 
from the figures in Appendix B, the standard deviations of response times across trials were 
strongly correlated with overall performance on the flicker task, r(182) = -.64, where more 
variable search times were correlated with slower and less accurate overall search 
performance.  
5.4.2 Section Discussion 
The goal of this section was to better describe differences between observers in flicker 
task performance.  A somewhat self-referential response to such a query is to observe that the 
primary difference in performance between observers was that some individuals were slower 
and less accurate at finding the changes than others.  However, re-considering performance 
differences across the available measures (i.e. in accuracy and response speed) of flicker task 
performance revealed several notable patterns.   First, just under half of observers found all 
changes across trials but most observers were mostly accurate (with a few outliers in the 
sample performing very inaccurately).  Second, although some of these accurate observers 
were reliably able to find the change in just a few seconds (or a few alterations of the change), 
other observers often searched for multiples of cycles to find the changes.  Some moderately 
accurate individuals searched an order of magnitude longer than the fastest and most accurate 
participants for the same changes.  Finally, variability in search times across trials was strongly 
correlated with overall performance.  All three of these findings are briefly discussed in relation 
to relevant literatures in the remainder of this section. 
Although 100% accuracy across flicker task trials is possible given task parameters, 
perfect accuracy across participants is not what we observed in this sample or in previous work 
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(e.g., Jensen & Simons, in prep).  During the flicker task, participants were allowed to search for 
a change until they identified the difference or terminated the trial with an incorrect response.  In 
other words, in a speed-accuracy tradeoff framework, trial length was determined by a self-
imposed deadline, allowing participants to vary in how they navigated task demands.  Evidence 
of speed-accuracy differences between participants originated in early psychological work (see 
Wickelgren, 1977 for a review), continued throughout the mid-1980s (Lohman, 1989; MaKay, 
1982; Meyer, Irwin, Osman & Kounios, 1988; Mischel, 1983; Wickelgren 1977), and continues 
to appear in contemporary research (e.g., Bogacz, Wagenmakers, Forstmann, & Nieuwenhuis, 
2010; Mischel, 2004).   Prior research suggests individuals will vary in accuracy on a variety of 
cognitive tasks (e.g., Wickelgren, 1977) 10, a result consistent with the findings described here.   
In research contexts, speed and accuracy of task performance are often considered in 
relation to overall accuracy and to participant time to respond to execute a correct response.  
For instance, the composite score and the analyses described in Chapter Four only included 
response times for accurate trials.  When describing responses on inaccurate trials in some of 
the graphs and analyses reported in this chapter, even more variability in response time 
performance was evident.  In this sample, variability in search times on the flicker task (as 
measured by standard deviations) shared 41% of the variance in the overall composite score. 
Relationships between overall response time and the standard deviation of response 
time have been observed in prior work (although the relationship is not always reported or 
assessed in studies that employ response time measurements).  Many researchers argue a 
consistent connection between the mean and standard deviation of response times is likely, 
particularly in the context of adult aging (e.g. work by Hultcsh; Logan, 1988; Wagenmakers & 
Brown, 2007; Myerson & Hale, 1993; Shammi, Bosman, & Stuss, 1998).   Across psychological 
studies, response time distributions tend to skew rightward from the lower bound of fastest 
response times (and become more skewed as tasks become more difficult) and the spread of 
response times tend to increase with their mean (Luce, 1986; Kelly et al., 2001; Myerson, 
Robertson, & Hale, 2007; Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff, 2002; Ratcliff, Zandt, & McKoon, 2004; Ratcliff, 
2002; Wagenmakers & Brown, 2007; Wagenmakers, Grasman, & Molenaar, 2005).  Some 
researchers argue the relationship between response times and standard deviation is an 
invariantly linear relationship (e.g. Myerson, Robertson, & Hale, 2007; Wagenmakers & Brown, 
2007), but other work describes evidence that relationships between mean response times and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 For example, low skill individuals might sacrifice accuracy because of the time required for better 
performance on difficult items (e.g. Lohman, 1989). 
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standard deviations vary between individuals and across age groups (e.g. Schmeidek et al 
2009).  For example, changes in an individual’s variability in response times can reflect strategic 
adjustments to control response time more generally (e.g. Kelly, et. al, 2001).   
Regular observations of a correlation between response time means and standard 
deviations in human data are managed within human research in several different ways.  One 
common solution is to “correct” skewed response time distributions by log transforming 
response times (in effect pulling long response times in towards the center of the distribution 
and spreading out response times closer to zero) in an effort to create a transformed dataset 
that conforms to distribution assumptions that are important for specific statistical analyses 
(although such an approach has limitations, e.g. Ranger & Kuhn, 2013).  Other solutions seek to 
specifically model response time and accuracy differences using various analysis techniques.  
For example, one common framing for variability in both speed and accuracy dimensions of 
performance is as a speed-accuracy tradeoff that can be formalized into a speed-accuracy 
tradeoff (SAT) function, where responses made quickly result in chance performance; After a 
sufficient delay, additional time allows for increasingly accurate performance, until (with 
sufficient time) the function asymptotes and additional time yields increasingly little benefit in 
accuracy (Wickelgren, 1977; Meyer et al., 1988).  Alternatively, more recent but extensive work 
with diffusion models has been employed to explain decisions related to recognition memory, 
combing both response time and accuracy in diffusion models that have been successful at 
characterizing performance differences between observers (Ratcliff, 2002; Ratcliff et al. 1999; 
see Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008, for a review).  
 
5.5 Differences in Response Times across Measures 
The importance of response time differences within flicker task performance and the 
observed cross-task relationship between flicker task performance and another response time 
based measure in the trial-making task together suggest that response speed may be a 
particularly defining dimension of flicker task performance.  Does the flicker task primarily reflect 
general response time differences between observers?  
Across the study, data were recorded that were not compiled into the primary outcome 
measures.  For example, time to respond to various non-time-pressured prompts was logged 
(see Chapter Three for additional detail).  The response times were all secondary variables that 
were not included in measures of primary performance but they were combined into a more 
general response time outcome measure.  In this final analysis section of Chapter Five, I briefly 
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consider various response time measures collected in the study described in Chapters Three 
and Four and then discuss response speed in the context of the cross-task relationships. 
5.5.1 Analysis Results 
See Table 5.1 for correlations across the various non-time-pressured response time 
measures.  Across these variables, key press response times were correlated with one another, 
although mouse click response times were not.  Variability within each of the response time 
measures was correlated across response time measures, where longer average response 
times were associated with more variability.   
In the context of the cross-task data set, response time measures correlated minimally 
with other response time based outcome measures (like flicker composite performance and the 
trail-making response time) as well as with personality factors like neuroticism and need for 
closure.  See Table 5.2. 
5.5.2 Section Discussion 
Although there was commonality in participants’ response speeds to various prompts 
throughout the study, flicker task search performance was not best predicted by these simple 
overall response times.  Instead, change detection search shared more consistent relationships 
with other intentional change detection tasks (and with the visual search and select task, i.e. the 
trail-making task).   
Beyond interpretations for intentional change detection, the clear consistency in 
response times across prompts is somewhat surprising.  Although the key presses were not 
highly time-pressured and the prompts that elicited the presses varied in complexity, individuals 
tended to be fast or slow to respond across them.  Moreover, as observed in the flicker task, 
there was a correlation with variability in response times across measures.  The lack of 
relationship between the key presses and the mouse responses likely reflect the task demands 
employed in the study.  For example, most timed primary task responses were made with key 
presses and only a few responses across the study required use of the mouse.      
Although we had no a-priori expectations of relationships between response speed and 
personality variables, prior research suggests differences in dimensions like impulsivity could 
correlate with speed-accuracy differences (Dickman & Meyer,1988) and variability differences 
between observers should correlate with measures of neuroticism (Robinson & Tamir, 2005).  
More intentionally targeted research could and should explore such possible relationships in 
further work.  In this normal young adult population, differences in measures like need for 
closure and neuroticism co-varied with response times. 
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5.6 Discussion 
Three sets of analyses in this chapter re-considered visual noticing performance by 
considering data across three intentional change detection tasks, data within an intentional 
change detection task with flickering scenes, and performance in the context of other response 
time measures collected throughout the study.  The first set of analyses assessed noticing of 
visual changes across three different multiple-trial change detection task implementations and 
found limited evidence of consistency across them.  Then, because of interest in flicker task 
performance as a criterion for subject inclusion and as the intentional change detection task with 
the most nuanced outcome measures, the next set of analyses summarized trial-by-trial 
performance on the flicker task by aggregating task data in several different charts.  Figures 
from this chapter and Appendix B document that variability in overall performance was reflective 
of search time differences across trials between subjects.  Finally, given the importance of 
response time differences in understanding flicker task performance, a set of secondary 
response time measures to non-pressured prompts were calculated and placed in the context of 
flicker task performance.  Although there were strong correlations between response times to 
various prompts, those differences did not correlate well with flicker task search across 
subsamples.  Altogether these findings contribute to a general understanding of intentional 
change detection and further inform the search for stable individual differences in visual 
cognition.  The remainder of this conclusion will summarize some central implications of these 
findings before discussing future directions of this work. 
This chapter began by discussing aggregation as a solution to the variability in visual 
noticing and then shifted to discussing observed variability around particular levels of 
aggregation to better understand visual noticing across repeated trials.  Having more fully 
characterized observed performance differences in intentional change detection, what does that 
observed stability and variability reveal?  The commonality across performance in the three 
change detection tasks combined with prior evidence of commonality between change detection 
performance and visual matching performance suggests that there is some consistency across 
individual performance during change detection tasks.  However, it is not clear what that 
performance consistency reflects.  Across tasks, the magnitude of response variability relative 
to the scale of the differences between individuals raises concerns about how strongly 
performance on one task can ever predict one another.   Future research should continue to 
look for stability across change detection tasks but should also extend such analyses further to 
better identify what performance consistencies across cognitive tasks exist more generally.  For 
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example, many cognitive training studies fail to find evidence of transfer of learning to tasks 
outside of the context originally trained (see Melby-Lervag & Hulme, 2013 for a review).  
Perhaps a lack of transfer between tasks is a further indication that similarities between 
cognitive task variants are limited.  No matter the underlying explanation for limited consistency 
in change detection performance across tasks, the implications of limited consistency in 
repeatable visual noticing scenarios for single trial noticing contexts are that consistent 
performance differences may be challenging to capture.  Visual noticing of the unexpected (as 
described in the introduction) remains a challenging context within which to search for 
consistencies in individual differences.  
The extended analyses in this chapter also presented a more nuanced perspective on 
intentional change detection performance.  Performance differences on intentional change 
detection trials during the flicker task illustrate how alternative outcome measures like speed 
and accuracy capture unique information about participant performance.  In other words, there 
is room for individual difference dimensions to characterize more complex understanding of 
participant performance than simply by reporting a single overall measure of task performance 
(like raw accuracy, for example).  Further modeling of trade-offs in speed and accuracy could 
better characterize individual differences in visual noticing.  For example, a relatively straight-
forward application of the 2-choice diffusion model (as in Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008) could be 
applied to visual noticing outcomes like those collected from the object and one shot change 
detection tasks and would yield additional parameters to fit and explain individual differences in 
performance. 
Why revisit variability and consistency in performance?  First, although we typically 
subtract variability away and focus on consistencies in our experimental contrasts, a coalition of 
researchers throughout decades of psychology research point out that there is large variability in 
individual performance across sessions (e.g. work by Hultsch; Epstein, 1980, Bem & Allen, 
1974), variability that might dwarf the magnitude of many main effects found through 
experimental contrasts (Gilden, 2001).  Second, our understanding of variability and consistency 
informs our statistical and technical calculations, informs our reasoning about data, and informs 
the inferences we draw from that data (Epstein, 1980; Fiske & Rice, 1955; Luce, 1995).  For 
example, our understanding of variability and consistency defines our base-rate expectations 
about the context for our datasets, like the size of meaningful effects given constraints of power, 
sample size, and numbers of observations sampled (e.g. see Miller & Ulrich, 2013 for a 
discussion of response time reliability).  Finally, expanding our consideration of consistencies in 
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performance to also include variability broadens our perspective to include a richer set of 
possible predictors.  Both consistencies in performance and consistent variabilities in 
performance may provide meaningful predictive power that should continue to be explored in 
future research. 
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CHAPTER 6: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN INTRAINDIVIDUAL VARIABILITY1 
 
6.1 Abstract 
 Intraindividual variability is the variation found within an individual’s behavior across 
similar instances.  This chapter reviews findings from several literatures that demonstrate large 
individual differences in intraindividual variability and then provides an analysis of a three-
session study with multiple measures of cognitive performance across attention-demanding 
tasks with a 75-person young adult sample.  Across sessions and tasks, individual differences in 
intraindividual variability were large and reliable, often sharing variance with primary task 
variables.   
 
6.2 Introduction 
Fiske & Rice (1955) write,  “Pure intra-individual variability is defined as the difference 
between the two responses of an individual at two points in time under the following conditions: 
(a) the individual is exposed each time to the same stimulus or to objectively indistinguishable 
stimuli; (b) the total situation in which the responses are made is the same on both occasions. It 
is doubtful whether such an abstract case ever exists.”  This Fiske & Rice quote articulates a 
fundamental problem in studying human behavior systematically: because two occasions are 
never truly identical, any observed differences in responses between those occasions co-vary 
with other differences between the occasions.  In other words, the differences between two 
responses made by the same individual correspond to myriad differences between the two 
observations (at minimum, their position in time).  The quote also provides a working definition 
for variability in an individual’s responses across objectively comparable instances as intra-
individual variability.  In other words, intra-individual variability is variability within an individual’s 
performance across instances, a difference in performance that is sometimes alternatively 
identified as lability, plasticity, or robustness of performance (Ford, 1987; Nesselroade, 1991; 
Ram & Gerstorf, 2009, Ram et al., 2005).  
6.2.1 Intraindividual Variability in Prior Research 
Interest in and theory about intraindividual variability in human performance converge 
from across fields of thought and study, both from within psychological research and beyond.  
Observations of reliable differences in intraindividual variability have been reported in a variety !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The dataset analyzed in this chapter was originally collected and described by Lee, Boot, Basak, Voss, 
Prakash, Neider, Erickson, Simons, Fabiani, Gratton, Low, & Kramer, 2012. 
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of special populations (Benton & Blackburn, 1957; Bruhn & Parsons, 1971; Burton et al., 2006; 
Christensen, et al., 2005; Cismaru & Chertkow, 1999; de Frias et al., 2007; Hultsch, et al. 2000; 
Li, et al., 2004; Klein et al., 2006; Stuss et al., 2003; Vinogradov et al., 1998; Williams, et al., 
2005), across early development (Dikiert, Der, Starr, & Deary, 2012; Dougherty & Haith, 1997; 
Siegler, 1994, Smith & Stanley, 1983; see van Geert & van Dijk, 2002 for a review), and in aging 
(see MacDonald, Li, & Backman, 2009; Nesselroade & Ram, 2004; Ram & Gerstoff, 2009 for 
reviews).  Intraindividual variability in personality research has been documented in relation to 
affect (Eid & Diener,1999), well-being (Baird, Le, & Lucas, 2006), impulsivity differences 
(Kirkeby & Robinson, 2005), and differences in neuroticism (Robinson, Wilkowski, & Meter, 
2006).  For instance, noting both the person and situation dependence of personality (e.g. 
Fleeson, 2004), Fleeson & Leicht, (2006) argue, “the comfortable coexistence of large within-
person variability and large between-person stability is the rule rather than the exception in 
personality.”  Finally, early psychometric studies of behaviors like simple response time also 
found evidence of differences in intraindividual variability, differences that were often originally 
interpreted in the context of intelligence testing (Baumeister, 1998; Eyesenck, 1982, Jensen 
1992; Smith & Stanley, 1983). 
Observed differences in intraindividual variability are understood in the context of current 
methodological and statistical theories.   For example, classical test theory conceptualizes 
observed performance as a combination of an underlying stable true-score and error, or 
randomly fluctuating variance (Spearman, 1904).  Under such a model variability is often treated 
as measurement error, as simple deviation from true score (Fitts, 1954; Schmidt et al., 1979), 
because large systematic differences in variance across observers challenges basic 
assumptions of classical test theory (Lindenberger & von Oertzen, 2006).  However, there are 
more recent efforts to extend classical test theory to explain intraindividual variability (Miller, & 
Ulrich, 2013) and to develop standards to model and calculate intraindividual variability (Luce, 
1995; Nesselroade & Ram, 2004).  Although differences between individuals are often under-
emphasized in current theoretical models, researchers increasingly argue intraindividual 
variability is not just noise (Silfkin & Newell,1998) but an important dimension of behavior to 
consider (Boker et al ., 2009; Molenaar, 2004).  If, as they argue, differences in intraindividual 
variability are large and often robust, the question then is how robust and how typical are such 
variability differences in average human populations. 
One of the literatures that most robustly documents and considers intraindividual 
variability is aging research.  Across studies of cognitive aging, increased variability within 
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individuals’ performance is linked with older age, decreased performance on primary outcome 
measures, and less positive long-term prognoses (see MacDonald, Li, & Backman, 2009; 
Nesselroade & Ram, 2004; Ram & Gerstoff, 2009 for reviews).  Typically, these differences in 
intra-individual variability are large and robust across measures of response time (Bielak et al., 
2010; Hultsch, MacDonald, & Dixon, 2002; Ram, Rabbitt, Stollery, & Nesselroade, 2005; 
Rabbitt, Osman, Moore, & Stollery, 2001; Wearden, Wearden, & Rabbit, 1997) and attention-
demanding cognitive task performance (Allaire & Marsiske, 2005; Ivnik, et al., 1995; Klein et al., 
2011; Nesselroade & Salthouse, 2004) and with other aspects of behavior like emotional control 
(e.g. Eizenman, et al., 1997) and movement (Newell, Mayer-Kress, & Liu, 2009).  For example, 
response times during a letter search task from 91 older adults across 36 weekly sessions, 
obtained in 12 estimates of intra-individual standard deviations per subject per session, showed 
reliable differences in intraindividual variability across individuals (Ram, Rabbitt, Stollery, & 
Nesselroade, 2005). Response time variability in that study also decreased with practice and 
researchers argued intraindiviudal variability was distinct from but related to more general 
estimates of mean cognitive task performance (Ram et al., 2005). 
 When documenting intraindividual variability in older adult’s performance, many aging 
studies also report variability in younger adult performance as a contrast group (e.g. Hultsch et 
al., 2002; Nesselroade & Salthouse, 2004; Robertson, Myerson, & Hale, 2006; Schmeidek, 
Lovden, & Lindenberger, 2009; Stawskie et al., 2013).  For example, the variability in 103 older 
adults’ response times was greater than variability in 101 younger adults’ response times in a 
spatial three back task across measurements during an impressive 100 session study 
(Schmeidek, Lovden, & Lindenberger, 2009).  Across participants, Schmeidek, Lovden, & 
Lindenberger (2009) reported that “individuals differed considerably in their relations between 
iMs and iSDs”, or in their mean response times and standard deviations around those mean 
response times.  Similarly, in a study of processing speed (as digit string comparisons), 
attention switching (as dual counts of targets in a series), and working memory performance (as 
an n-back task), 108 older and 68 younger adults were tested on 6 occasions; in this study, 
within person differences and between person differences did not converge and accounted for 
different aspects of overall performance (Stawskie et al., 2013).  
Although there is a robust investigation of intraindividual variability in aging contexts, 
fewer studies look for evidence of reliable differences in intraindividual variability in young adult 
populations.  Some intraindividual variability studies consider variability in accuracy across 
cognitive task performance (Berdie, 1969; Brose et al., 2011; Flehmig et al., 2007). For 
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example, 100 freshmen completed the same six cognitive tests (by punching holes through 
circles on a piece of paper in 90 seconds, by copying geometric dot matrices, by crossing out 
non-matched rows of digits to a target for 1.5 seconds, etc.) for 20 days; Berdie (1969) found 
reliable variability in raw score accuracy with modest correlations of variability across tasks.  
More recently, 101 young adults completed an n-back task and measures of negative affect and 
motivation, resulting in the observation that session-to-session variance was related to changes 
in affect, control of attention, and motivation (Brose et al., 2011).   
However, the bulk of research on differences intraindividual variability in young adults 
considers response time differences on tasks of varying complexity (Flehmig et al., 2007; Kelly 
et al., 2001; Kirkeby & Robinson, 2005; Larson & Alderton, 1990; Robinson, Wilkowski, & Meter, 
2006; Saville et al., 2011).   For example, in a single session study, 332 navy recruits reported 
the direction of arrows and completed more complex cognitive tasks (like computing multiple 
running totals and testing number location memory) and performance on the most difficult trials 
predicted working memory performance; Difficult trials were also characterized by the highest 
levels of intraindividual variability (Larson & Alderton, 1990)2.  In another single session study, 
intraindividual variability in response times during stroop task performance were found to 
correlate with impulsivity ratings of 138 adults (Kirkeby & Robinson, 2005).  And, in a two 
session study, 179 adult participants (Mage = 28, SD = 8, max = 45) made arrow direction 
responses, simple math calculations, and matched complex foreign word strings; Flehmig et al. 
(2007) found correlations between estimates of intraindividual variability in session one and two 
were high, .72 > r > .85.  Two other intraindividual studies used prior testing to identify 
undergraduate students with high and low variability in response times and then called those 
students back for further testing (Robinson, Wilkowski, & Meter, 2006; Saville et al., 2011). In 
the first, 75 undergraduates carried computers for seven days, completing about 5 
implementations a day of a simple word categorizations (each 224 trials).  Despite log 
transforming response times, removing extreme scores, and accounting for mean trends in the 
data, there remained a positive correlation between response times and intraindividual variability 
in response times (Robinson, Wilkowski, & Meter, 2006)3.  Saville et al. (2011) also called back 
high and low variability participants (87 students in 2 sessions) and collected response times to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Finding the largest intraindividual variability on the most difficult trials is consistent with findings from 
aging research (e.g. Robertson, Myerson, & Hale, 2006). 
3 More broadly, the studies and discussion included in Robinson, Wilkowski, & Meter (2006) address how 
neuroticism, response time variability, and negative affect interact.  
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various rsvp and stop signal trial types.  Performance was summarized in several different 
measures of central tendency, intraindividual variability, and skew.  They observed that while 
mean performance was the most reliable measure across sessions, the reliability of measures 
of intraindividual variability were not bad with large enough (i.e. around 200) numbers of trials 
(particularly for commonly used measures like the standard deviation of response times). 
6.2.2 Measuring Intraindividual Variability  
Across studies, intraindividual variation is most frequently reported and measured as the 
standard deviation around average performance.  In intraindividual variability research, this 
estimate is often called the intra-individual standard deviation (or iSD).  Standard deviations 
offer a number of benefits as an estimate (like being familiar and interpretable to most 
researchers) and are typically reliable across sufficient numbers of observations (Eid & Diener, 
1999; Estabrook, Grimm, & Bowles, 2012; Flehmig et al., 2007) but there is debate about the 
best way to measure intraindividual variability as a construct (Eid & Diener, 1999; Hultsch et al., 
2002; Jahng et al., 2008; McGonigle et al, 2000; Ram & Gerstorf, 2009; Salthouse, 2007; Slifkin 
& Newell, 1998).  The debate hinges around how strongly researchers should expect 
intraindividual variability to correlate with central tendencies in performance.  In other words, the 
debate is about how much means and standard deviations in measures of human performance 
are related and how strongly researchers should correct for that relationship in their calculations, 
particularly for response times.  One defining aspect of the discussion is the effect of lower or 
upper bounds within an outcome measure on variability as observations approach those 
limitations.  For example, response speeds can only be so fast, compressing the range of 
variability that can be expressed around average performance on the fast end of response 
speeds.  Similarly, accurate performance cannot exceed 100%.  As discussed in Chapter Five, 
variability within individual response times tend to correlate to the mean of those response 
times.  While some work supports the claim of a strong, linear, and deterministic relationship 
between the two variables, other findings suggest relationships between response times and 
standard deviations may diverge under some conditions4.  For example, in an older adult 
sample, intraindividual variability in response times were modifiable relative to mean 
performance with practice and feedback (Garrett, MacDonald, & Craik, 2012).  
A commonly discussed alternative to standard deviations is the coefficient of variation, a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 For example, not all work finds variability regularly predictive of other performance measures like 
response time (Benton & Blackburn, 1957; Bruhn & Parsons, 1971; Schwartz et al., 1989; Hetherington et 
al., 1996).   
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measure calculated by dividing intraindividual variability by mean performance (see Estabrook, 
Grimm, & Bowles, 2012; Flehmig et al., 2007; Jahng et al., 2008; Slifkin & Newell, 1998 for 
related reviews).  Studies contrasting the coefficient of variability with standard deviations tend 
to find similarity across the two measures and conclude both measures warrant further 
exploration.  For example, Flehmig et al. (2007) considered response time variability both as the 
standard deviation and as the coefficient of variability.  They found that the standard deviation 
was correlated to the mean and had good reliability; the coefficient of variability was less 
correlated with individual means and with performance changes linked to practice but was also 
less reliable.  They argue the coefficient of variability may offer a useful variability estimate.   
Similarly, in a study of over 750 older adults and 99 younger adults, Hultsch et al. (2002) found 
no difference between using standard deviations or the coefficient of variability as an estimate of 
intraindividual variability.  They also considered residual variability using linear regression to 
partial out common variability with mean (and other factors like age, gender, trial).  Across all 
measures there was a main effect of age for intraindividual variability differences.  Hultsch et al. 
(2008) argue the coefficient of variation is particularly limited because it confounds the effects of 
mean response times with variability as well as with the effects of practice and fatigue.  More 
generally, Estabrook, Grimm, & Bowles (2012) argue intraindividual standard deviations are not 
as reliable as estimates of central tendency, particularly with low numbers of observations, 
demonstrating how other error can be expressed through standard deviations in monte carlo 
simulations that generate possible data outcomes given different distributional parameters.  
From their simulations, Estabrook, Grimm, & Bowles (2012) prescribe several measurement 
conditions be met for studying intraindividual variability with standard deviations including that 
measurements be on interval scales, include measurement precision across multiple possible 
response levels, and avoid ceiling and floors in measurement scales.  Other alternatives to 
standard deviations include linear regression to partial out some covariates, using residual error 
estimates to estimate intraindividual variability (e.g. Hultsch, MacDonald, & Dixon, 2002; 
Williams et al., 2005) and solutions like p-technique factor analysis (e.g. Molenaar & 
Nesselroade, 2009).   
6.2.3 Time Dependence and Intraindividual Variability 
 One observation (or criticism, depending on one’s perspective) about the standard 
deviation as a measure of intraindividual variability is that it ignores temporal dependencies and 
structure, instead only estimating average or “net” variability (Ram & Gerstorf, 2009; Slifkin & 
Newell, 1998; Schmiedek, Lovden, & Lindenberger, 2009; Wagenmakers et al., 2005; Wang, 
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Hamaker, & Bergeman, 2012).  We expect systematic variability to occur in relation to the order 
of events in time.  For example, prior experiences influence and alter later responses as 
evidenced by inter-trial effects, fatigue, learning, adaptation, etc.  Such effects represent 
systematic variability that is expected to occur over time in experiments5.  These linear 
dependencies that occur between sequential responses represent a  “dynamic structure” within 
performance variability (Kelly et al., 2001). 
One way to respond to such criticisms is to explicitly consider change over time.  For 
example, intraindividual variability could be a correlate of performance gains across time.  For 
instance, in developmental research increased variability is often a hallmark of impending 
developmental change (Siegler, 1994; Siegler, 2007).  In non-developmental research, intra-
individual variability might also predict later performance gains.  For instance, Allaire & Marsiske 
(2005) asked 36 healthy older adults to self-administer exercise books with cognitive tasks twice 
a day for sixty consecutive days.  Across the three tasks (a letter series task, a number search 
task, and a word memory test) more variable performance was related to better performance 
gains.  
6.2.4 The Present Study 
Only a handful of studies report intraindividual variability in young adult samples and 
each has its specific scope of analyses and tasks.  The following analyses consider a multi-
session dataset of performance measures from several established cognitive-attention tasks 
(Lee, Boot, Basak, Voss, Prakash, Neider, Erickson, Simons, Fabiani, Gratton, Low, & Kramer, 
2012).  In relation to intra-individual variation, the cross-task analyses involved two related 
goals.  To better understand possible consistency in intra-individual variability, these analyses 
consider intraindividual variability within tasks and across three sessions.  These cross-session 
and cross-task correlations of individual performance are sometimes called intraindividual 
covariation (Fiske & Rice, 1955) or coupled within-person variation (Hofer & Sliwinski, 2006).  
Evidence of net intra-individual variability across different levels of aggregation would provide 
evidence of consistent differences between individuals in intraindividual variability.  Specifically, 
the Lee et al., 2012 dataset provides a unique opportunity to consider the reliability of estimates 
of intraindividual variability across sessions and across tasks.  These analyses also consider 
some time-dependent variabilities (like whether there are performance gains) across the three !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 On a larger life-span scale, patterns of time-structured intra-individual variability are studied as intra-
individual change, like changes associated with development and aging (Ram & Gerstorf, 2009; 
Nesselroade, 1991). 
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sessions. 
In reference to the definition of intraindividual variability provided by Fiske & Rice, the 
following analyses attempt to estimate within person variability across objectively similar 
instances (e.g. within each task, observations are averaged across performance and within 
condition and stimulus type).  For each task, we report response time and accuracy means (in 
Appendix C) as well as the standard deviations around those means (in Figures 6.1 and 6.2) to 
provide an account of the available outcome measures.  After calculating each estimate within 
each session, performance was compared across sessions to estimate consistency of 
variability. Finally, the overall variability estimates are considered in relation to mean 
performance and to change over sessions. 
 
6.3 Method & Results 
All outcome variables were calculated from the cognitive-behavioral task data described 
in Lee et al (2012)6.  A number of outcome measures were collected throughout this large-scale 
study, but the analyses in this chapter focus on outcome variables collected from a battery of 
attention-demanding cognitive tasks that participants repeated across three test sessions.  The 
cognitive battery was administered during two 2-hour testing sessions after an initial exposure 
session to space fortress, mid-way through the study, and then at the end of the training session 
(see Lee et al., 2012 for full task parameters and Appendix C for summary information). The 
cognitive battery included an Attention Blink Task, a Change Detection Task, the Dot 
Comparison Task, a Flanker Task, a Manual Sequence Task, an N-back Memory Task, and a 
Sternberg Memory Task.   
6.3.1 Variable Definitions and Data Aggregation 
The tasks included in this cognitive battery afford several possible primary outcome 
measures to use to assess stability and variability in performance.  For example, the Dot 
Comparison, Change Detection, Sternberg Memory, and N-back tasks all include a forced 
choice target/not-target judgment component that can be translated into signal detection 
measures of sensitivity and bias.  The cognitive tasks also each provide measurements of 
stimulus-based response times.  In these analyses, such response times were typically 
averaged within blocks and trial types and then within session, creating variables of individual !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 See the original paper for details about the full study and overall results context (Lee et al., 2012).  For 
additional details about the primary tasks, extracted variables, and cross-task data patterns underlying the 
analyses provided in this paper, see Appendix C.   
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scores that reflect an observer’s average response speed relative to other observers7.   In a few 
cases, there are additional or alternative primary task measures (e.g. a difference score 
between congruent and incongruent trials) that were resolved in relation to the specific task8.  
Altogether, then, each task provided an average response time estimate, an accuracy or 
sensitivity estimate, and a composite task performance estimate9.  These variables were 
calculated not because they are of primary interest in the study but because the overall means 
represent the center around which intraindividual variability estimates were calculated.  Tables 
summarizing response times and accuracy as well as more detailed method information are 
available in Appendix C. 
To assess intra-individual variability, variability estimates were calculated from primary 
task variables and separated into estimates across trials of a single session for each task.  To 
measure intraindividual variation, most estimates were calculated as standard deviations for 
each individual for response time and accuracy measures from each task in each session.  As 
possible, standard deviations were calculated across similar trials to obtain multiple estimates 
within a session (e.g. by condition by block by trial-type).  For the purpose of these descriptive 
analyses, intraindividual variability is estimated by standard deviations (as they are most easily 
interpretable in relation to outcome measures).  Future work could and should explicitly assess 
alternate methods of calculating variability.   
Finally, performance improvement across sessions was calculated for each task to 
capture change in the central primary task measure over trials and sessions.  Across tasks, 
overall improvements in primary task performances were negligible.  
6.3.2 Intraindividual Variation Reliability 
Intraindividual variation within a task was correlated across sessions, particularly for 
response time measures (See Figures 6.1 and 6.2). Similarly, intraindividual variability in 
accuracy was correlated with overall accuracy measures (See Figure 6.2).   
Intraindividual variability estimates within a particular task were typically correlated to 
variability measures calculated in other tasks, particularly for response times (See Figure 6.3). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 See Appendix C for details on how response times were calculated by task.  Of particular note in this 
dissertation, because of low detection rates and stimulus counter-balancing constraints, flicker search 
times were standardized by stimulus across session (not within session). 
8 See Appendix C for a detailed report of primary task outcome variables and for inter-correlations across 
primary task measures. 
9 These estimates correspond to the kinds of composite estimates typically calculated as outcome 
measures from these tasks.  The composite estimates calculated in the original study were aggregated 
independently from these calculations.  
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6.3.3 Across-Session Performance and Intraindividual Variability  
The relationships between performance improvements across session and the 
aggregated intraindividual variability measures are provided in Figure 6.4.  Performance gains 
were limited overall and showed limited relationships with intra-individual variability.  Primary 
task performance calculated as differences between conditions were less likely to correlate to 
intraindividual variability than aggregate composite measures that incorporated both response 
times and accuracy. 
 
6.4 Discussion  
Across the Lee et al., (2009) dataset, participants’ recorded behavior showed aspects of 
consistency and stability.  As expected with a set of established cognitive tasks, there was 
commonality across performance measures and across testing sessions.  For example, there 
was evidence of commonalities across several tasks and sessions in performance as measured 
by signal detection estimates and response time differences.  Moreover, consistency in 
intraindividual variability was observed both across tasks and across the three sessions, 
particularly for response times.  One question that remains to be answered is what such 
similarities in performance signify.  For example, such similarity could reflect underlying 
consistencies in cognitive mechanisms, might reflect some more general difference between 
observers, or might reflect measurement stabilities.  Further assessment of cognitive task 
performance across multiple sessions is needed to explore such possibilities.  For measures of 
accuracy and response times across the sessions, the possibility that ceiling and floor effects 
limit estimates of intraindividual variability also deserves additional consideration.  Particularly 
for accuracy, the range of observed scores could be limited and close to boundary conditions 
like perfect accuracy. 
When describing time-structured variability, evidence of sequential dependencies in 
performance were hypothesized as being linked to intra-individual variability.  In analyses thus 
far, sequential dependencies in performance were removed by subtraction from overall effects 
(e.g. Ram & Gerstorf, 2009).  In this study, variables that were specifically tailored to pick up 
improvements in central primary task measures in the cross-task data patterns were calculated 
and then intraindividual variability was considered as a predictor of primary task performance 
gains.  Unfortunately, gains in performance were negligible in this study, leaving little variability 
to correlate to other measures. 
Intraindividual variability in this dataset was often correlated with overall performance 
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measures.  Understanding this variability remains an important methodological and theoretical 
issue. If some individuals are more variable than others, samples of observations will provide 
better point estimates of “true scores” for less variable individuals (Eid & Diener 1999; Fleeson, 
2001).  In other words, the more variable some individuals are relative to others, the more likely 
it is that measures will be differentially predictable for some individuals relative to others.   If 
some individual’s outcome measures are more closely clustered than others, then performance 
in one observation is likely to be closer to the true mean for some participants more than others.   
Consistent intraindividual variability could reflect more stable trait-based differences 
between individuals, more transient state-based differences, or more behavior-specific 
differences.  For example, intra-individual variability in trait-like aspects of emotional volatility, 
something akin to neuroticism, may uniquely predict other behavioral and personality measures 
(see Eid & Diener, 1999 for review; Wessman & Ricks, 1966).  Similarly, stress and negative 
affect have been linked to higher levels of intraindividual variability (Sliwinski et al., 2006).   
Alternatively, consistent intraindividual variability may change within a person over time 
(Fiske & Rice, 1955).  For instance, more transient influences on behavior might also increase 
or decrease intra-individual variation.  As one example, highly motivated (hungry) rats tend to 
have lower response variability (Fiske & Rice, 1955) as do experimentally motivated humans 
(Garrett, MacDonald, & Craik, 2012; Yeo & Neal, 2004; Brose et al., 2010).  Similarly, behavior-
specific effects might modulate intra-individual variability.  For example, intra-individual 
variability may be reduced for practiced tasks (Flehmig et al., 2007; Myerson, Robertson, & Hale 
2007).  Again, future research should attempt to find stability in intraindividual variability across 
a range of conditions and contexts. 
Within this dataset, there are several opportunities for additional analyses to further 
describe and explain the observed relationships between intraindividual variability and overall 
task performance.  For example, implementing more complex modeling of intraindividual 
variability could help explicate the relationships between standard deviations of response 
measures and the overall mean (Ram & Gerstorf, 2009; Wagenmaker & Brown, 2007; Wang et. 
al .2012).  To resolve the role of intra-individual variability in performance, future research needs 
to explicitly consider participant variability in the context of overall performance.  One possibility 
is to model distribution parameters to help create predictions of the expected variability in a 
distribution of possible performance scores.  For example, by creating a parameter to define 
intraindividual variability, contrasting models could be used to test how much additional 
explicatory value is created by tailoring such a parameter to individuals or by setting a single 
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overall parameter across individuals.  
One important limitation of these analyses may be the robustness of measurements 
across sessions.  Reliable estimates of intra-individual variability across sessions may require 
additional data.  For example, one multi-session study documented substantially lower reliability 
for 7 sessions in single week than across 51 sessions (Eid & Diener, 1999).   However, 
increased observations presents a tradeoff for individual differences research.  More 
observations increases stability of measurement but, across time, how many additional trials 
can be tested before the outcome measures are capturing something fundamentally different 
about performance (Fiske & Rice, 1955)?  In the case of this dataset, however, already 
collected measures of more complex task performance (like a joystick tracking task) already 
exist.  These additional available outcome measures could be used to test the reliability of 
intraindividual variability across contexts and to test predictions from models of intraindividual 
variability created from the data described in this study.   Again, further replication and 
exploration of these individual differences across observations, tasks, and sessions is 
warranted. 
Finally variability in performance can be further decomposed into components like 
systematic variability, time-structured variability, and random noise.  Systematic variability can 
be observed in the form of regular fluctuations or “systemic dynamics” of the human mind (Kelly 
et al., 2001).  For instance, natural system-wide cyclical variability in performance is 
documented in relation to a number of performance and biological measures (e.g. Almeida, 
Piazza, Stawski, 2009).  More specifically, biological rhythms (Makeig & Inlow, 1993; 
Mathewson et al, 2011), metabolic activity (Fiske & Rice, 1955) and reaction-time biochemistry 
or perceptual systems psychophysics (Elliot & Muller, 2000) all show consistent cycles of 
variability.  Understanding intraindividual variability within these different scales of measurement 
and different types of variability would better characterize this underlying structure within human 
performance and help to identify the extent of consistent variability in measures of performance 
across trials, tasks, and sessions. 
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6.5 Figures 
 
Standard Deviations in Response Times Across Sessions 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Standard Deviations in Response Times within and across Sessions.  For each task and 
session, standard deviations in response times are listed with the standard deviations of each 
intraindividual response time measure.  Correlations of intraindividual variability across the three sessions 
are listed for each measure as well as the average correlation of each standard deviation and overall 
session mean for each session. 
 
 
 
Standard Deviations in Accuracy Across Sessions 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Standard Deviations in Accuracy within and across Session.  For each task and session, 
standard deviations in accuracy in hit rates are listed with the standard deviations of each intraindividual 
accuracy measure.  Correlations of intraindividual variability across the three sessions are listed for each 
measure as well as the average correlation of each standard deviation and overall session mean for each 
session. 
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Correlations between Intraindividual Variability and Cross-Session Outcome Measures 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Correlations between Intraindividual Variability and Cross-Session Outcome Measures.  This figure lists 
correlations between intraindividual variability measures (e.g. standard deviations of accuracy, response times, and z-
scored composites of both intraindividual measures) and cross-task session estimates of overall performance from 
these analyses, of the original Lee et al., 2012 composite measures, and of gain within a session. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSONS 
 
7.1 Abstract 
To conclude this dissertation, I outline original contributions of this thesis work, 
summarize main ideas and conclusions, and then describe the implications of this work both for 
our field and the broader community before discussing directions for future research. 
 
7.2 Conclusions  
This dissertation has contributed several literature reviews, two new analyses of 
individual differences data in young adult samples, and theoretical analysis and discussion of 
topics of interest to the fields of attention, awareness, perception, and cognition.  Chapter One 
(written in collaboration with Yao, Street, & Simons) provided an extensive overview of change 
blindness and inattentional blindness research, laying the foundation for the discussion and 
inquiry in later chapters.  Chapter Two described predictions and findings of attention-based 
individual differences in visual noticing, identifying distinctions between sets of findings and their 
implications for future research.  Chapter Three described the methods and task-level results for 
an new individual differences study.  Then, Chapter Four reported relationships between visual 
noting during an intentional change detection task, several incidental noticing scenarios, 
cognitive task performance, and personality measures and discussed stability across those 
findings.  Chapter Five re-visited intentional change detection to look for consistencies across 
tasks and within trials, finding substantial variability both within and between participant 
performance.  Chapter Six provided an analysis of intraindividual variability in cognitive task 
data across three sessions and found reliable variability in response times and accuracy within 
task as well as substantial commonality between response time variability across tasks.  
Chapter Seven will primarily summarize and discuss the implications of these findings, providing 
an overall conclusion to this thesis work. 
 One beginning to this dissertation was sparked years ago when my sister and I played in 
a small stream near a country road no more than fifty feet from intermittently passing vehicles. 
We played in the water in the long grass by the woods and watched as drivers wound their way 
past us through the valley.  So few of the drivers saw us or even glanced our way that we 
marveled at the obliviousness of adults and vowed to avoid such failures to notice ourselves, 
believing heartfelt intent could trump human tendency.  One can imagine myriad scenarios in 
which predicting who will notice what and when in such a context might be of importance and 
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interest in the real world.  For instance, when writing about visual noticing research authors 
often invoke particularly extreme example scenarios in opening paragraphs like this one to 
remind the reader of how the balance of important action can sometimes rest on noticing the 
right information at the right time.   However, by emphasizing these extraordinary event 
scenarios we distort the discussion of noticing from considering the uncountable moments of 
selection and comprehension that are noticing in our day to day lives to over-interpreting the 
significance of a single critical moment. 
In a different beginning to this project, the prologue, I wrote, “The surprising extent to 
which people fail to notice discrepancies can obscure a complimentary finding: that noticing is 
often variable in any given scenario (e.g. some observers notice what others do not).”  Viewing 
awareness from the perspective of failures to notice may somewhat over-emphasize variability 
by focusing on a boundary condition of perception.  For example, after viewing the incidental 
change video described in Chapter Three, observers would likely provide over-whelming similar 
accounts of their experience of the video, with the vast majority reporting some version of the 
central event as “a guy walked down a hallway with a book”1.  In other words, even though not 
all observers notice the critical change or items of interest in a particular scenario, observers are 
not likely to report dramatically different experiences of the event more generally.  It is the 
consistency in our common perceptual experience that makes the variability of a failure to notice 
surprising and intriguing.  To summarize, failures to notice do demonstrate that observers have 
limited ability to notice and recall detail from the world, but they do not prove that variability in 
who notices critical information and who does not in a particular context is inherently 
meaningful.  One central goal of this dissertation has been to assess the claim that variability 
within and between observers in contexts like visual noticing is meaningful. 
 The point of describing both of these beginning observations is to highlight that many of 
the central conclusions from the reviews in Chapter One and Two, and even the data reported in 
Chapters Three, Four, Five, and Six reveal more about what we all are likely to notice most of 
the time than about the ways in which people are different from one another.  When one driver 
notices children near the road when another does not, what does that difference really tell us?  
As reviewed in Chapter One, the findings of experimental work on visual noticing suggest 
                                                
1 For instance, those participants who reported noticing a change but did not describe the critical change 
typically described the camera angle change, the room change, etc. as the change of interest.  In other 
words, there was a limited range of responses even to an open-ended prompt to describe what changed 
during the video.   
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numerous contingencies can make a stimulus like children near a road more or less noticeable 
across observers.  However, these differences in observer noticing may reflect primarily 
situationally variable factors, where one observer might notice because they are attending the 
periphery for wild animals, or another notices because the children are closer to the road, or 
another because they are not mentally pre-occupied with their phone.  Experimental research is 
particularly good at identifying these kinds of factors in scenarios where we can hold many 
factors constant, manipulate the difference of interest, and then observe an overall difference 
between conditions.  One central conclusion of such work is that information people are 
attending is most likely to be noticed, with some bleed-over to related items depending on how 
individuals are engaged and what kind of information appears. 
Chapters Two and Four considered how differences in attention and cognition predict 
noticing.  In other words, the chapters considered whether who the driver is makes the individual 
more likely to notice.  A central conclusion from the inattentional blindness literatures is that the 
direction and occupation of central attention, or on where you are focusing and what you are 
doing as you focus, are both important aspects in determining what observers notice.  However, 
this observation leaves a tantalizing question unanswered: What explains differences in 
performance when observers are overwhelmingly doing the same thing (i.e. focusing on a 
computer-based cognitive task).  The strong claim of attention-based individual differences in 
visual noticing is that relative differences in cognitive ability (as measured by other task 
performance) explains those differences, but evidence of such relationships is somewhat mixed. 
For example, data suggests intentional visual search for change might be predictable while 
incidental unexpected noticing of happenstance anomalies may not.  One important question 
asked in this thesis in a few different ways (and it is a question that needs to be more regularly 
considered) is whether there is any reason to expect consistency across instances of visual 
noticing in the first place.  For single-trial incidental noticing, the answer seems to be no 
(although some relationships between reported noticing and personality suggest there may be 
some stylistic systematicity to how individuals respond in such instances).  For intentional 
change detection, consistencies in change detection do appear to reflect limited consistency in 
other attention-demanding cognitive tasks; If that pattern remains consistent in further work, a 
central question for the field at large to consider is why? 
Exploring individual differences in visual noticing was a question not only of 
understanding differences between individuals, but also of understanding the stability and 
variability within individual performance in the context of peers.  As such, Chapters Five and Six 
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considered variability within task performance and consistencies across tasks to better 
understand the underlying regularities of human performance.  A somewhat surprising result 
from these analyses was the conclusion that task performance can be highly variable, 
particularly measures like response time.  This variability is highly correlated to overall mean 
effects, where more variable performance often reflects more difficult trials and less ideal 
performance (as defined by fast and accurate performance).  The independence or non-
independence of variability from mean effects deserves to be further assessed, but regardless 
of the determinacy of the relationship, the fact that such a relationship exists at all reveals an 
important structure within task performance for all researchers to understand and incorporate 
into their models of human behavior.  Further characterizing the variability that is typically 
subtracted away from our aggregated outcome measures will provide a better understanding of 
the stability in behavior and performance that we do measure. 
Despite limitations and debate, the utility of aggregating observations to identify 
performance consistency is a fundamental tool of experimental science.  The tradition of 
measuring and considering consistency through experimental control and data aggregation 
remains robust, instead it is the variation that is subtracted and controlled away that is often 
dismissed as, at best, meaningless noise and, at worst, complicating contingencies that make 
human data messy.  But by only considering aggregated consistencies, we may artificially 
narrow our search space for meaningful aspects of human behavior (Bem & Allen, 1974).  By 
narrowly controlling experimental parameters to limit variation, we may artificially inflate 
consistency in individual performance by creating situations where our outcome measures are 
highly inter-related but are also extremely vulnerable to specific constraints or not relevant to 
more complex real-world behavior we hope to explain (Epstein, 1980; Lohman, 1989; McKay, 
1982).  Unconsidered aggregation may also confuse understandings and interpretations of 
reliability and validity of measurements.   For example, a distinction between concurrent 
reliability (reliability between observations taken during the same time frame) may be very 
different from temporal reliability (reliability over time) but is often confounded in the way 
reliability is discussed in relation to experimental paradigms2 (Epstein, 1980).   
Of particular concern in relation to the attempts to compare alternative outcome 
measures from particular tasks are how inter-related but different outcome variables might be 
                                                
2 This dissociation mirrors a similar distinction between concurrent validity and predictive validity (Epstein, 
1980), a distinction that also often remains un-discriminated (as it does throughout the framing of this 
dissertation, for example). 
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employed in experimental contexts.  The design choices of which outcome measures to 
consider and what observations to aggregate together define our variables and experimental 
contrasts.  In practice, these design and analysis decisions are often made through a 
combination of reasoning, tradition, and pragmatism on a study-by-study basis.   But, data 
aggregation is an analysis tool that is used across studies of human behavior (and as part of the 
scientific method more generally) and researchers must carefully consider how measurement 
decisions may be reflected across patterns of data.  For example, if performance measures 
based on similar mathematical computations tend to cluster together, is it fair to treat that 
similarity as evidence of construct stability rather than as evidence of systematic variability 
related to measurement?  Relatedly, subtle changes in implementations of cognitive tasks can 
impact task measures.  For example, in the flicker task, differences in parameters like trial 
timeouts or homogenous stimuli may reduce meaningful variation in performance as well as 
alter response contingencies.  For example, Kelly, Heathcote, Heath, & Longstaff (2001) 
discuss the cost of time-pressured trials for obscuring meaningful differences in response time 
variability. 
To fully understand the variability and stability in human performance, correlational 
procedures must inform experimental procedures and vice versa, as ideographic (individual) 
measurements should inform and be informed by nomothetic (more universal) measurements 
(Cronbach, 1957, Epstein 1980) and research on trait-level consistencies considered in balance 
with state-level regularity (Fleeson, 2004).  The reason this balanced approach is so essential is 
that it allows us to see different patterns within and across people, providing context about the 
scope and scale of our data patterns.  Similarly, a better understanding of the distributions and 
contingencies that underlie our paradigms and tests should help improve our modeling and our 
estimates of the reliability of our measurements and findings.  Moreover, a more detailed 
consideration of our task variables, of how they are calculated and what they reflect, should 
improve the validity of our outcome measures and theoretical interpretations of effects. 
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APPENDIX A: CROSS-TASK METHOD AND ANALYSIS DETAILS (CHAPTER 4)1 
 
A.1 Appendix Summary 
Appendix A provides supplemental method and analysis information about the cross-
task dataset described in Chapter Four.  Specifically, it provides the full correlation matrices for 
the alternative subsets of participants.  It provides a summary of demographic measures and 
cross-task data patterns.  Finally, the chapter provides additional details about the multivariate 
analyses presented in the figures of Chapter Four.  For additional information about tasks and 
for task-level summary statistics, see Chapter Three. 
 
A.2 Correlations across Alternative Inclusion Cutoffs 
Chapter Four provides results across three subsets of the dataset, representing planned 
comparisons across alternative informed inclusion criteria.  The full primary outcome correlation 
tables for each of the sub-samples discussed in Chapter Four is provided in Figure A.1. 
For intentional change detection during the flicker task, faster and more accurate search 
performance was correlated with better primary task performance across the various sub-
divisions of participants.  For instance, in the subset of participants who achieved 80% accuracy 
or higher, better performers tended to be more accurate at finding the target in the attentional 
breadth task, r(159) = .16, faster to click during the trail making task, r(157) = -.28, more 
sensitive to changes during the object memory change detection task,  r(160) = .15, and the 
visual short term memory task, r(158) = .18, and to have higher estimated Ravens ability, r(159) 
= .15.  In the subset of participants who achieved 100% accuracy2, again, better performers 
tended to be more accurate at finding the target in the attentional breadth task, r(92) = .16, 
faster to click during the trail making task, r(91) = -.35, more sensitive to changes during the 
object memory change detection task,  r(92) = .18, and the visual short term memory task, r(91) 
= .18, and to have somewhat higher estimated Ravens ability, r(92) = .12.   
For inattentional blindness, the relationship between noticing and the personality factors 
of openness and neuroticism remained constant.  In the 80% accuracy and above group, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 This study was supported by a subject payment grant from Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society, 
through their Grants-in-Aid of Research Program, and with additional funding through the University of 
Illinois Psychology Department Irwin Funds.   
2 By considering the subset of participants who were perfectly accurate at the flicker task, we eliminate 
the contribution of change detection accuracy into the composite better performers score, so here the 
variability in the better performers score is driven by differences in time to report finding the change by a 
key press.!
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noticing during the inattentional blindness trial remained positively correlated to openness and 
cognition, where more open observers were more likely to report noticing the object, r(155) = 
.17.  The same pattern held in the subset of observers who were 100% accurate, r(88) = .22.  
Similarly, in both reduced sub-samples the factor related to neuroticism remained negatively 
related to noticing, where observers who were more neurotic were less likely to notice in the 
80% accurate group, r(155) = -.23, and in the smaller subset of 100% accurate participants, 
r(88) = -.31.  The relationship between noticing and primary task performance was more 
variable.   Similar to the full sample results, noticing during the inattentional blindness trial in the 
80% accurate and above group appeared to be related to primary task performance, particularly 
for measures like attentional breadth, r(159) = .17, or calculated sensitivity to the object change, 
r(159) = .21, and for visual short term memory color change, r(157) = .19 but to a lesser extent 
for Ravens performance, r(159) = .11.  However, when considering the noticing rates of the 
most accurate change detectors, inattentional blindness was even less correlated to attentional 
breadth, r(92) = .14, to sensitivity on either object change detection , r(92) =.13, or to visual 
short term memory tasks, r(91) =.07 and Ravens performance, r(92) = .09. 
Finally, incidental change detection remained most strongly correlated with the 
personality factors conscientiousness and need for closure across different inclusion criteria.   
With the 80% accuracy cutoff, noticing an incidental change remained somewhat correlated with 
conscientiousness, r(156) = -.26, and with a preference for uncertainty, r(156) = .-14.   The only 
other correlation above .1 was with Ravens performance, where better performance on the 
Ravens task was associated with a lower likelihood of describing the shirt and book change 
during the video, r(159) = -.14.  In the further restricted 100% accuracy flicker task sample, 
higher conscientiousness remained correlated with incidental change noticing, r(88) = -.33, and 
observers who self-rated as liking ambiguity remained more likely to have reported noticing the 
changes,   r(88) = -.19.  The correlation with Ravens performance from the 80% cutoff sample 
was less present in the further restricted 100% accurate sample, r(92) = -.09.   However, there 
was some correlation with inattentional blindness, r(92) = .15, and accuracy at making line 
length judgments, r(92) = -.20; Neither of these relationships was as evident with the 80% 
accuracy group.  
One additional new noticing task during a magic video was also included in this study. 
Across the inclusion criteria, cross-task relationships between the magic ball height estimate 
and cross-task variables remained consistent.  For example, with the 80% accuracy cutoff, 
higher competition was correlated with higher estimates of the magic ball’s last position (and a 
147 
stronger reported experience of the magic illusion), r(159) = .20, as it was with the 100% 
accuracy cutoff, r(92) = .33.  Other predictors correlated to increased estimates of the ball’s 
height, included higher self-rated extraversion, r(159) = .17 and r(92) = .26, and lower object 
change detection sensitivity, r(159) = -.13 and r(92) = -.21.   
 
A.3 Demographic Predictors 
Age, sex, and video-game playing have been linked to differences in cognition and 
attention.  For example, many studies document decrements in attention measures and time-
pressured cognitive task performance with age (Deary, Johnson, & Star, 2010; Hedden & 
Gabrieli, 2004; Salthouse, 1996, 2004; Ratcliff, Thapar, & McKoon, 2001).  Participant sex has 
also been reported as a correlate of cognitive attention performance.  In particular, women tend 
to be somewhat slower on reaction time measures than men (Ballard, 1996).  However, such 
differences do not persist for women trained on cognitive tasks (Feng et al, 2007) or for female 
athletes (Alves et al., 2013; Lum, Enns, & Pratt, 2002) even though they are typical of control 
groups.  Finally, in a number of studies, video game experience is often related to better overall 
performance on cognitive task batteries in comparison to non-video game players (Anderson, 
Bavelier, & Green, 2010; Baniqued et. al., 2013; Green & Bavelier, 2003). 
A.3.1 Analysis Results 
Participants provided limited demographic information in this study, including information 
about three population characteristics that have been linked to performance differences in prior 
work: age, sex, and video-game playing.  The relationship between the sex and video game 
demographic variables and the overall data patterns are plotted in Figure A.23.   
For gender and video game playing, the dataset shows evidence of relationships 
between primary task measures and demographic variables.  For example, being a male was 
correlated with more reported noticing during the inattentional blindness trial and a lower 
estimate of the disappearing ball height.  Several personality factors as well as attentional 
breadth performance also correlated with participant sex.  Similarly, more time spent playing 
video games was correlated with better cognitive task performance for attentional breadth and 
the visual short-term memory task. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 There were no clear relationships between the outcome measures and age, an unsurprising finding 
given the limited age-range of sample.   
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A.4 Multivariate Analysis Details 
 An underlying analysis perspective promoted in Chapter Three is that reliable data 
patterns should appear consistently across alternative analyses or statistical approaches to 
describing a dataset.  Therefore, the patterns of relationships between and across variables are 
summarized through several multivariate analyses in Chapter Four (as more or less 
sophisticated employments of that analysis type).  This Appendix provides details about the 
multivariate analysis included in Chapter Four4.   
A.4.1 Factor Analysis 
The factorability of the primary outcome measures from the multiple-trial tasks was 
considered.  The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy across the measures was 
.64 (Range =  .59 - .71) and the Bartlett test for sphericity was significant, χ2 (21) = 109.7, p < 
.01, satisfying minimal assumptions for use of factor analysis (Kaiser, 1970; Sziuban & Shirkey, 
1974).  Intending to identify factors and create composite factor scores for later analyses, 
principle component analysis with no rotation and, later, with a varimax rotation for ease of 
interpretation, were used.  Solutions with and without rotation were similar.  The varimax rotated 
and sorted factor loadings are provided in Figure A.3.   
The primary cognitive task measures were reduced into two factors that explained 
approximately 22.6% and 21.2% of the variance respectively5.  All measures included in the 
factor analysis had primary loadings on one of the factors of over .5, with the exclusion of the 
object change detection sensitivity measure that shared variance across both factors.  For 
example, the component loadings for the first factor were comprised primarily of the Trail 
Making response time, Flicker task performance, and the Ravens estimated capacity.  The 
second factor captured variance in performance on the short-exposure judgment tasks, like the 
line judgment, visual short-term memory, functional field of view, and the object change 
detection tasks.  
A.4.2 Logit and OLS Regression Models 
 Logistic and OLS regression models using the cross-task predictor variables were fitted !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 There are always additional alternate ways to model and describe such data.  In this appendix, I provide 
a description of the analyses provided at the time this thesis was completed.  
5 A two-factor solution was selected for a number of reasons including the lack of increased explanatory 
power for additional factors after the first two factors as indicated by a leveling off of the eigenvalues and 
the lower contributions of additional factors to explained variance.  The two-factor solution also provided a 
coherent factor structure that was consistent with multiple-factor solutions, conceptually consistent with 
prior work using similar tasks and measures, and descriptively similar to the patterns observed in the 
CART modeling and correlations between tasks. 
149 
to the data to provide a minimal standard alternative analysis to the correlational tables and 
classification and regression tree ensemble modeling described in Chapter Four.  All regression 
analyses were carried out using Systat 13.1 ©Systat 2009 in the Windows 7 ©Microsoft 2009 
environment.  Although the logistic model for incidental change noticing did not better fit the data 
than an intercept-only model, for the other noticing measures (inattentional blindness, intentional 
change detection, and the magic ball height estimate) the full regression models fit the data 
better than an intercept-only model.  See Figures A.4 – A.7 for regression coefficients and 
model evaluation summaries. 
A.4.3 Classification & Regression Tree Analyses  
One approach to describing relationships between visual noticing and predictor variables 
is to use re-sampling and bootstrapping techniques to characterize relationships between 
variables.  In these analyses, I use a version of regression and discriminant analysis to predict 
performance on the noticing measures of interest from the available dependent variables by 
taking multiple random partitions of the sample to find the best-fitting models.  To characterize 
the cross-task data patterns, classification and regression trees were repeatedly generated to 
identify variables that were predictive of noticing in the four visual noticing tasks analyzed in 
Chapter Three6.   
In these analyses, an algorithm randomly selects and sets aside approximately 1/3 of 
the participant data and uses the remaining data to construct the best-fitting prediction model 
possible (as discriminant analysis and classification decision trees) using common variance to 
select the best predictors by evaluating all possible splits and selecting the best splits to 
minimize impurity (e.g. within sum-of-squares error).  The model then predicts out-of-bag 
observations for cross-validation to characterize how well the model explains the remaining data 
as the mean squared error of the predicted scores relative to the observed scores (Breiman, 
Friedman, Olshen, & Stone, 1984).  These classification and regression tree (CART) analyses 
were calculated using the 175-person subset of participants with estimates for all outcome 
measures.  See Figures A.9 and A.10 for representative trees and summaries of prediction error 
using the re-sampling models, a representative tree, and average performance. 
Using Matlab R2011a and the TreeBagger (as well as the fitensemble, and 
ClassificationTree.fit) functions, I repeated this procedure to identify which variables tended to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 This approach was used in Jensen & Simons (in prep) to model performance on similar noticing tasks 
and similar models are considered here within the current data sample as an attempt to replicate some of 
those findings.   
150 
be the most predictive measures across many random subsets of my data (across 50 attempts 
to find the best predictors by generating 200 trees)7. The utility of predictors across those 
various analyses is estimated by the increase in mean-squared-error for out-of-bag observations 
when the predictor variables were randomly scrambled across individuals.  After considering the 
plots in Figure A.8 of the average out-of-bag mean squared error across different leaf sizes (leaf 
size defines the minimum bin size), I used a default leaf size of 20 across sets of 200 grown 
trees.  The graphs in Figure A.8 show how trees with smaller leaf sizes tend to over-fit data and 
lead to higher MSE, how the models for intentional change detection and inattentional blindness 
predict performance about as well as the sample mean while prediction of incidental noticing is 
much more unstable; and the variability within the error rates across the trees.   
To help elucidate the classification and regression trees that underlie these analyses, I 
provide representative decision trees for each task that were constructed by selecting the most 
predictive variables and creating a simple standard tree model.  For each model, the 
representative tree provides one instantiation of the underlying models being identified through 
ensemble methods.   
For intentional change detection, better performance is best predicted by other 
measures of primary task performance on cognitive tasks.  In Figure A.10, the most useful 
predictor variable was search time to click on the next numbered circle during the trail making 
task.  Other useful predictors included performance on the object memory change detection task 
and Ravens performance.  Somewhat surprisingly, given the lack of correlation across the 
sample, agreeableness was also a somewhat useful predictor of overall flicker task 
performance8.   
For inattentional blindness (see Figure A.9), performance on both of the one-shot 
change detection tasks (the object memory and VSTM tasks) as well as on the Ravens matrices 
problems are somewhat useful as classifiers.  In addition, and not surprisingly given the 
correlation patterns, openness and neuroticism were also somewhat useful predictors.  For 
example, for inattentional blindness, the openness/cognition factor divides the sample in half, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 The summary graphs of feature importance are presented in Chapter Four.   
8 Extremely high agreeableness may be predictive of lower composite flicker task performance because 
these individuals are more willing to persist in a difficult search for changes when their peers might give 
up with an incorrect response.  To consider this possibility, I extracted the 5% of the sample with the most 
extreme agreeableness self-ratings (N = 10).  Indeed, these very agreeable individuals did tend to be 
somewhat more accurate (M = 92.5%, SD = 10%) than the overall sample (M = 86.2%, SD = 24.8%) as 
well as somewhat slower to find the changes (M = .16, SD = .37) relative to the standardized search 
times, despite no overall correlation between agreeableness and either dimension.!
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predicting more open participants will be more likely to notice the unexpected information.  For 
the less open observers, those who had higher sensitivity on the object change detection task 
are predicted to notice while those with low sensitivity are predicted to not notice. 
For incidental change detection, as you can see in Figure A.9, few variables are reliable 
as classifiers.  Only personality factors like those related to closure/ambiguity and 
conscientiousness/impulsivity are useful as classifiers.  For example, the representative tree 
uses the closure dimension to sort participants into three bins.  Observers who self-rated in the 
middle of the need for closure dimension were predicted to notice.  Observers with more 
extreme preferences for or against closure were predicted to not notice the unexpected 
changes. 
Finally, observer’s estimate of the height of the last time they saw the disappearing ball 
were correlated with several self-rated personality factors and with primary task performance 
measures.  In the representative tree depicted in A.10, an observer’s ball height response was 
estimated by predicting that more highly self-rated competitive individuals would make a higher 
estimate.  Observers with lower rated competitiveness were further discriminated by their 
Ravens performance, where observers with better Ravens performance were predicted to have 
a lower height estimate and observers with lower Ravens scores were predicted to have an 
average ball height estimate that was similar to competitive individuals. 
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A.5 Figures 
 
Cross-task Correlations 
Correlation Matrix for Full Sample (N ≈ 196)  
 
 
Correlation Matrix for 80+% Flicker Accuracy Sample (N ≈ 162)  
 
 
Correlation Matrix for 100% Flicker Accuracy Sample (N ≈ 94)  
 
Figure A.1. Cross-task Correlations across Subsamples.  Correlations between primary outcome 
variables for the three sub-samples are listed.  Sub-samples were defined by different inclusion criteria 
that were informed by prior research (i.e. Flicker Task Accuracy cutoffs for below 80% and below 100% 
accurate observers).   
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Sex & Video Game Hours within Cross-task Correlations 
 
Figure A.2. Sex and Video Game Correlations. Correlations between primary outcome variables with 
reported sex and hours per week spent playing video games for the three different inclusion criteria 
subgroups.  For the full, 80% accurate, and 100% accurate cutoffs, N ≈ 196, N ≈ 162, N ≈ 94, 
respectively. 
 
 
Multiple-Trial Cognitive Task Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 
Figure A.3. Factor Loadings for Multiple Trial Cognitive Tasks. Component loadings as calculated using 
Principle Component Analysis of primary task performance on the multiple trial cognitive tasks are listed 
across two factors. 
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Intentional Change Detection Regression Table 
  
Figure A.4. Intentional Change Detection OLS Regression Table.  
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Incidental Change Detection Regression Table 
 
Figure A.5. Incidental Change Detection Logistic Regression Table.   
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Inattentional Blindness Regression Table 
 
Figure A.6. Inattentional Blindness Detection Logistic Regression Table.   
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Magic Ball Height Judgment Regression Table 
 
Figure A.7. Magic Ball Height Judgment OLS Regression Table.  
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Incidental Change Detection    Inattentional Blindness 
Classification Trees     Classification Trees 
  
 
Intentional Change Detection   Magic Ball Height Judgment  
Regression Trees      Regression Trees 
 
  Figure A.8. Mean Squared Error in Noticing Predictions Across Alternative Leaf and Tree Sizes.  
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Representative Classification Tree Examples  
 
Figure A.9. Representative Classification Trees for Incidental Change Detection and Inattentional 
Blindness.  
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Representative Regression Tree Examples  
 
Figure A.10. Representative Regression Trees for Intentional Change Detection and the Magic Ball 
Illusion. Negative values of the magic ball height judgment correspond to a lower height judgment. 
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APPENDIX B:  SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURES (CHAPTER 5)1 
 
B.1 Appendix Summary 
Appendix C provides supplemental figures for Chapter Five that characterize flicker task 
search across trials, stimulus pairs, and accuracy levels.  For additional information about the 
cross-task dataset, see Chapter Four and Appendix A.  For additional information about 
individual tasks and task-level result summaries, refer to Chapter Three. 
 
B.2 Variability in Intentional Change Detection  
 The primary goal of this appendix is to provide supplemental figures to enrich the 
discussion of flicker task performance described in Chapter Five.  I provide a brief summary of 
each figure and table in this appendix but implications of these findings are discussed in 
Chapter Five. 
B.2.1. Median Change Search Times 
 Figure B.1 presents matched median response time summaries of flicker task 
performance between this study and previous work in our lab (the prior study included fewer 
participants but more trials of flicker change detection search).  Despite halving the number of 
observations in the current study relative to the preliminary study, the graphs show similar 
patterns of responses. 
B.2.2. Item Responses By Change Image Pair 
Item-by-item data for each stimulus pair presented during the flicker task is plotted in the 
performance graphs in Figure B.2 .  In these charts, performance variability across stimuli pairs 
is evident.  For example, comparing stimuli pairs C and D, the greater difficulty of noticing the 
change for stimuli pair D is reflected in longer and more variable search times as well as in 
lower accuracy across participants.  In contrast, stimuli pair C contains an easier change for 
participants to detect, as participants were more uniformly able to accurately find the change in 
under 30 seconds.  The lower variability of responses in relation to stimuli pair C results in a test 
item that has a smaller overall contribution to the combined score differences across observers 
(see Chapter 3, Figure 3.3).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 This study was supported by a subject payment grant from Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society, 
through their Grants-in-Aid of Research Program, and with additional funding through the University of 
Illinois Psychology Department Irwin Funds.   
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B.2.3. Longest Search Time & Search Time on Incorrect and Correct Responses 
In Figure B.3, individuals’ longest search time, regardless of accuracy, is plotted against 
their overall accuracy across trials.  In the under 80% accuracy group M = 56.6, SD = 24.8 (N = 
22); in the 80%-92% accuracy group M = 66.8, SD = 41.9, (N = 68); and for the 100% accurate 
group M = 54, SD = 32.9, (N = 94).  
To contrast search times for accurate and inaccurate trials, Figure B.4 provides a 
scatterplot of average search times for correct and incorrect trials (on a standardized scale). In 
this graph, two trends are evident.  First, response times on trials that ended with an incorrect 
response could be up to several orders of magnitude slower than correct responses. (Note that 
the x-axis ranges from -2 to 2 while the Y-axis ranges from -2 to 10 relative to the same 
standardized units across dimensions.)  Second, the 80%-100% accurate group has more 
variability in incorrect search times than the under 80% accurate group, suggesting possible 
individual differences in navigating tradeoffs between accuracy and response time. 
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B.3 Figures  !
Flicker Task: Median Response Times by Overall Accuracy 
 
Preliminary Work (N = 126, Trials = 25) 
 
Number of Changes Correctly Identified  
Figure B.1. Flicker Task Median Response Times and Accuracy in Preliminary Work.  Intentional change 
detection standardized response times for accurate trials are plotted by overall accuracy1.  Upper and 
lower bounds indicate upper and lower quartiles around the median response time for each individual.  
Within each accuracy level, response times are sorted by the composite flicker change detection outcome 
measure (a combined response time and accuracy index, see Appendix A.4 for additional details). 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Negative values represent faster response times.  
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Flicker Change Detection Search Time and Accuracy by Stimulus Pair (A-D)!
 
Figure B.2 Scene Stimuli for Flicker Change Detection with Performance Scatterplots. The twelve change 
detection stimuli pairs are pictured next to performance scatterplots, with participant search times in 
seconds (on the Y axis) plotted against an individual’s overall performance rating on the flicker task (on 
the X axis).  Search times longer than 2 minutes are plotted at 120 seconds next to a number listing the 
full search time.  Purple lines represent search times for individuals who clicked on the correct change 
location.  Orange circles represent search times for incorrect click responses.  The black asterisks plotted 
at the low end of the composite performance scale represent data from observers who never correctly 
clicked on any changes.!
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Flicker Change Detection Search Time and Accuracy by Stimulus Pair (E-H)!
 
 
Figure B.2 (cont.) 
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Flicker Change Detection Search Time and Accuracy by Stimulus Pair (I-L)!
 
 
 
Figure B.2 (cont.)  
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Flicker Task: Longest Search Time by Overall Accuracy 
               
Figure B.3. Flicker Task Longest Search Time by Accuracy. Each participant’s longest search time (in 
seconds, and regardless of accuracy) is plotted as a function of overall accuracy (percent correct) during 
the intentional flicker change detection task.   
 
Flicker Task: Average Response Times for Accurate and Inaccurate Responses !!!
 
Figure B.4. Flicker Search Times for Accurate and Inaccurate Trials. Average standardized response time 
on correct trials (Y-axis) is plotted against average standardized response time on incorrect trials (X-axis) 
for all participants.  Fast responses are represented by negative values and all times were standardized 
against average performance by stimulus pair on correct trials only.  Each mean value represents 
different counts of observations dependent upon individual’s overall accuracy. Individuals with only error 
trials or only accurate trials are plotted at 0 on the axis with no observations. 
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APPENDIX C: SUPPLEMENTAL METHOD, TASK, & RESULTS DETAILS (CHAPTER 6) 
 
C.1 Appendix Summary 
Appendix C provides supplemental information about the dataset described in Chapter 
Six of this dissertation.  The full dataset was originally described and collected by Lee, Boot, 
Basak, Voss, Prakash, Neider, Erickson, Simons, Fabiani, Gratton, Low, & Kramer (2012).  This 
appendix outlines defining parameters of the original study and cognitive-attention tasks and 
describes how measures were aggregated and calculated for these analyses. 
 
C.2 Study Description 
The results described in Chapter Six report variability in behavioral measures of primary 
task performance collected during several cognitive-attention tasks across three separate study 
sessions.  Such measures of variability are defined by the details of how the underlying data 
were collected, calculated, and summarized.  Therefore, this appendix briefly describes primary 
task details and the outcome measures extracted from each task.  These summaries typically 
include estimates of accuracy, response times, overall task performance, within session 
variability, and change in performance across sessions.  Overall, then, the goal of this appendix 
is to provide a primarily descriptive account of the tasks, measurements, and variables that 
inform the data extracted and analyzed in Chapter Six, with particular focus on measuring the 
variability within central estimates of individual’s responses during these tasks.  
 
C.3 Method Details and Variable Summaries  
These data were collected as part of a multi-session training study in the Beckman 
Institute at the University of Illinois that included the collection of measures of individual’s 
performance across a number of behavioral and neural measures (see Lee et al., 2012 for the 
complete and originally reported study details).    
In this 60-hour training study, 75 participants between the ages of 18 and 30 were 
assigned to learn a computerized Space Fortress game that is theorized to demand the 
coordination of several cognitive processes including attention, memory, multi-tasking, and 
motor coordination (Mane & Donchin, 1989).  The primary goal of a Space Fortress player is to 
destroy the central space fortress through missile fire while navigating and avoiding damage to 
a player-controlled ship.  The task requires precise timing and navigation as well as 
maintenance of multiple goals like tagging and managing mines as well as monitoring bonus 
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resource availability.  The game is, in essence, a computer-based cognitive task training 
environment and it has been employed in several experiments (e.g. Boot et al., 2010; Blumen et 
al., 2010; Erickson et al., 2010; Fabiani et al., 1989; Frederickson & White, 1989; Gopher et al., 
1989, 1994; Kramer et al., 1995; Vo et al., 2011; Voss et al., 2012).  In this study, participants 
were assigned to one of three training conditions (a full emphasis training group, a hybrid 
variable-priority training group, or a no training control group1).  The published findings of Lee et 
al. (2012) describe a null effect of training condition for cognitive task performance and, 
therefore, in these analyses the data for the 75 participants were collapsed across condition to 
provide a larger sample size. 
During the Space Fortress training phase, participants also completed test sessions 
before, during, and after the 15 training sessions.  These cognitive test sessions included two 2-
hour sessions on participants’ second and third visits to the lab, two additional sessions after 10 
hours of training, and a final two cognitive test sessions after 30 hours of Space Fortress 
training.  The sessions included test-trials of the Space Fortress game as well as a battery of 
visual attention cognitive measures, including an Attention Blink Task, a Change Detection 
Task, the Dot Comparison Task, a Flanker Task, a Manual Sequence Task, an N-back Memory 
Task, and a Sternberg Memory Task, and several additional complex task performance 
measures2.  Data from these visual attention tasks are described here and explored in Chapter 
Five3. 
The remainder of this appendix summarizes the cognitive-attention tasks employed by 
Lee et al. (2012) in the order completed by participants.  Each task summary includes an 
explanation of how data were aggregated and analyzed to address the questions raised in 
Chapter Five.  For each task, I report accuracy (or sensitivity as measured by d-prime for tasks 
with target absent trials) and response times and the typical primary outcome variable.  Then, I 
discuss intraindividual variability measures (calculated as standard deviations) and change in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 During training, participants were either encouraged to maximize their overall score in the game, or were 
told to focus on maximizing performance on particular sub-scores.  The no training control group only 
played Space Fortress during the three blocks of test sessions.   2!Additional measures of complex performance on tasks like probability learning, a flight simulation, radar 
monitoring, and joystick control were collected but not considered in this series of analyses.  The study 
also included a pre and post test on subsets of Raven’s Advanced Matrices.  In these analyses, we 
initially attempted to include Raven’s task data, however with only two observations of overall accuracy (in 
session one and session three) there is not really within session variability to assess.   Further analyses 
of variability and stability could consider performance during these additional tasks.!
3 For the most part, complete original data was available for these calculations for all subjects with the 
exception of one subject who was missing session two data for most tasks. 
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performance across sessions. 
C.3.1 Flanker Task 
During each of the three sessions, participants completed a Flanker Task (e.g. Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1974) with 20 practice blocks and 100 test trials.  Half of the trials were congruent trials 
(either <<<<< or >>>>>) and the remaining trials were incongruent (either <<><< or >><>>).  
Participants were to report the direction of the central arrow as quickly as possible using a 
direction congruent response with the keyboard (z key or / key).  Response time and accuracy 
were recorded.   
Participants were typically accurate at reporting the direction of both the congruent and 
incongruent targets across sessions (congruent M = 99%, SD = 2.3%; incongruent M = 92.3%, 
SD = 10.3%).  Average response time to the stimulus was around 450 msec across participants 
and trials (congruent M = 432 msec, SD = 53 msec; incongruent M = 481.3 msec, SD = 51.6 
msec).  See Figures C.1 and C.2 for summaries of accuracy and response times across 
sessions.  For the flanker task, an outcome measure of interest is often the response time 
difference between compatible and incompatible flanker trials (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Eriksen 
& Schultz, 1979).  The relative time difference between responses to compatible and 
incompatible flankers for each individual was comparable in this study to previous work (M = 
54.3 msec, SD = 18.8) and was correlated across sessions, average r(71) = .55, SD =.09. 
Across sessions, intraindividual variation in accuracy was limited due to near ceiling 
performance. For example, the standard deviation in accuracy across the various stimulus types 
within a session was low (M = 4.4%, SD = 3.0%).  The standard deviation of response times for 
correct trials of the flanker task were calculated for each stimulus type and then averaged within 
session.  Across sessions, the average standard deviation in response time was 61 msec (SD = 
33 msec). See Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 for summaries of intraindividual variability within 
sessions of the flanker task.   
Across sessions, accuracy at identifying the direction of the central arrow remained at 
near ceiling performance levels (M = 95%, SD = 4.9%).  However, participants became slightly 
faster to respond to the probe (response time averages by session are listed in Figure C.1).  
There was no evidence of change in the response time difference between incongruent and 
congruent trials across sessions (MS1 = 54.1 msec, SDS1 = 25.2 msec; MS2 = 56.9 msec, SD S2 = 
21.5 msec; MS3 = 51.7 msec, SDS3 = 20.8 msec). 
C.3.2 Manual Sequence Task 
A variation of a Manual Sequence Task (e.g. Nissen & Bullemer, 1987) required 
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participants to respond as quickly as possible with the location of a star that appeared in one of 
four rectangles, corresponding spatially to the four response keys (v,b,n,m).  In each session, 
participants first practiced responding to the locations with the key press.  Participants then 
completed 20 repetitions of one particular randomly generated 10-location series (with the 
constraint that no immediately repeating locations occurred in the series).  If participants 
responded with a wrong key press, the response was coded as an error but the stimulus 
remained until participants made the correct key press.  
Participants were accurate at responding with the correct key to match the prompt (M = 
96.7%, SD = 2.8%) and fast to respond both overall (M = 374.0 msec, SD = 57.2 msec) and on 
accurate trials only (M = 363.9 msec, SD = 58.6 msec).  Summaries of response times for 
accurate trials and overall accuracy by session are listed in Figures C.1 and C.2.  In the original 
task parameters, the primary outcome measure of interest was improvement in response times 
for correctly pressed response keys within repetitions of the 10-location series (Nissen & 
Bullemer, 1987).  In this study, observers became faster at executing the series of key presses 
within a session.  The typical difference between average item response times during the final 5 
repetitions of the sequence was 65.8 msec faster than after the average item response time 
during the first 5 repetitions of the sequence (SD = 47.1).   
With near perfect response accuracy, the standard deviation in accuracy across 
repetitions of the series was low (M = 5.3%, SD = 2.9%).  The standard deviation of response 
times was calculated for correct responses within each block, i.e. within each repetition of the 
series (M = 74.5 msec, SD = 20.6 msec).   See Figures 6.1 and 6.2 for summaries of 
intraindividual variability within sessions of the manual sequence task.   
Across sessions of the manual sequence task, observers became slightly faster to 
respond to the location prompts (MS1 = 396.7 msec, SDS1 = 69.8 msec; MS2 = 371.4 msec, SDS2 
= 58.6 msec; MS3 = 354.3 msec, SDS3 = 68.3 msec).  
C.3.3 Dot Comparison Task 
The cognitive battery included a Dot Comparison Task (e.g. Salthouse & Babcock, 1991) 
during which participants reported whether two square arrays of 24 filled or open circles were 
the same or different.  Participants first completed 10 practice trials and then three test blocks of 
36 trials.  During each of the three sessions, the same 10 practice trials and then the same 108 
stimuli pairs of dot arrays were presented in the same order to all participants.   Across the 
trials, half of the dot array pairs were matched and half were different from one another. 
Across sessions, participants were accurate at identifying whether the arrays matched or 
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not as indicated by high hit rates for accurately reporting a difference (HR = 85.1%, SD = 8.2%) 
and low false alarm rates for misclassifying identical arrays as different (FAR = 4.9%, SD = 
2.6%).  In a signal detection context, this accurate performance translated into good sensitivity 
to the differences as measured by d-prime (M = 3.0, SD = .7) and into a slight bias to report no 
difference across sessions (M = .3, SD = .2).  Typical time to respond was around two seconds 
(M = 1,856 msec, SD = 870 msec) and response times for accurate responses were 
comparable (M = 1,842.8 msec, SD = 428.8 msec).  In Salthouse & Babcock (1991), dot 
comparison performance was reported as raw accuracy (number of hits + number of correct 
rejections).  Such a primary outcome measure is redundant with sensitivity as was already 
reported in Figure C.2.   
To calculate an estimate of intraindividual variability in accuracy, the standard deviation 
of accuracy across the three blocks was calculated within trial type (e.g. same or different 
stimuli) and then averaged across session (M = 5.4%, SD = 1.8%).  The standard deviation of 
response times was calculated for correct responses within blocks and conditions and then 
averaged across the session (M = 591.8 msec, SD = 198.7 msec).   See Figures 6.1 and 6.2 for 
summaries of intraindividual variability within sessions of the task.   
Across sessions, participants did not become more sensitive to the matching arrays (MS1 
= 2.9, SDS1 = .8; MS2 = 3.1, SDS2 = 1.0; MS3 = 3.0, SDS3 = 1.0).  Participants were slightly faster 
to discriminate pairs of arrays for each consecutive session (MS1 = 1,945 msec, SDS1 = 471, MS2  
= 1,869 msec, SDS2 = 438; MS3 = 1,752 msec, SDS3 = 460).  
C.3.4 Attentional Blink Task  
In each test session, participants completed several trials of an Attentional Blink Task 
(Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992).  In this task, participants were asked to monitor a set of 
black uppercase letters that were presented serially on the screen in the same location (as an 
rsvp stream) for two targets (a white lowercase letter and a black X). Participants practiced 
monitoring for each target individually first, completing 20 practice trials detecting the identity of 
the first white letter target (either s, g, or b) and 20 practice trials reporting whether the second 
target (the X) had appeared in a series. After the 40 practice trials, participants completed three 
blocks of 48 test trials (144 total test trials) with varying lags between the white letter and the X 
(when it appeared).  On test trials, participants responded with the identity of the white lower 
case target letter and then pressed a key to indicate that an X was presented in the remaining 
rsvp stream.   50% of the trials had no second target and on the remaining trials the second 
target was equally likely to occur at a lag of 2, 4, 6, or 8 letters. 
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Across trials and sessions, participants were accurate at reporting the identity of the first 
target (M = 95.3%, SD = 5.1%) and sensitive to the presence of the second target across all 
lags as estimated by d-prime (M = 1.3, SD = .4).  As is typical, participants were least likely to 
detect the second target when it lagged only two positions behind the first target (M = 46.1%, 
SD = 24.1%) relative to the longer lags (M = 69.5%, SD = 17.5%).  Calculated sensitivity for 
these “lag two” trials was lower (M = .77, SD = .68) than overall sensitivity and participants were 
somewhat biased to not report a lag 2 target (M = .54, SD = .44).  Correct response times to the 
first target identification question were compiled within session (see Figure C.1) and averaged 
989.4 msec (SD = 282.0) across sessions. 
The standard deviation in accuracy was calculated for all but lag 2 trials and was higher 
than for some of the other tasks included in this study (M = 11.0%, SD = 5.2%).  The standard 
deviation of response times was calculated for correct responses (M = 441.3 msec, SD = 352.9 
msec).   See Figures 6.1 and 6.2 for summaries of intraindividual variability within sessions of 
the task.   
Intraindividual variability in reporting the second target was calculated within trials and 
across sessions.  Any overall reduction in the attentional blink across sessions for each 
participant was calculated as a performance improvement in lag 2 sensitivity across sessions, 
although there was little evidence of change (M increase = .12, SD = .35). 
C.3.5 N-back Memory 
During each session, participants completed an N-back Memory Task (e.g. Jaeggi, 
Seewer, Nirkko, Eckstein, Schroth, Groner & Gutbrod, 2003).  Participants began with a practice 
trial in which a series of thirteen letters were presented serially in a central location on the 
screen.  As each letter appeared, participants were to respond with the “z” key if the letter was 
the same as the previous letter or with the “/” key if the letter was different.  After the practice 
block that included feedback, participants completed 5 additional blocks of this 1-back memory 
task, each including a series of 20 letters.  Then, participants completed a 2-back version of the 
task by reporting whether the current letter matched the letter that appeared two positions back 
in the series.  Again, after a practice block with feedback, participants completed 5 blocks of the 
2-back memory task with 20 letters.  Response time and accuracy were recorded. 
Participants were able to accurately discriminate the repeated letters from the non-
repeated letters for both n-back tasks.  For the 1-back task, participants were very sensitive to 
the repeated letters (M = 4.1, SD = 1.1).  For the 2-back task, participants were also sensitive to 
the targets (M = 3.3, SD = 1.2), although some participants’ performances were more influenced 
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by the 2-back task than others (ave decrease in sensitivity = .8, SD = 1.0).   Across the trials, 
participants were biased to report the target was not a repeat (M = .28, SD = .19).  Average 
response times across trials were calculated on accurate trials (M = 700.6 msec, SD = 121.3 
msec).  An outcome measure of interest in the context of the n-back task is often the cost in 
response times and accuracy for the 2-back task relative to the 1-back task.  In this dataset, the 
average cost in response times was around 181.2 msec (SD = 92.0 msec). 
The standard deviation in accuracy was calculated across the average accuracy of each 
block within the 1-back and 2-back trial types and then averaged within each session (M = 
6.9%, SD = 3.1%).  The standard deviation of response times was calculated for correct 
responses within each block within condition, i.e. within 5 blocks of 1-back and 5 blocks of 2-
back trials for each session (M = 309.7 msec, SD = 67.3 msec).  See Figures 6.1 and 6.2 for 
summaries of intraindividual variability within sessions of the n-back task.   
Performance improvements in sensitivity were calculated as well, although the 
improvement was not large (M = .1, SD = .6).  Across sessions participants became slightly 
faster to respond within condition (M = 27.9 msec, SD = 50.66). 
C.3.6 Change Detection Task 
In each of the three sessions, participants completed 1 practice trial and then 25 test 
trials of a Flicker Change Detection Task (e.g. McCarley, Vias, Pringle, Kramer, Irwin, & Strayer, 
2004; Rensink et al., 1997).   In each session, 23 out of the 25 trials contained changes to street 
scene images (e.g. the stimuli are pairs of identical scene photographs with a single photo-
edited discrepancy between them), leaving the remaining two trials as no change catch trials.  
Each version of the scene appeared serially on the screen for 240 milliseconds followed by an 
80 millisecond blank.  The two scene versions then continued to alternate at the same rate until 
the trial timed-out after 30 seconds.  If participants found a change before the trial timeout, they 
were to press the “c” key.  Upon responding that there was a change, participants identified the 
change location by clicking on one of the scene stimuli.  Accuracy at detecting the change, 
response time to find the change, and the click location identifying the change were collected4. 
The resulting hit rates (HR = 84.9%, SD = 8.7%) and false alarm rates (FAR = 18.2%, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 There were some irregularities with data collection, primarily in selecting the list. Seven participants are 
missing data for 1/3 of the image pairs b/c they were given one list twice.  Two others given two 
exposures to the same list (in addition to the other lists).  All repeated exposures to the scene changes 
were deleted from the dataset.  Also missing data from S1 for one participant, reason unknown.  One 
participant in S2 did not report noticing any changes (never pressed the c key so no response time 
recorded.) 
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SD = 25.6%) indicate that participants tended to be sensitive to the presence of the change (M = 
1.6, SD = .4) and biased to report a change across participants (M = -.4, SD = .4)5.  In addition 
to the change/no change judgment, participants made a click response to indicate the change 
location.  These click locations were later coded as either correct or incorrect given the change 
location in each stimulus pair.  Across stimuli, participants noticed 83.7% of the image changes 
(SD = 19.3%) and observers tended to correctly locate the changes if they reported noticing a 
change (M = 90.2%, SD = 11.1%)6.  Response times ranged from 232 milliseconds to 30709 
msec.  Average response time for accurately identifying a change was around 8 seconds or 
about 12 full cycles of the blanks and image pairs (M = 6624.7 msec, SD = 1000.4 msec)7.  To 
calculate a composite change detection estimate, standardized response times were subtracted 
from standardized accuracy (M = -.02, SD = .85). 
The standard deviation in accuracy was high relative to other tasks (M = 29.8%, SD = 
10.8 %).  The standard deviation of response times was calculated for correct responses (M = 
5975.5 msec, SD = 1116.0 msec).   See Figures 6.1 and 6.2 for summaries of intraindividual 
variability within sessions of the task.   
Performance improvement was calculated as improvement in the composite score 
across all sessions (M = -.05, SD = .41).   
C.3.7 Sternberg Memory Task 
In each session, participants also completed 16 practice trials of a Sternberg Memory 
Task (e.g. Sternberg, 1966) followed by 96 test trials presented in four blocks of 24 trials.  The 
memory set for each trial was a sequence of 3 or 5 letters, presented each for 1200 msec 
followed by a 500 msec blank.  After the letter series and a 1500 msec delay, participants were 
presented with a probe and prompted to respond as to whether that item had been present in 
the memory set.  For half of the test trials, the probe item was from the memory list and for the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 A bias to report a change is somewhat unusual for intentional change detection tasks (a bias to report 
no change is typical) but reflects the high false alarm rate with an average of just over 13 of the 75 
participants reporting a change on no-change trials.  Since the task parameters included a time-out if a 
change had not been found and a high proportion of target present trials, it is possible participants were 
more likely to set a liberal criterion for a change so that they could then consider the click response 
screen to make a guess at the change location.  The error location clicks support this possibility, as 
incorrect click responses were not uncommon, nor were they randomly distributed but tended to cluster 
on top of plausible scene changes given the stimulus set.   
6 The majority of participants correctly identified the change when they report having found it.  For about 
10% of participants (N = 8), accuracy at localizing the change given that the observer reported seeing it 
was under 80% (M = 59.1%, SD = 21.7%). 
7 Time to respond that there was a change was slower for trials where participants did not later click on 
the correct change location (M = 17.5 sec, SD = 6.6 sec). 
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other half it was an item from a randomly selected foil list.  On average, 37.5% of the test trials 
had three items and 62.5% of trials had a set size of five.  Accuracy at responding to the 
memory probe and response time to the probe were recorded. 
Overall response time varied by set size (set size 3: M = 942 msec, SD = 289 msec; set 
size 5: M = 1075 msec, SD = 297 msec).  See Figure C.1 for average response times on 
accurate trial by session.  Accuracy was high and errors were low as reflected in high sensitivity 
for both set sizes (set size 3: M = 4.18, SD = .97; set size 5: M = 3.21, SD = .83).  In the original 
instantiation of the Sternberg task, the outcome measure of interest was response time per item; 
calculating the difference in response times between set size 5 and 3 provides a corollary to 
such an estimate, session one: M = 127.7 msec, SD = 107.0; session two: M = 92.6, SD = 
115.8; session three: M = 89.7, SD = 126.1. 
To calculate average response times and deviations in response time, observer data 
was averaged across 16 groups of trials in each a session (by averaging within each set size, 
within target absent or present trials, and within the 4 blocks of trials).  The average standard 
deviation of response times within block within condition for both target present and absent was 
calculated for correct responses (M = 309.5 msec, SD = 95.4 msec).   Intraindividual variability 
in probe sensitivity across set-sizes was also calculated within set size and probe type within a 
block.  The standard deviation in accuracy was low overall (M = 8.5%, SD = 3.8%). See Figures 
6.1 and 6.2 for summaries of intraindividual variability within sessions of the task.   
Improvements in sensitivity to the memory probe were calculated, although there was 
little evidence of change in sensitivity (M = -.1, SD = 1.0) and little change in response time (M = 
4.5 msec slower, SD = 122.1 msec).   
 
C.4 Outcome Variables Summary  
A central goal in assessing inter-individual differences in performance is to characterize 
stability in inter-individual performance across tasks and sessions and measures.  To report 
inter-individual performance stabilities across tasks and measures, cross-task and cross-
measure correlations are provided in Table C.1.  Although the pattern of relationships across 
variables is complex, there is evidence both of commonality between measures of performance 
on different tasks as well as patterns of consistent differences between individuals within tasks.  
Across the dataset, measures of individual performance within a task tended to correlate 
with one another, although sometimes in different directions.  For example, in the Dot 
Comparison task, sensitivity to the change as measured by d prime is correlated with an 
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individual’s relative response times, r(73) =  .48, where slower participants have a higher 
sensitivity.  Similarly, accuracy at repeating the Manual Sequence responses was positively 
correlated to response time, r(73) = .34.  In other words, in these tasks longer response times 
were correlated to more accurate responses.  However, in other tasks, the correlation between 
response time and accuracy or sensitivity was negative.  For example, under some task 
parameters, longer search times correlate to poorer sensitivity.  For example, higher N-back 
sensitivity was correlated to shorter search times relative to peers, r(73) = -.47 and, in the 
Sternberg Memory task, shorter average response times were correlated with higher sensitivity 
across participants, r(73) = -.22.   
Although there may be systematic relationships between measures of the same task, 
there is also evidence that similar outcome measures correlate across tasks.  In Table C.1, the 
correlations between primary outcome measures on conceptually related and similarly 
calculated measures tend to be correlated.  For example, sensitivity to forced choice responses 
tend to be correlated across tasks as well as correlated with overall accuracy on tasks that do 
not include possible false alarm trials.  Similarly, there is a strong tendency for response times 
relative to peers to be correlated across tasks.  For example, response speeds across tasks all 
covary (ave r = around .3). 
 !!
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C.5 Figures 
!
Average Response Times Across Sessions 
 
 
 
Figure C.1. Average Response Times within and across Sessions.  For each task and session, average 
response times are listed with the standard deviations of each response time measure.  Correlations of 
response times across the three sessions are listed for each measure as well as the average correlation 
of each estimate for each session. 
 
 
 
Average Accuracy Across Sessions 
 
 
Figure C.2. Average Accuracy within and across Session.  For each task and session, average accuracy 
or sensitivity is listed with the standard deviations of each accuracy measure.  Correlations of accuracy 
across the three sessions are listed for each measure as well as the average correlation of each estimate 
for each session. 
 
  
Task Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 r (SD)
Flanker Task 481.0 (56.3) 458.1 (50.4) 438.7 (37.6) .70 (.08)
Manual Sequence Task 387.2 (70.1) 361.7 (60.3) 343.3 (70.1) .66 (.05)
Dot Comparison Task 1935.8 (468.9) 1854.4 (433.1) 1742.9 (448.3) .86 (.02)
N-back Task 698.0 (121.0) 766.4 (145.5) 642.6 (127.8) .74 (.07)
Attention Blink 1076.7 (255.2) 1008.9 (364.9) 887.3 (351.1) .63 (.16)
Change Detection Task 6627.8 (1562.0) 6580.0 (1421.9) 6429.0 (1437.5) .09 (.11)
Sternberg Task 1008.1(270.8) 1016.5 (268.0) 1020.1 (270.9) .65 (.08)
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